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There was a muddy centre before we breathed. 
There was a myth before the myth began, 
Venerable and articulate and complete. 
 
From this the poem springs: that we live in a place 
That is not our own and, much more, not ourselves 
And hard it is in spite of blazoned days. 
 
   —from Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction 
       Wallace Stevens 1942 
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Criticisms of design education suggest that educational practices have failed to 
produce competent designers and, concurrently, failed to allow for participation in culture 
(Norberg-Schulz 1965, Rudofsky 1987, Ponce de Leon 2010, Norman 2011).  These 
criticisms manifest themselves in questions of design methodology and in issues of race, 
class, and gender equity in both educational and professional practices; however, they 
have not engaged design education from the standpoint of educational philosophy.  This 
dissertation begins a philosophical inquiry of those criticisms of design education by 
critically constructing a history and philosophy of design and design education.  This 
construction suggests that design is, at a very basic level, analogous to the processes and 
practices associated with making (Frampton 1996, Sennett 2008).  Resultantly, this work 
explores three ways of making—artistry, workmanship, and craftsmanship (Risatti 
2007)—whose beliefs and practices are beneficial in understanding how educators might 
think about and teach design. 
This exploration of ways of making engages the work of educational philosophers 
as a means of coming to terms with criticisms of design education.  Building from Jane 
Roland Martin’s project of cultural bookkeeping (Martin 2011), this dissertation theorizes 
a taking account of ways of making that can influence how we understand design.  Taking 
account allows for the identification of assets and liabilities that impact design education 
and, once identified, can be fostered or eliminated in educational practice.  Taking 
account requires a methodological strategy that can identify those assets and liabilities 
associated with education in design.  As practices in education both shape and are shaped 
by culture (Martin 2011), this work engages critical theories that have been applied to 
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other cultural practices.  This dissertation has adapted, associated, and applied approaches 
by feminist scholars (Warren 1990, Korsmeyer 2004, Harding 1993, hooks 2015, 
Lugones 1987, Laird 2014, Code 1991).  It has engaged the writings of African-American 
educators (Du Bois 2014, Washington 1986) and critical race theory (Anderson 1988) 
when exploring the educational practices that characterize African-American education 
in the South.  The perceived liabilities of vocational education emerge from an 
exploration of the works of educational theorists (Dewey 1966 and 1997, Coffey 1992, 
Hager and Hyland 2002, Lewis 1991). 
In re-conceptualizing Vitruvius’ de Architectura as a treatise concerning the 
educational value of craftsmanship, this dissertation theorizes that his call for utility, 
durability, and beauty is a statement of the necessity of the designer—the architectus—
to make judgements.  This ability to make judgements—judgements that require the 
knowledge of epistêmê and the “know-how” of technê (Aristotle 1999 and 2004, Plato 
1991 and 2002)—is the most essential skill of the designer if she is to attain the height of 
her profession; if she is to produce useful physical artifacts that assist in mediating human 
relationships with and in the world.  Further, making judgements can be applied to other 
educational practices that require creative and critical outcomes (Churchman 1967, Schön 
1983, Waks 2001)—it can be applied to practices in both design and general education.  
The ability to make judgments and the ability to recognize and accept that knowledge is 
not limited to the epistemic is a result of an education in craftsmanship.  The educational 
value of craftsmanship is an educational theory that should provoke conversations among 
a variety of educational agents and, resultantly, lead to new areas of exploration in design 




Expectations and Design Education 
As an undergraduate, like most students, I wanted to learn those things that would 
help me succeed in my chosen profession.  For me, that meant that I wanted to learn to 
become an architect and, more broadly construed, a designer.  Of course, at that time, I 
was not really sure what that meant.  I do not recall having any specific expectations, just 
a belief that my teachers would know what I needed to learn and that we would, together, 
work toward my goal.  I found my way to Auburn University’s School of Architecture 
after very brief stints in engineering and visual arts.  I did not know what becoming an 
architect might mean to me; at the time, what I was learning in my design classes seemed 
similar to the things I had learned in my two- and three-dimensional art classes.  As an 
architecture student, I found that the things that I had learned in my art classes were 
applicable to my education as a designer; however, architectural education moved beyond 
the ordering principles of balance, harmony, and rhythm and beyond issues of scale and 
proportion that I had learned as an art student.  Architectural education included 
conceptual issues—it engaged design from the perspectives of psychology, sociology, 
cognition, and philosophy—issues that may have been present but not articulated in my 
art classes.  Questions of design were more than questions of aesthetics and the 
arrangements of form and space; they were questions of how humans understood and 
lived in an experiential world.  At Auburn, the curriculum was driven by these questions 
of how humans encounter the world.  Resultantly, the central problem of architecture—
and, by extension, design—was one of human dwelling.  This question of dwelling, in 
one form or another, I hold to be the central question of all forms of design—a question 
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of creating physical artifacts that assist humans (and non-human animals) in mediating 
our relationships with and in the world.  As an undergrad—and prevailing over the 
personal beliefs about design held by any one of my professors—a concern for human 
dwelling was at the forefront of my education.  Design, at least for me, was a process of 
inquiry into what it meant to inhabit the world and how to make that habitation both 
meaningful and appropriate.  For me, design was—and remains—a process of exploration 
and discovery. 
 Since I have become a design educator—at least in the formal sense of teaching 
as a profession—I have found that students come to my classes with different 
expectations of what it might mean to study design.  Perhaps they are more practical than 
I was.  Perhaps their expectations are a result of social, political, educational, and 
economic forces; forces that have become increasingly complex since my time as an 
undergrad.  Regardless of the reasons, most of my students appear to come to school with 
different expectations of what a design education might be and of how that education 
should be conveyed.  I currently teach Architecture, Interior Design, and Industrial 
Design undergraduates and all, overwhelmingly, begin their educations with similar 
expectations; expectations that have led me to question both how and what I need to teach 
in order to have them succeed in their professions. 
 The expectations of my students are difficult to articulate.  They come to school 
with expectations that, at least to me, seem antithetical to design.  For the most part, I 
would suggest that my current students do not have the expectation of a curriculum based 
in exploration and discovery.  Rather, they expect a more formulaic pathway that leads 
to them being designers.  They expect that there will be design problems, but they also 
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expect that there will be singular and correct answers to those problems.  Exploring 
precedents, finding analogous relationships in the solutions to similar problems, 
creatively exploring possibilities, and—perhaps most importantly—learning through 
experiments that might result in failure all seem a waste of time to them.  I very often 
hear statements like, “Tell me what to do and I will do it” or, in defense of their work, 
“That’s what my professor told me to do.” 
Seemingly, for my students, their expectation of learning design is no different 
than their expectation of learning math, or science, or history.1  In these classes, they 
expect to attend lectures, learn facts, be tested and, resultantly, be qualified in their 
knowledge.  Apparently, my students have become accustomed to proceduralist forms of 
education and, therefore, their conceptions of knowledge require the absolutism 
associated with binary certainty—they require a universal set of truths and falsities that 
exist without question.  As a result of their habituation to an acceptance of proceduralist 
practices, they are not prepared for the levels of uncertainty that come with design 
education.  They are certainly not prepared to attain, or hold as valid, knowledge that 
comes through acts of making and doing; forms of knowledge that are central to education 
in design.  It is this observation, coupled with another, that has led me to this work; that 
has created a foundation for my present inquiry. 
 
Diversity and Design Education 
 The second observation that has led me to questions concerning design education 
was an observation concerning social equity.  As an undergrad, I was not aware that there 
                                                 
1 At least in the way that these subjects are presented to them prior to their experiences in college—as 
subjects with definitive answers that are not subject to interpretation. 
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were race, class, and gender biases in education.  This was more than likely a result of 
my unexamined privilege—at the time I was not aware of privilege or of the results of 
that privileging.  Diversity was not an issue that was articulated at Auburn in the late 
1980s even though the vast majority of my classmates were middle-class white males.  
Likewise, in my professional career as an architect, diversity was not an issue that 
demanded significant reflection.  The profession echoed my educational experiences—
most architects were middle-class white males.  In my career as a design educator, issues 
of diversity and inclusion have come to be significant concerns in design education, in 
design practice, and in our Western cultural practices in general. 
Most of my professional career as a design educator has been spent in state 
universities; in institutions whose student bodies should mirror the race and gender 
diversity in the populations from which those students are drawn.  Generally, this is the 
case—there appears to be appropriate race and gender representation in my undergraduate 
classes.  This representation, however, does not seem to have affected the race and gender 
disparity in the professions.  According to the Missing 32% Project, 42 percent of 
architecture graduates are female; however, the number of licensed female architects is 
only between 15 and 18 percent (Dickenson 2014).  While there is no reliable data 
correlating education and employment for minority architecture students, only two 
percent of practicing architects identify as African-American (Oguntoyinbo 2013).2  
These studies, and others exploring the same disparities, suggest that “women and people 
                                                 
2 The terms African-American and Black are used almost interchangeably in this work; however, they are 
not generally interchangeable.  I have, in most instances, chosen to use the term employed by those I have 
cited; i.e., if an author uses the term Black, I, in response, use that term.  In contemporary practice, Black 
refers to people of African descent through the African diaspora.  African-American refers specifically to 
Black people from the United States whose ancestry is tied to practices of enslavement. 
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of color continue to lag behind white men in terms of concrete measures of career 
success” (EQxD 2016).  Further, studies of this kind begin to offer “insights into ways in 
which individual practitioners, employers, and the industry as a whole can make changes 
on a policy and culture level that promote satisfying careers” (EQxD 2016). 
This disparity between education and employment has become significant to the 
profession; multiple studies and initiatives have been launched in efforts to mitigate both 
race and gender inequalities.  These efforts, as promoted by the professions, have also 
begun to impact educational practices.  They have resulted in the inclusion of non-
Western traditions in existing classes and in the creation of new classes exclusively 
devoted to diversity issues.  While these inclusions have begun to address issues at the 
surface of the problem of social equity, they have not begun to impact the deep structure 
of educational practice.  These issues of race and gender equity are issues that design 
educators, for the most part, see as social problems rather than as problems related to 
teaching and learning.  In other words, most design educators do not see issues of race 
and gender disparity as issues specifically related to pedagogical practices or to curricular 
content. 
 It was these realizations—that students’ expectations of design do not cohere to 
educational practices in design and that social equity is not generally considered a 
problem of pedagogical practice or curricular content—that led me to my questions of 
how and what it means to teach design.  These realizations led me to begin to think of 
them as problems that should be addressed through educational philosophy; that 
educational theory might allow design educators to begin to address these issues in more 
significant ways.  In an effort to address these issues, this dissertation is an attempt to 
6 
begin to articulate a response both to student expectations and to the disparities of race 
and gender that have become significant liabilities to education in design.  It was these 
issues that led me to pursue this work; to explore what I mean when I think about, talk 
about, and participate in, the education of future designers.  I began this exploration by 
engaging criticisms of design education and by questioning what it means to be a 
designer.  In attempting to address these criticisms and answer these questions I hope that 
I can begin to disrupt student expectations, engage a more inclusive way of teaching, and 
provide my students with the education necessary for each of them to become capable 
and competent designers. 
 
Crisis in Design Education 
For the past several generations, design education3 has been in a continual state 
of crisis; a crisis consisting of a highly self-conscious questioning of academic identity 
and of unresolved self-criticisms regarding pedagogical practices and curricular content.  
This educational crisis concerning the teaching, content, and identity of design education 
has been most readily evidenced in the critical writings of both social and design theorists.  
As early as the eighteenth century, political philosopher Adam Smith, in An Inquiry into 
the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, suggested that the complex issues of a 
division of labor inherent in the mechanization and industrialization of production 
provided the context in which design became detached from manufacture—in which 
design, in a contemporary sense, became a profession for which a particular sort of 
                                                 
3 I suggest that “design education” in this context includes the fields of architecture, interior design, 
landscape architecture, industrial/product design, and many, if not most, of the engineering fields—
essentially, educational realms that cohere to the professional practices that tend to solve difficult 
problems associated with humankind’s physical interactions with the world. 
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education became necessary (Smith, 1904).   Smith further described the emerging role 
of designers when he suggests that there are those “who are called philosophers, or men 
[sic] of speculation, whose trade is not to do any thing, but to observe everything, and 
who, upon account, are often capable of combining together the powers of the most 
distinct and dissimilar objects” (Lees-Maffei and Houze 2010, 32).  For Smith, these 
people of speculation were those who acted both to conceive of the physical artifacts that 
are used by humans in their daily activities and to innovate practices associated with the 
manufacturing of those artifacts—what we might think of as the first professional 
designers. 
With the ever-increasing frequency of industrial manufacturing in the nineteenth 
century, an era that many consider as fully necessitating the contemporary disciplines of 
design, William Morris, John Ruskin, A.W.N. Pugin and others decried the newly 
prevalent system of machine production as antithetical to the knowledge realms 
associated with the education of those practicing traditional methods of manufacture.  
Collectively, these thinkers expressed a fear that non-critical acts of machine 
production—and the assignment of productive innovation to people of speculation—
would supplant the traditional knowledge generated by individual makers practicing their 
particular trades.4  These very early criticisms—criticisms that arose with the birth of the 
design professions—can be characterized as concerns about a fundamental shift in 
knowledge generation, acquisition, and transmission that occurred as design emerged as 
a distinct discipline during the transition from individual acts of making to industrial 
                                                 
4 See Morris’ The Ideal Book, Ruskin’s The Stones of Venice, and Pugin’s True Principles of Pointed or 
Christian Architecture for a more in-depth critique of industrialization.  Also, see The Design History 
Reader, The Craft Reader, and Twentieth-Century Design, (among others) for a more contemporary 
discussion of the educational losses associated with machine-production. 
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forms of manufacture.  Since the industrial marginalization of individual making, and the 
concurrent emergence of design as a profession, critical questions in and about 
knowledge, pedagogical practices and curricular content in design have maintained a 
constant presence among those theorists struggling to make sense of what design is and 
how design shapes and expresses our human relationships with and in the world. 
In 1965, architectural theorist Christian Norberg-Schulz suggested that the 
shortcomings of architecture—the shortcomings of the designed environment—
“necessarily implies that the training of architects is unsatisfactory.  The schools have 
shown themselves incapable of bringing forth architects able to solve the actual tasks”5 
(Norberg-Schulz 1965, 219).  In this case, those tasks were the tasks of integration and 
analysis; tasks that might provide the experience necessary for designers to fulfil their 
professional and cultural roles.  Norberg-Schulz—further elaborating the 
phenomenological critiques of Hegel and Heidegger—was primarily concerned with the 
dissociation of human experience from the artifacts of our daily lives.6  Designer and 
social historian Bernard Rudofsky, also in 1965, called into question the canonical nature 
of the design professions—particularly architecture—when he presented the exhibition 
Architecture without Architects at the Museum of Modern Art in New York City.  
Rudofsky’s work, this exhibition and a subsequent text, visually expressed a 
dissatisfaction with the persistence of design history and practice in marginalizing the 
vernacular—in dismissing those design artifacts that did not emerge from imperialist and 
                                                 
5 There appears to be much more theoretical writing from architects (about architecture) than from other 
fields that might be thought of as making up the discipline of design.  This is, perhaps, because 
contemporary architects have been troubled by the privileging of ornamentation as fashion—aesthetics—
over use value and spatial experience.  Other design fields seem to suffer less from this privilege as the 
artifacts that they produce tend to place more preference on use value—on utility. 
6 See particularly his Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture (1979). 
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consumerist cultures but, rather, from the daily necessities of lived experience.  Both 
Norberg-Schulz and Rudofsky appear to be critical of the design professions—and the 
education of those designers—in that they are concerned that design has moved away 
from the necessity of human experience to an arbitrary and self-referential reliance upon 
itself in order to address matters of taste rather than matters of use.  This shift from utility 
to the arbitrariness of taste implies a reliance upon a repressive system of canonical works 
and educational practices that do not appear to address an essential role of design—a role 
associated with practices in physical and useful innovation that I will explore further. 
As recently as 2010, Monica Ponce de Leon—currently Dean of Princeton’s 
School of Architecture—echoed these social and educational critiques when she noted 
that design education “has become associated with elite societies and, as a result, has 
remained outside of recent dramatic cultural shifts” (Ponce de Leon 2010).  In remaining 
outside culture, Ponce de Leon’s critique suggests that design has failed to recognize 
changes in the beliefs and attitudes that define cultural practices and, more importantly, 
has failed to engage in the construction and maintenance of culture in relation to those 
changes.7  This failure to engage in cultural concerns has been most evident in how design 
education has been ineffective in addressing issues of equality and diversity—of race, 
class, and gender—that have had a profound affect upon how, for whom, and by whom 
design is practiced.  Ponce de Leon further suggests that design education has established 
and maintained a model of pedagogy that “has already shown its limits, its weaknesses, 
                                                 
7 When I suggest that design education has failed to engage in the construction and maintenance of 
culture, I use the term maintenance in the sense of the continued refinements necessary to maintain a 
thing in working order—something like maintaining the performative value of the thing.  I do not mean 
for the term maintenance to be misinterpreted as attempting to adhere strictly to traditional beliefs and 
assumptions that might stagnate cultural progress.  
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and its flaws” (Ponce de Leon, 2010).  At about the same time, design theorist and 
educator Don Norman suggested that design curricula were still reliant upon outdated 
methods and, resultantly, that “design education is mired in the past” (Norman 2011).   
Both Ponce de Leon and Norman appear to imply that design education has been limited 
by its unquestioned reliance upon Euro-centric traditions of knowing, as codified by 
canonical works and knowledge, and that the resultant pedagogical practices have 
become stagnant.  Pedagogical practices in design, and the curricular content that 
influences those practices, have become removed from, and are not responsive to, the 
contemporary cultures in which they exist.  An uncritical reliance upon a canonized past 
has not allowed for design to fulfill its role in relation to the complex problems associated 
with contemporary lived experience or in relation to cultural production.  It appears that 
these stagnant pedagogical practices and a neglect of curricular content have been 
antithetical to educational concepts that could allow for a critical assessment of both 
physical needs and the roll of design in the construction and maintenance of culture.  
Resultantly, these stagnant pedagogies and their neglected curricula have ensured that 
design education has been unable to evolve in order to meet the ever-changing needs of 
people in relation to their physical and cultural environments. 
In addition to its crisis of pedagogical practices and curricular content, design—
as an educational practice—has had difficulty in defining itself in relation to the more 
widely acknowledged academic fields of education in the sciences and education in the 
humanities.  This binary pair of educational fields, established by chemist, novelist, and 
educational philosopher C.P. Snow in his 1959 Rede Lecture entitled The Two Cultures, 
has become the accepted model for most contemporary educational discourse (Snow 
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2012).  In establishing the binary opposition of education in the sciences and education 
in the humanities, Snow established a relationship that places educational practices in 
concert with other binary oppositions.  Such oppositional constructs are products of what 
feminist environmental philosopher Karen Warren calls an oppressive conceptual 
framework; a framework that implies a logic of domination (Warren 1990).  Among other 
binary oppositions, education in the sciences can be thought of as aligned with objectivist 
thought; education in the sciences is perceived of as objective, as concerning indisputable 
matters of fact.  As the oppositional binary (Collins 2000), education in the humanities 
becomes aligned with subjectivity; it is thought of as concerning matters of opinion and 
beliefs that are subject to change.8  As this binary opposition has become an accepted part 
of educational culture, the opportunity for other ways of knowing has been eliminated 
from most conversations about educational practices.  Snow’s two cultures have come to 
define the perceptual canon of knowledge and, as such, the canon of educational practice.   
As design is not generally perceived of as either a science or as a subject associated with 
the humanities—although its curriculum includes both—design education has had trouble 
in locating its position within educational practice; within institutional hierarchies that 
actively support the two culture binary.9  Further, education in design is generally 
regarded as a professional field—an educational environment of training for the 
professions without an expectation of knowledge generation that is typically associated 
with the more academic pursuits of the sciences or the humanities.  In some ways, this 
                                                 
8 See Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2012) for a more complete explication of 
the objective/subjective binary and how it effects common perceptions of the objective veracity of 
scientific knowledge and of educational practices in the sciences. 
9 While design is not generally perceived of as a science or a subject associated with the humanities, its 
curriculum includes courses in both the sciences and the humanities.  This inclusion of sciences and 
humanities has been present at least since the time of Vitruvius and will be described in more detail when 
I discuss Vitruvius’ explanation of the education of an architect in Chapter Four. 
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professional status tends to marginalize education in design as vocational; as an academic 
field having no knowledge value and no bearing on cultural practices. 
While design practices do require, and generate, knowledge that is associated both 
with the sciences and with the humanities, the professional status of design education 
generally excludes it from any conversations regarding STEM (Science, Technology, 
Engineering, Math) education—those fields of education that we might broadly 
categorize as existing within the sciences.  Further, design education is generally 
excluded from conversations regarding issues of individual identity, of culture, and of 
conversations concerning race, class, and gender equality that arise in the humanities.  
This professional existence outside the established binary culture of the academy, which 
certainly exacerbates the crisis of academic identity, may also act to intensify any 
criticism of pedagogical practices and curricular content—criticisms of both knowledge 
content and the individual identities of the students and practitioners of design-related 
professions—without providing a basis for resolving those criticisms.  While this broader 
crisis of the academic identity of design education may not be able to be solved in any 
reliable manner, its impact upon pedagogy and curriculum will be addressed within my 
contention that it is the lack of a historical and philosophical framework for education 
that is the underlying cause of concern for social and design theorists when they are 
critical of design education.  Theorizing a historical and philosophical framework for 
education in design may provide an understanding of the central beliefs and assumptions 
that ground and influence both curricular content and pedagogical practices in design; 
beliefs and assumptions that may be at the root of contemporary criticisms of design 
education.  Such a theory provides access to what educational philosopher Jane Roland 
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Martin calls the deep structure of educational thought; “the culture’s very general and 
fundamental habits of thought” that influence how we engage in educational practices; in 
this case, how we think about and teach design (Martin 2011, 27).  I hold that it is these 
fundamental habits of thought, our deeply held and often unquestioned beliefs and 
assumptions, that act as a foundation for the deep structure of educational thought in 
design.  These beliefs and assumptions exist at the core of criticisms suggesting that 
design education is failing to succeed in educating future designers or in contributing to 
cultural creation and maintenance. 
 
Reconceptualizing the Crisis 
The crisis of design education—these interrelated critiques of academic identity 
and of pedagogical practices and curricular content—appears to indicate that educational 
practices in design are failing to meet the challenge of producing capable designers and 
also failing to allow the disciplines of design to participate in the creation and 
maintenance of culture.  While this crisis is predominantly seen as a failure of education, 
most of the criticisms leveled against design education have had more to do with design 
methodologies and very little to do with educational practices.  Design methodologies, in 
this sense, are those theoretical and stylistic decisions that affect the formal attributes of 
design artifacts; i.e., classicism, modernism, minimalism, or any of the other -isms that 
are represented through physical manifestations.  Norberg-Schulz supports this 
methodological bias when he suggests that the reason for the failure of design education 
“has been the lack of an integrated theory of architecture which defines and co-ordinates 
the problems” (Norberg-Schulz 1965, 224).  Design theorists have concerned themselves 
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with criticisms of design methodologies and attempts both to modify and to unify those 
methodologies in response to perceived problems; however, they have not thought about 
their criticisms as identifying educational problems.  Design theorists have discussed 
what design might mean to them and how their particular understandings of design should 
be implemented in educational practice, but they have failed to consider how educational 
thought might impact educational practices in design—how an exploration of the deep 
structure of educational thought in design might change how we think about and teach 
design.  This is the true crisis of pedagogical practices in design—a not knowing who we 
are in regard to the deep structure of educational thought and how educational practices 
might respond to that knowledge.  It appears necessary to establish an educational 
framework—a framework that is historical and philosophical—that might ground 
pedagogical and curricular decisions regarding education in design.  There will always 
be different theoretical positions—different methodologies of design—from which 
design is taught, however, these positions should be secondary to an educational 
framework upon which they can be constructed and evaluated.  It is this educational 
framework that might ensure that design education produces capable designers who can 
respond to needs that define our physical relationships with and in the world and ensure 
that the practice of design returns to its role as an active agent in the creation and 
maintenance of culture. 
Design theorists have thoroughly criticized design education as not meeting the 
challenge of producing capable designers, and of failing to engage culture, but they have 
been unable to consider their criticisms as problems of educational theory; they have been 
unable to move beyond criticisms of design methodology and address problems from an 
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educational standpoint. In criticizing methodologies of design, they have failed to 
consider Martin’s question of how education is or is not furthering the assets and limiting 
the liabilities of our cultural practices (Martin 2011); or, in a more specific sense, how 
education can further the assets and limit the liabilities of the educational and professional 
cultures of design.  It is to these shortcomings of design pedagogy—a preponderance of 
criticism of design methodologies and an unawareness of educational thought—to which 
one must necessarily respond if there are to be useful, practical, and meaningful 
educational experiences; experiences that both produce capable designers and further 
Martin’s goal of education achieving its primary end; “to form the best individuals and 
cultures it can” (Martin 2011, 204).  Re-conceptualizing the crisis of design education as 
a problem of educational thought, rather than as a crisis of the shortcomings of any 
particular theory of design, may suggest solutions to those perceived problems—
problems of pedagogical practices and curricular content and issues of academic 
identity—that provoke criticisms of design education.  In order to evaluate education in 
design as an educational problem, it is necessary to engage the deep structure that grounds 
educational practices in design.  Because education in design is a relative newcomer to 
the field of education, it is necessary to establish and engage a historical and philosophical 
structure for design education that might allow for interpretation, for interrogation, and 
for criticism.  Because education in design has not been engaged from an educational 
standpoint, there is a need to establish a means of uncovering and evaluating those beliefs 
and assumptions that inhabit the deep structure of education in design and that 
subsequently influence how we think about and teach design.  This search for a history 
and philosophy of design that might act as a framework for educational practices in design 
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has mirrored my own personal search for understanding my identity as a designer and as 
a design educator.  In extrapolating from my personal questioning of what it means to be 
a designer and what it means to be a design educator, perhaps, a means of thinking about 
and talking about an educational philosophy of design can be explored. 
 
A Maker of Everythings 
In 2007, I was pursuing a Master of Fine Arts in Furniture Design at the Savannah 
College of Art and Design (SCAD) in an effort to prepare myself to further my career as 
a designer and as a design educator.  I was also employed by SCAD as the Furniture Shop 
Manager, a position that required me to assist undergraduate students in realizing their 
designs—in educating those students as makers.  I was spending about sixteen hours per 
day either working, or drawing, or making; living my life as a designer and as a design 
educator.  This level of engagement with my work, while professionally fulfilling, gave 
me very little time for the normal pursuits of a husband and father.  One of the things that 
I missed due to my academic and design obligations was the first grade Parent/Teacher 
Conference for my then six-year-old daughter, Rebecca.  It was an encounter there, later 
relayed to me by my wife, which really codified the questions that I was encountering as 
I thought about what it might mean to be a designer and a design educator; of how I might 
be able to think about myself as a designer and a design educator and what that might 
mean to my students and, relatedly, to the broader field of education in design. 
Rebecca was a new first grader at a new school, the Jacob G. Smith Latin 
Academy—a Latin magnet school for Savannah that just happened to be our locally zoned 
elementary school.  As a magnet school, the student body of Jacob G. Smith was made 
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up of children from families that spanned all tiers of Savannah society; a society stratified 
by racial and socioeconomic boundaries.  As happens in many social settings, people 
were trying to place themselves, and others, within some sort of framework regarding 
social status.  One woman asked Rebecca what her father did.  Becca dutifully answered, 
“He makes things.”  Not really satisfied, or, perhaps just curious, the woman asked what 
kind of things.  Becca, rolling her eyes at the silly questions asked by adults, answered 
“Everythings.”  To my six-year-old daughter I was a maker of everythings.  Not 
satisfied—perhaps because “a maker of everythings” made little sense to her—this 
woman turned to my wife who settled the question with “My husband is at SCAD.”  This 
seemed to have worked; it wrapped up the conversation and the woman drifted off to her 
next conversation. 
While I found the retelling of the encounter entertaining, I also realized that the 
content of that conversation paralleled the content of the questions about design and 
design education that I was having at the time.  Becca’s response that I was “a maker of 
everythings” actually made some sense to me.  At the time, I was engaged in designing 
and fabricating products as diverse as bar tools, clocks, tables, seating environments, 
aircraft interiors, and digital laboratories.  However, in light of the continued questioning 
of the woman at Becca’s school, it was clear to me that being “a maker of everythings” 
was not quite the right answer.  I was a maker; and I was confident that, within reason, I 
could make almost anything.  But, what was a maker?  What did it mean for others to 
think of me as a maker?  How did thinking of myself as a maker answer questions about 
what it might mean to be a designer?  At the time, it seemed to me that a maker—if 
defined in a generalist sense—was someone who worked with their hands to make things.  
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In a more refined way, a maker might be thought of as one who creates physical artifacts 
that assist human (and non-human) beings in negotiating their relationships with and in 
the world.  In light of these definitions, “a maker of everythings” might simply be thought 
of as a worker; a tradesperson who participates in practices of production, of fabrication, 
of manufacture.  This, however, was not the type of maker I was.  In knowing that I was 
not the type of maker associated with manufacturing—with the work that workers do—I 
began to think about other makers that I might be; of other ways that being a maker might 
be defined. 
My wife’s addendum to the conversation, her statement “My husband is at 
SCAD,” provided additional territory for me to explore in order to determine what sort 
of maker I might actually be—of how I might define myself as a maker in order to 
understand myself as a designer and a design educator.  SCAD is known as an institution 
that produces both artists and designers; its institutional reputation as an art school is well 
known and well received in Savannah.  This reputation, however, positions those 
associated with SCAD as fundamentally different from those who have chosen more 
traditional career paths—SCAD does not intentionally produce doctors or lawyers or 
mechanics or carpenters.  The woman’s acceptance of my being at SCAD was enough 
for her—she had placed me in a category that was different than most career professionals 
and different from those employments associated with work in the trades.  Seemingly, 
however, she had no interest in determining what sort of “maker of everythings” that I 
was beyond her knowing that I was not a tradesperson and that I was not a traditional 
professional.  This distinction was not enough for me in my search for how I might 
understand myself as a designer. 
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Being associated with SCAD—and SCAD being a school of art and design—I 
seemed to have two additional descriptors available to me of what a maker might be.  I 
could possibly identify either as an artist or as a designer.  In some sense this was helpful, 
I could think about what it meant to be a maker in the ways that artists work and, 
additionally, what it might mean to be a maker in the ways that designers work.  In a very 
obvious sense, a maker that identifies as an artist is one who practices artistry; one who 
creates physical artifacts or actions that we call art.  Likewise, a maker that identifies as 
a designer can be seen as one who practices design; one who creates physical artifacts 
that we think of as having been designed.  These simple definitions, while clearly 
differentiating between artistry and design, did very little in helping me determine how I 
might perceive of my work as a designer and of my desire to teach others who wanted to 
be designers.  Like my earlier definition of the practices associated with manufacture, 
these simple definitions of the practices of artistry and design did not seem to explain 
how I thought about what I did.  Activities that we can categorize as the practices of artists 
and workers appeared easy enough to understand as negations of what I was; I did not 
see the work that I was doing as that of an artist or as that of a worker.  The only identity 
of maker that appeared to remain to me was the sort of maker that produces physical 
artifacts through a process of design.  I had come to the conclusion that designers were 




The Relationship of Making to Design 
As a designer, I did make things.  I conceived of and produced prototypes; 
eventually, many of those prototypes led to my constructing finished objects.  These 
finished objects are what I am thinking about as design artifacts—objects of my making 
that solved practical problems; that solved design problems that I posed in response to 
perceived physical needs in relation to lived experience in the world.  Design problems, 
in this sense, were problems that required physical solutions to address the needs of 
humans (and non-human animals) as we negotiate our physical relationships with and in 
the world; solutions that allow for responses to the stimuli provided by our physical 
environments.  I spent untold hours in the shop creating my own prototypes and their 
resultant design artifacts and helping others make the things that they had conceived—
the physical solutions to their perceived problems.  This simple revelation—being a 
maker that identifies as a designer—helped me begin to understand myself; it helped me 
begin to define who I was when I said that I was a designer and it allowed me to begin to 
clarify how I might think about design education.  Still, this understanding of myself as a 
maker associated with the practices of design rather than as an artist or as a worker did 
not quite provide an understanding of how I might conceive of this designation in relation 
to design education and in relation to criticisms of education in design. 
Even in beginning to define myself as “a maker of everythings”—as a designer—
other closely related issues that might affect both my self-definition and how I thought 
about design education arose out of my continued reflections upon Becca’s encounter.  
The first of these tangential issues arose from the woman’s asking Becca what her father 
did.  This question seemed to imply that there was some privileged position given to my 
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occupation; that my being male privileged my occupation over that of my wife.  Was my 
employment—as a man—in some way more important than the employment of my wife 
who was a part of this encounter?  Further, was a male “maker of everythings” in some 
way the norm?  Certainly, looking at the contemporary history of design, it is obvious 
that the majority of celebrated designers have been male—the canons of various design 
disciplines are overwhelmingly focused upon the accomplishments of men.10  This 
relationship between professional practice and gender led me to question whether gender 
played a role in how I identified myself as a designer or in how others identified designers.  
More importantly, this realization led me to conclude that gender bias has, often 
unnoticed and unquestioned, impacted educational practices in design. 
The second issue raised by Becca’s encounter was originally a bit more difficult 
for me to conceptualize.  Both my wife and daughter are Asian.  Did the questioning 
woman assume that I was Asian as well?  If so, did my perceived Asian identity in some 
way qualify my occupation as a maker?  Would being Asian—and thus outside traditional 
Western canons—make me somehow less of a designer in this woman’s eyes?11  As I am 
not Asian—I identify as white—how might my racial identity situate me as a designer, 
and more importantly, what effect might this have on me as a design educator?  How 
                                                 
10 In many cases, those in positions of power—predominantly white men—took credit for the works of 
others; of women, of minorities, of the enslaved, of the oppressed.  This taking of credit silenced the 
voices of others and further contributed to the positions of privilege inhabited by those men and 
contributed to homogenizing the canons of knowledge associated with their work. 
11 Or, perhaps a more capable designer?  The Western acceptance of, and infatuation with, design 
originating in Asia could have a significant impact upon how designers of Asian descent are viewed.  
Japanese design—from all eras—has been considered some of the best in the world.  Japanese design 
concepts like wabi sabi have found a place in mainstream design education and in the popular design 
press.  Likewise, mimicry of Chinese design found a foothold in the explosion of Chinoiserie during the 
Eighteenth Century.  While this remains more a decorative style, a matter of taste, it still allows the 
possibility of one thinking that Asian designers are equally or more capable than their Western 
counterparts.  Of course, using words like Western and Asian in an attempt at defining various traditions 
is antithetical to educational practices that attempt to eliminate privilege. 
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might my culturally diverse students of both sexes think of designers, and of themselves 
as designers, when the vast majority of their role models were like me?  Like the gender 
hierarchy presented above, it appears that an obvious racial hierarchy also exists both in 
design education and in the design professions as well. 
There also appears to be a class hierarchy that is implied and reinforced by the 
race and gender hierarchies.  Traditionally, those white males who have made up the 
ranks of designers have been from the upper and (more recently) the middle classes.  
These questions of race, class, and gender—questions of privilege—have become 
important issues for me as I define myself as both a designer and, more particularly, as a 
design educator.  Issues of race, class, and gender privilege appear to have an effect upon 
the type of maker one might become.12  Further, these questions of privilege begin to call 
into question the history of design—they begin to interrogate the privilege of the canon 
of design; the privilege of those design artifacts identified as canonical and the privilege 
associated with the designers who produced them.  Seemingly, defining myself as a 
designer was becoming more complicated and, further, was not yet providing me with the 
answers that I was seeking. 
 
Design as Craftsmanship 
Ultimately, this understanding of myself as “a maker of everythings” only began 
to allow me some very loose understanding of what it meant to be a designer and how 
that understanding might affect me as a design educator.  I still did not have a deep 
understanding of what a designer was; of what being a maker that identified as a designer 
                                                 
12 The categories that I have chosen to differentiate types of makers—workers, artists, and designers—all 
appear to imply racial, class, and/or gender biases. 
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might mean.  Just as Smith’s comment about the profession of design emerging with the 
rise of industrialization implied that education in design was a newcomer to the academy, 
it turns out that the terms design and designer are also of relatively contemporary origin.  
Art theorist Howard Risatti suggests that these terms originated in the early Industrial 
Revolution; they arose because of a need to differentiate between those objects that were 
handmade and those that resulted from machine production.  “Before industrial 
production took over, the idea of ‘design’ as it had come out of Italy [il designo] was not 
understood as an endeavor abstracted from the practical realization of objects by separate 
individuals working with their hands but as a feature integral to their making” (Risatti 
2007, 155 – 156).  Prior to industrialization there was no distinction between maker and 
designer.  In its contemporary understanding, the term designer implies someone who 
conceives of objects, spaces, and/or places—design artifacts—that act to solve complex 
and pragmatic problems; physical artifacts that mediate and improve our human (and non-
human) relationships with and in the world.  In other words, a designer conceives of 
things that make our lives easier, or more efficient, or less stressful, or any other number 
ways of saying that products of design allow for an improved quality of life.13  There is 
no real sense of making within this contemporary conception of a designer as one who 
conceives, although, in reality, most designers normally are makers.  In trying to find a 
more fitting term for what it is that I thought that I was doing—envisioning and making 
things—I began to think about where the contemporary professions that we associate with 
design might have come from; I began to think about and imaginatively construct a 
                                                 
13 An improved life might be thought of as one where basic needs are satisfied.  As such, human (and 
non-human) beings are allowed time for contemplation, for recreation, for relaxation.  One might even 
argue that this allows for the enhancement of our cultural practices.  An improved life is one where we 
are allowed indulgences after basic survival is assured. 
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history that might assist in understanding what it meant when I called myself a maker 
who practiced design.  It seems reasonable to think that even though design is a 
contemporary term that there have been people since the beginning of human history who 
conceived of and produced artifacts in an attempt to make life better—people who worked 
to renegotiate and redefine our physical encounters with the world. 
In trying to identify early designers—those people who worked to create artifacts 
that shaped and expressed our physical encounters with the world—the term craftsman, 
as defined by sociologist and cultural critic Richard Sennett, began to allow for a more 
robust conception of the history of the practice of design.14  According to Sennett, a 
craftsperson is one who works with physical materials to modify them into useful objects 
that are a result of problem finding and problem solving related to needs that arise out of 
our lived experiences in the world.  In this sense, traditional objects of craft can be thought 
of as bowls, blankets, stools—physical artifacts that contain, that cover, and that support 
(Sennett 2008).  These artifacts that contain, cover, and support are representations of the 
design artifacts necessary to solve the problems that humans have encountered in 
responding to their physical environments.  For Sennett, the craftsperson is a maker that 
is involved in the practices of craftsmanship; in those practices that produce physical 
artifacts intended to mediate our physical relationships with and in the world.  As the 
craftsperson that Sennett is describing is a pre-industrial maker, it can be assumed that 
                                                 
14 The term craftsman, like the term craftsmanship, is highly problematic in its gender implications.  
While Sennett did identify these terms as problematic (see his work The Craftsman, p. 23), I think it is 
important in any critique of the underlying assumptions and beliefs about education in design to respond 
to and raise awareness of these problematic terms.  I will use the terms craftsperson and craftspeople 
when discussing the individuals whose practices are related to craftsmanship; however, I have not found a 
suitable gender-neutral term to replace the term craftsmanship.  This is possibly due to the generally 
accepted meaning of craftsmanship in its adjectival forms.  Other, gender-neutral, terms tend to 
marginalize the high level of skill and the reciprocal relationship associated with learning implied by the 
term craftsmanship. 
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this craftsperson was engaged in processes that might now be called design.  Further, 
Sennett goes on to say that craftsmanship gives name to the basic human impulse to do a 
job well for its own sake, and that craftsmanship in practice involves developing skills 
and knowledge that focus on the objective work of making in order to solve problems 
rather than on the subjective nature of ourselves.  In thinking about craftsmanship as a 
practice of engaging specific forms of skill and knowledge in order to solve problems, I 
suggest that the knowledge engaged by craftspeople is a sort of mitigated relativism, a 
relativism that occupies the spaces that exist between the problem, the physical material 
engaged in solving the problem, and the knowledge, skills, and beliefs employed by the 
craftsperson in addressing the problem at hand. 
In order to solve the complex and practical problems of physical engagements 
with and in the world, we can understand craftsmanship as a series of related practices 
that allow for a broader conception of knowledge than that available in binary systems—
binary systems implied in Sennett’s objective/subjective differentiation.  Craftsmanship 
can be thought of as both a practice and a way of generating forms of knowledge that 
challenge binary assumptions.  Further, in thinking about craftsmanship as an expression 
of making that depends upon a mitigated form of relativism to create physical artifacts 
that assist in mediating our physical relationships with the world, we can say that practices 
of craftsmanship just are the practices of technological innovation and that the physical 
artifacts created by craftspeople just are technological artifacts.  If we accept the premise 
that craftsmanship just is technological innovation, then perhaps we can understand 
design practices—in their efforts at improving quality of life—as practices originating in 
the technological innovation first practiced by craftspeople.  It is this idea of design 
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originating in craftsmanship as a practice of technological innovation that has the 
potential to alleviate the crisis of identity manifesting itself in contemporary criticisms of 
design education and to allow for conversations about privilege—canonical, gender, 
class, and race—in regard to making; in regard to the field of design.  This understanding 
of craftsmanship as originating in and embodying the role of technological innovation 
might provide value in theorizing an educational philosophy of design. 
 
The Deep Structure of Craftsmanship 
To begin any exploration into the idea of craftsmanship as an educational 
philosophy—as a means of teaching design in a way that addresses both the practical 
requirements of technological innovation (material/physical/environmental concerns) 
and cultural issues associated with privilege—it seems appropriate to investigate the 
conceptual origins of craftsmanship; to engage the deep structure that grounds our beliefs 
and assumptions in regard to craftsmanship.  This investigation is necessary in order to 
develop an understanding of what a term like craftsmanship implies for a philosophy of 
education in design and how design, as an educational concept, might find its place in 
relation to the established binary culture of educational practice.  An exploration of both 
the mythological and the historical origins of craftsmanship appears appropriate to any 
effort to begin a conversation about the role of craftsmanship in pedagogical practices 
and in the academic identity of education in design. Through a re-visioning of the Greek 
myths that involve Pandora, Prometheus, and Hephaestus, and through analysis of the 
historical writings of the Roman architect Vitruvius, I will theorize a more fully coherent 
association of design with craftsmanship and, further, with the technological innovation 
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that describes practices related to design.  This association will then suggest that design, 
as a practice, can be thought of as a technological (technê-logical) means of addressing 
and mediating the physical relationships that humans encounter with and in the world.  
As such, an examination of craftsmanship provides a substantive foundation from which 
to theorize an educational philosophy of design; a foundation that provides a historical 
and philosophical framework upon which educational practices in design can be 
constructed and evaluated. 
Further, this historical and philosophical framework can act to counter the 
hierarchal structure of privilege currently associated with design education and practice.  
Establishing a philosophy of education in design radically alters the critique—it replaces 
the pedagogical primacy of critiques associated with design methodology; of particular 
theories of design that might be thought of as subjective manifestations of taste.15  This 
move from a multiplicity of criticisms regarding methodological practices to an 
educational framework that depends upon a critical investigation of its history and 
philosophy allows for an educational philosophy that is robust in its acceptance and 
validation of a variety of forms of knowledge and, as such, responds to criticisms of race, 
class, and gender equality that plague design education and the design professions.   In 
this sense, the framework that I wish to explore creates an educational philosophy for 
education in design that responds to mythological, to historical, and to contemporary 
philosophical thought.  This proposed framework gives design educators a way of making 
                                                 
15 It should be made clear that design theories as pedagogical guidelines are none-the-less theories of 
teaching and learning.  They teach us a way to understand the world and to make use of that knowledge.  
Any particular design theory teaches us a particular way to view and solve problems and, thus, is a theory 
of learning.  Generally, we do not associate design methodologies as educational theories of learning but, 
rather, as theories of aesthetic expression.  As such, we do not allow that these methodologies might also 
educate non-designers in understanding how to relate to, or interact with, an environment or object. 
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judgments concerning our pedagogical practices and the content of design curricula.  
Additionally, it fulfills my goal of delineating an educational basis upon which design 
pedagogy—in any of its particular design methodologies—can be constructed and 
evaluated.  Concurrently, this educational philosophy acts to articulate the educational 
value of craftsmanship—it provides a means of discussing craftsmanship as an 
educational concept that might have benefit beyond design education. 
 
Taking Account: An Analysis of Making 
In attempting to reconceptualize criticisms of design education as regarding issues 
of educational structure rather than issues concerning methodologies of design, I 
suggested that it might be beneficial to theorize the deep structure of design; to theorize 
a historical and philosophical framework of design so that we might be able to understand 
what design is and how we might think about and teach design.  Reflecting upon my own 
struggle to understand myself as a designer and a design educator, I came to the 
conclusion that my identity as a designer was tied to my practices as a maker.  In 
determining what it might mean to be a maker, and how this might influence how I 
identified as a designer, I conceived of three ways of making that might help define my 
understanding of myself as a designer.  Ultimately, I came to the conclusion that as a 
maker, I might think about myself as an artist, as a worker, or as a craftsperson.  As a 
designer, I could be engaged in activities that arise out of our understandings of the ways 
of making associated with artistry, with workmanship, or with craftsmanship.16  Any of 
                                                 
16 Like the term craftsmanship, the term workmanship is problematic in its gender implications.  When 
talking about individuals, I have used the gender-neutral terms worker and workers.  However, like the 
term craftsmanship, I have not found an acceptable gender-neutral term to represent workmanship.  The 
subtleties and implications of the term workmanship seemingly cannot be replaced.  It also seems 
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these three ways of making might help me identify how I think about myself as a designer 
and, of more importance, how I might think about my role as a design educator; how I 
might engage educational practices in design. 
Since I hold that some form of making exists within the most fundamental core of 
practices associated with design, I argue that it is particularly important to understand the 
way that making is thought of in relation to design; how any particular form of making 
influences the deep structure that supports our beliefs and assumptions about design.  
While I constructed brief arguments for why I think that the making associated with 
craftsmanship is most appropriate to how I see myself as a designer, I think that it is 
necessary to more fully explore artistry, workmanship, and craftsmanship in order to 
assess the ability of each to provide positive contributions to a framework of professional 
practice and educational thought in regard to the broader concept of the education of 
designers.  In much the same way that Martin’s concept of cultural bookkeeping can be 
engaged in order to evaluate the assets and liabilities that are foundational to a culture’s 
beliefs about education, I will engage each of the three ways of making in order to identify 
and assess the particular assets and liabilities that they might bring to design practice and, 
additionally, to the deep structure of educational thought in design.  In the first sense, I 
will evaluate whether or not the particular assets and liabilities associated with each of 
the three ways of making actually contribute to the skills and aptitudes necessary to 
design.  I will be asking if an education in artistry gives students the skills and abilities 
needed by designers; if an education in workmanship gives students the skills and abilities 
needed by designers; and if an education in craftsmanship gives students the skills and 
                                                 
necessary to employ some gender-biased terms to illustrate the problems of gender subordination in 
relation to the professions associated with both workmanship and craftsmanship. 
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abilities needed by designers.  Fundamentally, I will be asking if any of these three ways 
of making is beneficial to the education of designers if design is thought of as the process 
of problem seeking and problem solving that creates physical artifacts that assist in 
mediating human (and non-human) relationships with and in the world.  Simultaneously, 
I will explore the beliefs and assumptions that formulate the deep structures of each of 
these ways of making.  I will take account of the assets and liabilities that shape how we 
understand each of these ways of making at a fundamental level. 
 
Taking Account: A Feminist Critique 
In taking account of the beliefs and assumptions that formulate the deep structure 
of each of the three ways of making, I will engage Martin’s theory of cultural 
bookkeeping as a means of determining the issues that influence our understanding, at a 
fundamental level, of these various ways of making.  Like Martin, I will assume that there 
are two dichotomies that are at the structural core of Western thought—the existence of 
a nature/culture divide and the existence of two separate spheres, the public and the 
private, that divide our concept of that culture (Martin 2011).  It is the nature/culture 
divide and the public/private spheres of culture that form the “rock bottom” dichotomies 
that “have long informed Western thought quite generally” (Martin 2011, 28). These 
dichotomies are what Martin suggests form the deep structure of Western thought; they 
are concepts which form our “fundamental beliefs about the social order” (Martin 2011, 
26).  This deep structure might also be defined by what feminist philosopher of 
epistemology Sandra Harding calls the “sexist and androcentric assumptions that are ‘the 
dominant beliefs of an age’—that is, that are collectively (versus only individually) held” 
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(Harding 1993, 52).  Further, the binary nature of the deep structure of Western thought 
is reinforced by feminist aesthetic philosopher Carolyn Korsmeyer’s concept of deep 
gender—oppositional concepts that manifest themselves in the gendered terms masculine 
and feminine (Korsmeyer 2004).  Black feminist scholar Patricia Hill Collins has 
theorized that binary oppositional thinking—where fundamentally different entities are 
related through their definition as opposites—provides “ideological justification for race, 
gender, and class oppression” (Collins 2000, 70).  The two rock bottom dichotomies 
populating the deep structure of Western thought are best understood as inhabiting binary 
conditions; as proposing conceptual identities that exist together as polar opposites.  
There exists a binary opposition between nature and culture.  There exists a binary 
opposition between the public sphere and the private.  These binary oppositions, by their 
very natures, form systems that are associated with oppression, with subjugation.  As 
Martin suggests, “the reasons differ according to the thinker but the motive is usually the 
same: ‘separate from’ signifies ‘superior to’” (Martin 2011, 29). 
In recognizing the deep structure of Western thought as grounded in the 
oppressive construction of binary oppositions, in accepting that one of the binary pair is 
superior to the other, we can once again return to Karen Warren’s theory of oppressive 
conceptual frameworks.  The theoretical constructs of Warren’s ecological feminism 
begin to unite all perceived forms of oppression; a critique of the patriarchal oppression 
of women by feminist theorists, a critique of the subjugating oppression that exists in the 
fundamental dichotomies of the deep structure of Western thought, and a critique of 
identity predicated upon Snow’s educational binary.  “Insofar as other systems of 
oppression (e.g., racism, classism, ageism, heterosexism) are also conceptually 
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maintained by a logic of domination, appeal to the logic of traditional feminism ultimately 
locates the basic conceptual interconnections among all systems of oppression in the logic 
of domination.  It thereby explains at a conceptual level why the eradication of sexist 
oppression requires the eradication of other forms of oppression” (Warren 1990, 132).  
This statement, the notion that there is an interconnectedness among all systems of 
oppression, can be seen, in conjunction with feminist philosopher Maria Lugones’ notion 
that “Unity—not to be confused with solidarity—is understood as conceptually tied to 
domination,” (Lugones 1987, 3) to conceptually implicate the essentializing character of 
any binary as a form of oppression that can be exposed and scrutinized through 
application of feminist theories.  Through the logic established by Warren, the binary 
oppositions that are at the core of the deep structure of Western thought can be considered 
part of a feminist critique.  If the fundamental dichotomies of nature/culture and 
public/private are scrutinized as oppressive systems then the language, the voice, 
established in feminist critique can be appropriated to bring awareness to and affect 
change in these beliefs and assumptions that underlie Western thought and that act to 
negatively influence how we think about and teach design. 
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Chapter One: An Accounting of Artistry 
 
Making: The Deep Structure of Design 
In attempting to understand criticisms of design education—criticisms of 
pedagogical practices and curricular content and of academic identity as proposed by 
Monica Ponce de Leon, Don Norman, Christian Norberg-Schultz, and Bernard 
Rudofsky—I have come to view these criticisms as something more than a means of 
questioning what is taught in design.  These critiques of design education can be 
reconceptualized as questions concerning the deep structure of beliefs and assumptions 
that constitute educational practices in design.  Seemingly, most criticisms of education 
in design have not been considered questions of educational philosophy but, rather, have 
been criticisms of design methodology.  When I am thinking about methodologies of 
design, I am referring to the many -isms associated with theories of design and the 
physical manifestations of those theories; classicism, modernism, structuralism, 
deconstructivism, and multiple others.  Most criticisms of design education have been 
relegated to questions of how and why we choose to accept and perpetuate particular 
methodologies of design and of how and why those methodologies are judged to be 
successes or failures.  While this questioning of, and subsequent responses to, 
methodologies are a result of changing beliefs—of changes in the dominant worldviews 
of the cultures in which they arise—it does little to address problems that might be 
thought of as educational.  Methodological inquiry, in this sense, is not equivalent to 
educational inquiry.  In order to respond to the weakly articulated, but substantially 
deeper, criticisms of design education that are educational in nature, we must turn to an 
inquiry of educational practices; an inquiry concerning the deep structure of education in 
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design from an educational standpoint.  To look at design education through the lens of 
educational philosophy requires that we begin to name, describe, and interrogate those 
practices that result in design education failing to produce capable designers and 
simultaneously failing to participate in the creation and maintenance of culture. 
In order to reconceptualize contemporary criticisms of education in design as 
problems of educational thought rather than problems of design methodology, I have 
proposed theorizing a history and philosophy of education in design.  The theorization of 
such a history and philosophy might allow for an interrogation of the beliefs and 
assumptions that exist at the “rock bottom” of how we talk about and teach design; beliefs 
and assumptions that form the deep structure of our thoughts concerning design and the 
education of designers.  As design is a relatively contemporary term, one whose history 
originates in the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution, I have suggested that one must 
turn to other, more long-lived practices, that might be thought of as the historical 
precursors of design practices.  These precursors of design might be thought of as those 
practices that extend the scope and history of design such that there is a deep structure to 
explore; a structure that parallels the longstanding need of humans to create physical 
artifacts that assist in mediating our relationships with and in the world.  As I hold that 
some form of making is necessary to any conception of the practices of design, and is, 
likewise, necessary in creating physical artifacts, I have proposed three distinct ways of 
making that might be explored as possible means of conceptually extending the more 
recent history and philosophy of education in design; three ways of making that are 
possible precursors to the practices that we now call design. 
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In considering my personal experiences regarding what it means to be “a maker 
of everythings,” I have concluded that there are three ways of making that might help me 
understand my role as a designer and as a design educator.  I might be the sort of maker 
that is involved in practices of artistry, in practices of workmanship, or in practices related 
to craftsmanship.  Each of these ways of making might provide insights that inform how 
I think of myself as a designer and how the artifacts that I produce can be thought of as 
designlike.  More importantly, taking account of these distinct ways of making provides 
me with a more encompassing conceptual arena for exploration—an arena that allows me 
to conceptualize educational practices in design that predate the Industrial Revolution—
as I attempt to articulate the deep structure that supports a history and philosophy of 
education in design.  In exploring different ways of making—in engaging these ways of 
making as educational—I can approach the deep structure of design; I can engage the 
core beliefs and assumptions that influence how we think about the practice of design and 
the education of designers. 
In engaging these possible precursors, practices that conceptually extend the deep 
structure that influences how we think about design, it is necessary to determine if these 
precursors embody practices that are perceived of as designlike; if the practices associated 
with any particular way of making are equivalent to and support those practices that 
constitute the role of design.  As I have defined design as that set of practices that produce 
physical artifacts that assist in mediating human (and non-human) relationships with and 
in the world, then any particular form of making that might extend the deep structure of 
thought about design must function to support this understanding of the role of design.  
First, it must be determined if any particular way of making produces artifacts that fulfill 
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the requirements of a functional critique associated with design practices.  A second 
determination as to whether any particular way of making might be beneficial in 
conceptualizing a more thorough history and philosophy of education in design involves 
a taking account of the beliefs and assumptions that form the deep structure of thought in 
regard to that way of making.  This taking account entails an exploration of the assets and 
liabilities inherent in any particular way of making.  Most importantly, such a taking 
account is necessary to expose those liabilities that might limit the ability of design 
education to produce capable designers and to participate in the creation and maintenance 
of culture.  The first of these determinations is a matter of whether or not a particular way 
of making fulfils the functional requirements of design to create physical artifacts that 
assist in mediating our human (and non-human) relationships with and in the world.  The 
second determination, whether or not a particular way of making perpetuates liabilities, 
requires an engagement with the deep structure of thought that underlies the beliefs and 
assumptions that we hold.  This taking account of the deep structure of education in 
design, of those practices that might be thought of as leading to successes and to failures, 
is an educational theory that is based upon and grows out of the cultural bookkeeping 
theorized by Jane Roland Martin. 
While I hold that making is necessary to any understanding of design practice, a 
general idea of making—of creating physical artifacts—is not particularly useful when 
attempting to identify the type of maker that I, as a designer, might be.  Further, a general 
idea of making does not engage possible ways of making that might be beneficial in 
extending the deep structure of thought in design education beyond its origins in 
industrialization.  The concept of making, alone, is too broad a category to assist in 
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establishing a means of identifying and evaluating how to further educational assets and 
limit educational liabilities that might allow or prevent design education from producing 
capable designers and participating in the creation and maintenance of culture.  In any of 
the three ways of making that I have described—artistry, workmanship, and 
craftsmanship—there is an association with a ‘know-how’ that manifests itself as the 
manual skill needed to create physical artifacts.  While the “know-how” of the practices 
of artistry, workmanship, and craftsmanship might differ, it is not the “know-how” in and 
of itself that might distinguish the value of these ways of making.  In order to understand 
the educational value of these different ways of making, it is necessary to explore each in 
relation to the physical artifacts that they produce and to the intentions that underlie those 
artifacts.  Additionally, it is helpful to engage each of them in an educational setting; to 
assess critically design curricula that are associated with making—the creation of 
physical artifacts—as it is applied to artistry, to workmanship, and to craftsmanship. 
Howard Risatti, in A Theory of Craft (2007), provides an argument for why 
contemporary craft just is art; an argument that collapses the existing distinction between 
those artifacts that are traditionally thought of as works of fine art and those that are 
traditionally thought of as the products of craftspeople.  The work of glass sculptor Dale 
Chihuly is an excellent example of this proposed collapse—his works blur the boundaries 
of the art/craft distinction as they exist as works of fine art but are produced from the craft 
tradition of glass blowing.  While Risatti’s arguments have some merit; especially in a 
contemporary environment where craft artifacts are not necessarily intended for practical 
uses; I am not interested in whether the contemporary artifacts that we call art and the 
contemporary artifacts that we call craft are different, but in what ways they—throughout 
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history—might establish the educational value of artistry, of workmanship, and of 
craftsmanship.  For the purpose of conceptually extending the deep structure of design, 
my interests lie in the educational value of understanding the intentions of particular 
practices rather than the artifacts produced.  As most artifacts are representational of the 
intentions of the maker, it is these intentions that must be understood in order to determine 
their educational value.  The intentions associated with any particular way of making 
might affect how we educate design practitioners and, additionally, this intentionality 
might apply, more broadly, to how we think about general education and cultural 
production.  As such, I will begin with an examination and conceptualization of the role 
of artistry as it might influence education in design.  I will engage how an education in 
artistry might be a possible way of making that precedes and informs education in design; 
a precedent that extends the historical origins of design and of design education.  After 
determining how the making associated with artistry might impact education in design, I 
will take account of how the deep structure of an education in artistry might maintain and 
perpetuate a logic of domination that is miseducational and, as such, limits the ability of 
education—education in artistry, education in design, and general education—from 
participation in the creation and continued maintenance of culture. 
 
The Role of Artistry: A Functional Critique 
In order to determine if practices associated with artistry might extend the 
conceptual origins of education in design it is necessary to determine if those practices 
might be of educational benefit to designers.  It is necessary to determine whether the 
practices associated with artistry provide the knowledge and skills of design practices; 
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whether they can be thought of as providing the intentionality necessary to design 
artifacts.  The knowledge and skills of design practices can be thought of as that 
knowledge and those skills that illustrate the intentionality necessary to design artifacts.  
In order to make such a determination, it is important to accomplish two tasks.  The first 
is to define what is meant when discussing the term artistry; the second is to identify 
instances of this in relation to design education.  When I discuss artistry, I am referring 
to practices associated with the production of artifacts that we call art.  Art, as I define it, 
consists of those artifacts that document and communicate the beliefs of the cultural and 
social communities within which they originate.  Artistry, in this way, is similar to 
educational philosopher John Dewey’s assertion that the production of art results in 
artifacts that are representational of human experience.  Artistry, then, just is “part of the 
significant life of an organized community” (Dewey 2005, 5).  As such, art is intended to 
reflect and communicate “the emotions and ideas that are associated with the chief 
institutions of social life” (Dewey 2005, 6).   In the sense that I am using the term, artistry 
applies to the work of individuals in the production of works that speak to the cultural 
beliefs, practices, and aspirations of that particular group. 
Artistry, like workmanship and craftsmanship, involves both knowledge and 
skills associated with manual competence in the creation of well-made things; it requires 
employing the “know-how” appropriate to the practice at hand.  It is here, however, that 
the similarities between artistry, workmanship, and craftsmanship end.  The production 
of art does not approach the level of pragmatism associated with the production of 
workmanship.  Artistry is not solely concerned with production—in some cases, it is not 
concerned with the skill of production at all.  Further, the practices associated with artistry 
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do not achieve, nor aspire to, those conditions necessary to craftsmanship—the creation 
of physical artifacts that are intended to functionally mediate our physical relationships 
with and in the world.  While artistry does, in many cases, produce physical artifacts, 
those artifacts serve different functions than artifacts associated with other ways of 
making. 
On the surface, the artifacts produced by artists are quite different than the artifacts 
produced by workers and the artifacts produced by craftspeople.  Generally, we hold the 
products of artistry—whether they be paintings, sculptures, music, writing, or any other 
number of expressions—to be somehow different from the practical, utilitarian artifacts 
that are the products of workmanship or of craftsmanship.  The artefactual products of 
artistry are generally held to have cultural value—to speak to us as cultural beings—while 
the artifacts produced by workers and craftspeople primarily possess use value.  While 
this differentiation is convenient in day-to-day use, it does not yet fully distinguish how 
artistry, workmanship, and craftsmanship differ in relation to my attempt to extend the 
conceptual structure of design education.  It is necessary to explore how education in 
artistry differentiates itself from educational practices in workmanship and craftsmanship 
and, thus, might possibly contribute to the fundamental knowledge and skills necessary 
to education in design. 
In a specific sense, I wish to differentiate artistry as a way of making that might 
impact education in design on a more theoretical level.  The work of artists—those 
engaged in artistry—is, in one noteworthy way, similar to the work of craftspeople and, 
in other equally significant ways, is strikingly different.  Artists, very much like 
craftspeople, act intentionally in the production of their work.  In The Human Condition, 
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Hannah Arendt distinguishes Homo faber—humans as makers—as distinct from Animal 
laborans—humans as beasts of burden—in that Animal laborans approaches work as an 
end in itself where Homo faber is engaged in work for the purpose of making something 
(Arendt 1958).  This intentionality separates both the artist and the craftsperson from the 
drudgery of workmanship; the worker acts without any intention other than producing 
artifacts—the production of the worker acts as an end in itself.  The artist and the 
craftsperson both act intentionally in their productivity—production becomes a reciprocal 
relationship whereby the artist or craftsperson negotiates with the act of production; 
making judgments—based in the processes of making—that affect the continuing act of 
production.  In this way, the production of the artist and the craftsperson rises above 
Arendt’s Animal laborans and expresses the intentionality of Homo faber.  The 
intentionality necessary to making judgments brings us much closer to the expression of 
the knowledge and skills needed by designers.  Intentionality appears to be at least one 
appropriate means of extending the conceptual history and philosophy of education in 
design. 
While intentionality is shared by both artists and craftspeople, it is their different 
applications of intentionality that further allow us to approach an understanding of the 
knowledge and skills necessary to the education of designers.  One of the two important 
ways that the intentionality of artistry differs from that of craftsmanship is in how it 
employs the concept of the judgment of utility.  Craftsmanship requires an intentionality 
of use, of function.  The artifacts produced by craftspeople are readily placed into the 
functional categories of containing, covering, or supporting (Sennett 2008).  These 
artifacts respond to the embodied needs of human beings—and non-human animals—as 
42 
we interact with the world where it is necessary that we contain, cover, or support in order 
that we both survive and thrive in response to actual physical conditions.  For artifacts 
produced within the realm of artistry, judgments of utility are something else altogether.  
Works produced by artists, in general, do not need to possess the utility of containing, 
covering, or supporting.17  The artifacts that count as the products of artistry are not 
primarily intended to have an immediate impact upon the physical conditions that exist 
in the world. 
The use intentions of artifacts associated with artistry are not in their physical 
utility, but in their ability to communicate ideas and concepts to the observer.  Such 
communication is abstract just as language is abstract—it names things without being the 
things themselves.  These named things—the ideas and concepts of abstraction—are the 
result of socially and culturally agreed upon standards and they are conveyed in the 
particular vocabulary of the particular social/cultural group in which they are produced.  
The utility of artifacts associated with artistry does not suggest immediate physical impact 
upon the world; rather, these artifacts act upon the social/cultural world of the particular 
groups that generate and understand their communications.  The use intentionality of 
artistry is dependent upon a particular social/cultural milieu for it to have meaning.  The 
implied meaning—the use—of these artifacts is subject to the interpretations of the 
human minds that constitute the social/cultural group to which the artifacts belong.  This 
suggests one possible reason that anthropologists can never truly know the intentions 
behind the sculptural and ceremonial artifacts of most long-dead cultures—particularly 
                                                 
17 Works of art, however, can fulfill these functions.  Here I am thinking of ceremonial objects—chalices, 
memorial quilts, honorary swords—that represent function but do not actually function in the mundane 
way that cups, quilts, and swords actually function.  
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those cultures with no written language.  Anthropologists, and people more generally; 
however, have very little trouble in understanding the use function of the tools and other 
utilitarian artifacts of those same cultures.  In making this differentiation, the use 
intentionality of artistry differs from that of craftsmanship in that it is necessarily 
subjective—it is subject to cultural beliefs and practices—while the use value of 
craftsmanship is specific to particular needs.18  In this sense, the use value of 
craftsmanship can be thought of—in some ways—as objective; the utility of craft artifacts 
is directly related to addressing physical problems that exist in the world. 
The second important way that the intentionality of artistry differs from that of 
craftsmanship is in how it employs the concept of the judgment of aesthetics.  In 
attempting to understand what it means to be a designer, to produce physical artifacts that 
assist in mediating relationships with and in the world, I would suggest that designers 
work according to both functional and aesthetic criteria.  As noted above, the judgments 
associated with utility—judgments that might be thought of as objective—fulfill the 
functional criteria of the work of a designer.  While artistry, very much like design, 
requires processes that allow the artist to create physical artifacts that might describe our 
social/cultural relationships with and in the world, it does not prioritize the judgment of 
utility.19  It is, rather, the aesthetic realm that is critical to the intentionality of artistry.  
Artists are primarily concerned with aesthetic judgments in regard to their work rather 
than the functional utility of the artifacts that they produce.  Philosopher Peter Angeles 
                                                 
18 While subjectivity can—and does—play a role in design, it should not be considered one of the 
problematic issues of design education.  I believe that the subjectivity present in design must be thought 
of as secondary to the use value of designed artifacts.  Later, I will suggest that this subjectivity is 
necessary in theorizing craftsmanship as a form of mitigated relativism that may be useful in 
reconceptualizing educational practices in both design and general education. 
19 While it does require judgments of utility in conveying its social/cultural meaning, its primary form of 
judgment concerns aesthetic value. 
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suggests that the primary function of the artifacts associated with artistry is “to produce 
an aesthetic experience of beauty without regard to what economic or practical use they 
may be put” (Risatti 2007, 72).  Aesthetic judgments, in disregarding the economic or 
practical use of the artifacts produced, generally place no significant emphasis on the 
material properties of those artifacts.20  In many cases—performance art, orchestral 
works, dance, impromptu speeches, etc.—there are no actual physical artifacts that 
remain in existence.  In contrast to this, design requires a reciprocal relationship with the 
physical properties of materials—materials either natural or man-made—in order to 
produce actual artifacts that must embody both aesthetic and functional criteria.  
Likewise, any complete framework for education in design must equally address both the 
aesthetic and functional criteria of physical artifacts that exist in the world.  As such, 
education in design must, necessarily, include pedagogical practices that address aesthetic 
judgments; some form of education in artistry appears pertinent to education in design. 
From the perspective of design thinkers, there is another possible way of 
characterizing those practices that distinguish the products of designers from the products 
of artists and from any other physical artifacts.  Urban planner and learning theorist 
Donald Schön, in theorizing ‘designlike’ practices, argues that design practices consist of 
problem solving in an experiential world (Schön 1983).  One central intention of the 
designer is to solve a problem that exists.  Artifacts that we call art may act to depict the 
existing (perceived) world, to define possible worlds, and/or to represent beliefs and 
customs regarding the social world, but they are generally not thought of as artifacts that 
                                                 
20 While artists may choose particular materials because of their ability to communicate particular ideas, 
because of their ease of use, or because of their physical durability, they do not, generally, choose 
materials based upon their performative characteristics in regard to usability; to the wear caused by use. 
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are created in order to solve physical problems.  In some ways, ‘designlike’ problem 
solving can be thought of as a pragmatic approach that generally distinguishes design 
artifacts from other artifacts.21  Further, Schön distinguishes design “know-how”—the 
ability to solve problems—as the central form of knowledge transmitted by design 
education.  Schön, as an educational theorist, prioritizes this ‘know-how” knowledge over 
the generally accepted two culture model of knowledge in the sciences and knowledge in 
the humanities.  In prioritizing the ability to solve problems as the primary task of 
education in design, it appears that an education based solely upon the intentionality of 
artistry is an insufficient methodology of educating designers.  However, in attempting 
to determine what form of making might conceptually extend a history and philosophy 
of education in design, it remains beneficial to explore an educational critique of the deep 
structure of thought associated with education in artistry. 
 
The Deep Structure of Artistry: An Educational Critique 
The second necessary step in determining the educational value of extending the 
history and philosophy of education in design through the educational practices 
associated with artistry is in taking account of the assets and liabilities that might be 
inherent in an education in artistry.  It is important to expose those practices and beliefs 
in the deep structure of education in artistry that might be miseducative; those practices 
that we would consider both educational and cultural liabilities to the practices of design.  
As established earlier, a feminist critique is useful in exposing and naming such liabilities 
                                                 
21 I suggest that the concept of problem solving is a necessary requirement of design artifacts.  It may also 
be a requirement of other artifacts; however, I do not hold that it is primarily or fully necessary to the 
existence of those artifacts that we do not categorize as design artifacts. 
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and, as such, in creating the possibility of conversations that might assist in eliminating 
those practices.  In Education Reconfigured: Culture, Encounter, and Change (2011), 
Martin proposes a process of cultural bookkeeping that is beneficial in determining the 
educational assets and educational liabilities that might be transmitted in any encounter 
between learners and any number of educational agents. For Martin, educational agents 
are not limited to formalized practices that we associate with schooling; she 
“acknowledges the brute fact of multiple educational agency by including in the 
educational realm all of a culture’s groups, institutions, organizations, social movements, 
and the like” (Martin 2011, 63).  As educational agents can take most any form, I will 
suggest that the three ways of making that I have associated with “a maker of everythings” 
can be considered educational agents and can be held accountable for the assets and 
liabilities that they pass on when they are associated with education in design.  This taking 
account of the assets and liabilities of ways of making that might conceptually extend the 
history and philosophy of education in design allows for an understanding of the 
educational value of any particular way of making as an educational agent and how it 
might be beneficial in creating a framework for educational practices in design.  Martin’s 
bookkeeping project aims to “identify the whole wide range of a given culture’s 
educational agents, the full extent of the assets and liabilities in each one’s portfolio,” 
and, as such, to address those assets and liabilities in an effort to improve educational 
practice. (Martin 2011, 110).  Such a valuation allows criticisms of design education to 
move beyond the surface of methodology and interrogate the deep structure of beliefs and 
assumptions that exist at the core of education in design.   
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For Martin, the list of educational agents, one comprised of school, home, family, 
and culture is vast; however, in exploring education in design I will not be looking to a 
multitude of individual agents.  I will only engage in taking account of the ways of making 
that might impact design education—theories of making associated with artistry, with 
workmanship, and with craftsmanship and how they might impact the deep structure of 
design; how they might structure how we think about and teach design.  I will adapt 
Martin’s theory of a deep structure of educational thought to an accounting of practices 
in artistry, in workmanship, and in craftsmanship as a means of illuminating the beliefs 
and assumptions that form the foundations of education in design.  Such a taking account 
is necessary in order to expose deeply held beliefs that can be thought of as liabilities that 
impact the education of designers and prohibit design education from participating in the 
creation and maintenance of culture. In exploring education in design at its “rock bottom,” 
it may be possible to begin conversations that assist in limiting liabilities and fostering 
assets that produce capable and competent designers that might, through their 
professional practices, become educational agents that continue to further cultural assets 
and eliminate cultural liabilities. 
Martin theorizes that there are two primary dichotomies that form the foundation 
of the deep structure of thought in Western culture; “a nature/culture split that 
encompasses mind/body dualism and a two-sphere analysis of society with its 
accompanying gender divide” (Martin 2011, 28).  I suggest that these dichotomies exist 
as part of what Karen Warren calls an oppressive cultural framework; a framework of 
binary pairs that limit our abilities to make choices.  In associating feminist critiques of 
patriarchal oppression with the binary dichotomies of Martin’s nature/culture split and 
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the gender divide of a public/private analysis of society there exists a conceptual link 
between the oppression associated with these dichotomies and the elimination of a broad 
range of possible choices as theorized by feminist scholars.  As feminist philosopher bell 
hooks has noted, all oppression is unacceptable in that “being oppressed means the 
absence of choices” (hooks 2015, 5).  Absence of choice is implied in such binary pairs; 
only two possibilities exist rather than the multiplicity of choices that might exist outside 
of oppressive binary frameworks.  Without the ability to make choices, it can be assumed 
that oppressive binary frameworks limit the intentionality of making associated with 
practices in design.  In Martin’s case, the oppressive cultural framework is one that is 
predicated upon dichotomies; systems that, like the gendered assumptions of patriarchy, 
imply the binary opposition of domination and subordination.  As domination and 
subordination are expressions of oppression; then oppression, as a concept, may be the 
means to relate a general feminist critique to an accounting of the beliefs and assumptions 
that exist at the “rock bottom” of education in design. 
 
The Patriarchal Assumption 
One possible means of taking account of the assets and liabilities associated with 
the deep structure of any particular way of making is through application of Carolyn 
Korsmeyer’s concept of deep gender.  Korsmeyer suggests that “gender can be the lens 
through which we discover basic aspects of philosophy itself at its very roots, as well as 
the common frameworks of thinking that it supports” (Korsmeyer 2004, 85).  An analysis 
of instances of deep gender in educational practices associated with artistry and its 
conceptual relationship to aesthetics and canonical value systems may provide a point of 
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departure for taking account of the assets and liabilities that ways of making associated 
with artistry might bring to a conceptual extension of the history and philosophy of 
education in design.  Korsmeyer provides a framework for this deep gender analysis in 
her work regarding feminist responses to the canon of fine arts. 
In the sense that Korsmeyer uses the term, deep gender is a predominantly hidden 
system of value judgments that hinge upon “oppositional concepts and schemes of value 
whose meanings fluctuate in different historical and cultural contexts” (Korsmeyer 2004, 
3).  Her oppositional concepts readily manifest themselves within the binary opposition 
of the gendered terms masculine and feminine.  These terms, as gendered, represent not 
sexual difference, but rather, the “many ways that cultures mold their members into 
different social roles” (Korsmeyer 2004, 2).  Further, this social gender binary is 
intimately associated with the intellectual binary of mind/body dualism represented in 
Martin’s nature/culture split and with the gendered assumptions of a public/private 
dualism in Western beliefs.  Within Korsmeyer’s concept of deep gender, the privileged 
and dominant binary masculine is associated with the Cartesian mind, and further, with 
culture, reason, the fine arts, and countless other seemingly neutral identifiers.  In 
opposition to this privilege, the subordinate feminine binary is associated with the 
Cartesian body, with nature, with emotion, with craft, and with other identifiers opposite 
those in the dominant category.  In utilizing the gender categorization of these binary 
pairs, Korsmeyer holds that deeply embedded gender claims can be exposed in what 
might otherwise be seen as neutral ideas, statements, beliefs, and systems. 
It is within the oppositional values of gendered binaries—within the hierarchy of 
dominant and subordinate—that we find the cultural liability of patriarchal oppression 
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and possible means to overcome that liability.  It is deep gender claims, claims hidden 
beneath the structure of appearance, that support the oppression of women and others 
who do not fall within the dominant patriarchy encapsulated under the conceptual binary 
masculine.  The patriarchal oppression present in the binary dominant/subordinate 
exemplifies Karen Warren’s logic of domination.  In identifying this logic of domination 
represented within deep gender binaries, one can conceptually implicate all patriarchal 
systems as forms of domination that can be engaged and transformed through feminist 
critique.  The patriarchy of deep gendering, as established by Korsmeyer’s gender 
binaries, can be logically conceived of as fully embedded within culture, and as such, 
shown to play a significant role in cultural miseducation.  This deeply embedded bias 
toward the oppression associated with the masculine binary is what I will call the 
patriarchal assumption.  For Martin, this patriarchal assumption is a cultural liability that 
exists within the deep structure of Western culture’s beliefs and assumptions that 
influence educational thought and, as such, should be eliminated by and through 
educational practice. 
Korsmeyer employs her concept of deep gender as a method of revealing ways 
that feminists have begun to use aesthetic values as a means of questioning the deep 
structure of thought associated with an education in artistry; the deep structure of thought 
supporting the established canon of the fine arts.  In challenging the traditions of the 
canon, Korsmeyer is not interested in creating a narrow definition of the practices 
associated with artistry but, rather, in broadening that definition in order to be both more 
inclusive and to expose and question established societal norms; norms that limit Martin’s 
goal of education to form the best individuals and cultures and, more specifically, for 
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education in artistry and education in design to produce capable artists and designers and 
prepare them to participate in the creation and maintenance of culture.  Korsmeyer notes 
that “one agenda (among many) of some feminist artists has been to question the terms 
of classification and evaluation employed in art and to defy those standards in their own 
work—thereby resisting the gendered ideals that pervade art traditions” (Korsmeyer 
2004, 105).  Through both the intellectual critique (theory) provided by feminist aesthetic 
philosophers and the particular works (application) of feminist artists, the patriarchal 
assumption represented within the canon of fine arts has been exposed and; likewise, a 
means has been provided of overcoming this particular cultural liability. 
In attempting to mitigate this liability, Korsmeyer notes that “tradition remains 
the overarching point of reference for feminist and postmodern artists, who refer 
continually to the past, whether ironically, parodically, or confrontationally.  Tradition 
unavoidably frames the work of even the most iconoclastic artists, for only God creates 
ex nihilo” (Korsmeyer 2004, 128, 129).  Ex nihilo—literally “out of nothing”—is 
significant both to Korsmeyer’s critique and to any reasonable understanding of the 
canonical role of art.  Korsmeyer, in assuming a feminist position, places herself in 
opposition to some thing—in this case that thing being a patriarchally privileged 
definition of the concept of artistry.  This positioning against is a rejection of existing 
conditions.  Feminist artists, in struggling against the existing and ever-present canon 
have begun its transformation.  Due to the deeply embedded gender oppression of the 
patriarchal assumption, a singular and wholesale dismantling cannot be expected; 
however, change at the fringes none-the-less weakens the patriarchal and canonical 
structures present in the fine arts.  Korsmeyer’s theoretical works and the production of 
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feminist artists are, in effect, responding to existing conditions that they find unacceptable 
in relation to their beliefs about the world.  It is from this position of the rejection of 
existing conditions—of a canon that enforces traditional ideas and normative standards—
that change can and does occur.  In changes to—and the subsequent expansion of—the 
canonical tradition that results, there exists a denial of absolutism and universals in all of 
their forms and a simultaneous engagement with culture itself in challenging those deeply 
established positions of tradition. 
This struggle against and rejection of norms and standards within the fine arts 
tradition indicates that art—and its evaluation—is value-laden; that it is meaningful and 
thereby contributes to the deep structure of our cultural identity.  In this conception of the 
structural value of fine arts, those works of art that question the canon become political 
in nature.  Contemporary feminist works of art that critique the canon of fine arts 
concurrently engage in a political critique of culture; “art is a means to uncover aspects 
of social position that have been just as eclipsed and distorted as ideas about femaleness 
and maleness in cultural history” (Korsmeyer 2004, 107).  Understanding contemporary 
feminist art as a critique of culture implies a need to transform that culture—for culture 
to be modified as a result of interaction; for culture to learn and grow in the same way as 
the individual.  The methodology of this transformation, by way of Korsmeyer’s concept 
of deep gender and Warren’s logic of domination, might further be employed to dismantle 
other canonical traditions that are shown to perpetuate both educational and cultural 
liabilities. 
By applying the concepts of Korsmeyer’s deep gender, culture has been situated 
within the realm of the binary masculine; it is patriarchal in form and structure.  
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Resultantly, patriarchy has traditionally held a canonical position within cultural 
discourse.  This patriarchal canonicity has allowed for all institutions, groups, and 
individuals who participate in culture to be subsumed under the oppression associated 
with deep gender and patriarchy.   Traditional philosophical aesthetics is a product of 
patriarchal culture.  The canon of fine arts is a product of patriarchal culture.  Traditional 
design education is a product of patriarchal culture.  However, it is not just at this 
culturally relational level that the oppression of patriarchy exists; it exists too in the 
relations between aesthetics and the fine arts canon, between the fine arts canon and fine 
arts education, between aesthetics and the canon of design, between the canon of design 
and design education.  The oppression of patriarchy is evident in all of these relations in 
that they are all bound by the commonality of culture, a culture that is based upon and 
within patriarchal assumptions. 
The canonicity of the patriarchal assumption is key to allowing a feminist critique 
that serves as the means of taking account; as that line of inquiry that identifies both 
educational assets and liabilities and raises them to consciousness “for everyone to see 
and understand” (Martin 2011, 111).  Such taking account allows us to identify and make 
judgments about practices, beliefs, and assumptions; judgments that determine if our 
foundational beliefs and assumptions are assets worth protecting or liabilities that should 
be exposed and subjected to scrutiny.  I intend to employ this taking account of assets and 
liabilities in order to explore the value of the practices that result from the deep structures 
of education in artistry, in workmanship, and in craftsmanship as they might be employed 
to conceptually extend the history and philosophy of education in design. 
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The École des Beaux Arts: An Education in Artistry 
While we can assume that the knowledge and skills necessary to an education in 
design—one conceptually extended through the educative practices of artistry—have, 
throughout history, been transmitted in some form or other by various educational agents, 
the first formal instances that we can reliably engage are those of apprenticeships and the 
guild system.  Young men—and during this time we can assume that it was, 
predominantly, only young men—who had an interest in, a capacity for, or were perhaps 
forced into practices associated with artistry and craftsmanship were made apprentices to 
established master artists and craftspeople.  Under this system, students learned from both 
the tutelage of the master and from the practices of producing associated artifacts.  An 
apprentice model of education was based in both theory and practice—theories and 
practices grounded within lived experience—and, resultantly, produced new masters who 
were intimately familiar with all aspects of the cultures and environments they worked 
within, with the forms and materials of their trade, with functional utility and aesthetic 
expression, and with the intricacies of making in relation to their particular arts.  While 
these processes and traits appear to be what Martin might term cultural assets, there are 
also aspects of those practices that can be viewed as liabilities through the lens of deep 
gender.  A master/apprentice relationship remains firmly within the deep gender binary 
established in Korsmeyer’s masculine/feminine critique.  The liability of the patriarchal 
dominance of an apprenticeship-based education is echoed by Dewey when—in relation 
to traditional education—he relates this form of knowledge dissemination and acquisition 
to “customary and traditional beliefs [that] held men in bondage” (Dewey 1966, 270) and 
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that this knowledge was “merely the accumulated opinions of the past, much of it absurd” 
(Dewey 1966, 302).  
The deeply embedded patriarchal assumption prevalent in the deep structure of 
Western thought—and therefore, in educational practices—was perpetuated and further 
reinforced during the rise of intellectualism that accompanied the Enlightenment.  It was 
at this time that formal schooling, at least for the realms of knowledge associated with 
the masculine binary, took the place of apprentice and guild systems.  In design education 
the predominant example of formalized design education would be the establishment of 
the Académie des Beaux-Arts in Paris.  It is in the educational practices of the Académie 
that we can see a form of design education—an education based upon principles 
associated with artistry—that precedes the Industrial Revolution. 
The Académie des Beaux-Arts was established in France in 1648 during the reign 
of Louis XIV.  The Académie, later renamed the École des Beaux-Arts, was founded by 
Cardinal Mazarin, Chief Minister to the King of France, as an educational institution 
capable of providing a continuous source of artists and designers to attend to the 
decorative needs of the French aristocracy.  As an institution, the École des Beaux-Arts 
established a pedagogy based upon rigorous examination and appropriation of historical 
precedent as the primary means of articulating design decisions.  The structural, material, 
ornamental, proportional, geometric, and spatial qualities present in the works of Greek 
and Roman antiquity were unquestioningly re-appropriated as solutions to students’ 
assignments.  This model of unquestioning acceptance can be seen as representing what 
educational philosopher Susan Laird describes as a monarchist sensibility; a description 
both pertinent to its literal formation and to its pedagogical methods (Laird 2014).  An 
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educational model based upon the unquestioning acceptance of precedent can be seen as 
representing a monarchist sensibility—grounded within and supported by the patriarchal 
assumption—in that practices based upon the precedents of history, much like those of 
the monarch, appear above reproach.  This monarchist authority is articulated by the 
doctrine of the divine right of kings.  Just as the monarch, by divine right, is not subject 
to any earthly authority—and, as such cannot be questioned—the precedents of Western 
design history were granted an academically sanctioned divine authority.  In removing 
any notion of earthly accountability, the École des Beaux-Arts removed design pedagogy 
from the realm of any real and tangible world—and, thus from the changing cultural 
constructs of particular societies—and placed it within an unfounded domain of 
appropriation that served only to communicate the power of the monarchy and to preserve 
monarchist privilege.  It is this removal from lived experience and its impact upon 
educational and professional practices that Rudofsky criticized over three hundred years 
later. 
Conceptually, an acceptance of the monarchist principle of divine right creates 
another binary condition that acts as a liability to education in design.  The divine is paired 
in contrast to the worldly.  In applying Korsmeyer’s conceptual logic, the divine is placed 
within the dominant masculine binary and the world of lived experience joins the 
subservient feminine.   This divine/worldly binary pairing reinforces the already firmly 
established assertion that education in design is deeply gendered and, as such, oppressive 
in its limitation of choice.  An education in design based upon the deep structure 
associated with the patriarchal assumption perpetuates liabilities derived from those 
gendered assumptions and fails to allow for the multiplicity of choices that are necessary 
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to any meaningful forms of knowledge acquisition and cultural production.  In accepting 
the divine authority of a monarchist model—in removing any notion of worldly 
accountability—design education was removed from any corresponding relationship to 
those characteristics associated with the feminine; it was firmly and authoritatively 
grounded in the masculine binary.   
This notion of divine right in design education was further perpetuated by the 
relation, maintained at the École des Beaux-Arts, between instructor and student.  This 
relationship was modeled upon existing oppressive systems and remained, 
predominantly, one of master and apprentice.  This model confers divine authority upon 
one, the master, and unquestioning subservience upon the student.  This relationship of 
mastery is continually reinforced since, according to Sherry Ahrentzen, feminist 
architectural scholar and Research Professor of Architecture at Arizona State University, 
“the studio, being a closed system, becomes an incubator in reproducing these beliefs” 
(Ahrentzen 1996, 75).  It is, perhaps, this elitist system—one established under the 
doctrine of the divine right of kings and still practiced in contemporary educational 
practice—that Ponce de Leon and Norman are calling into question when they express 
concerns with the unchanged model of studio instruction.  It is certainly a model that has 
contributed to the perception of design fields as constituting elitist professions and, as 
such, predicating design’s exclusion from the construction and maintenance of culture.  
Understandably, a pedagogical model based upon monarchist assumptions must be 
rigorously critiqued if design is to reinterpret itself as culturally relevant and capable of 
meaningfully addressing both educational practices and cultural uncertainties.  The first 
significant challenge to the deeply gendered authority of monarchist design education 
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came during the period that might loosely be termed Modernity with the foundation of 
the École Polytechnic. 
 
A Rejection of Monarchist Privilege: The École Polytechnique 
It was not until 1792, that design education began to question the authority of the 
monarchist practices of the École des Beaux-Arts.  At that time, under the auspices of 
Jean-Nicolas-Louis Durand, design education at the École Polytechnique was “organized 
to create scientists and technicians with specialized skills” (Tavernor 2009, xxxiii).  This 
shift away from a monarchist and canonical understanding of design cohered to the shift 
toward rational understanding typical of late Enlightenment thought.  The logic of 
mathematics, the technologies of industrialization, and a belief in humankind’s authority 
over the natural world began to assert more influence on design education than the 
monarchist call for the preservation and veneration of tradition.  As a result of this shift, 
design expression, design practice, and design education became “the servant of a new 
kind of rationality and science” (Tavernor 2009, xxxiv).  In attempting to escape 
monarchist privilege, the École Polytechnique traded one form of privilege for another.  
In attempting to move beyond canonical ways of knowing, the faculty of the École 
Polytechnique did not attempt to shift design away from a position of monarchal privilege 
and toward the practical, material, appropriate, world of human experience but, rather, 
became subservient to the objectivist rationality of science.  The project of Modernity 
abandoned the monarchist ideal in favor of a positivist universalism coherent with the 
belief systems established in scientific ways of knowing. 
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This positivist understanding of design knowing, while not fully supplanting the 
monarchist model, continued into the early twentieth century.  In his 1923 essay 
“Towards a Collective Construction,” designer and De Stijl theorist Theo van Doesburg 
noted that “Our epoch is hostile to every subjective speculation in art, science, 
technology, etc.  The new spirit, which already governs almost all modern life, is opposed 
to animal spontaneity, to nature’s domination, to artistic flummery.  In order to construct 
a new object we need a method, that is to say, an objective system” (Cross 2006, 119).  
Six years later, the Swiss-French architect and planner known as Le Corbusier fully 
objectified the house as a “machine for living.”  In addressing the second Congrès 
Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne, Le Corbusier described the utility of the house 
as consisting “of a regular sequence of definite functions.  The regular sequence of these 
functions is a traffic phenomenon.  To render that traffic exact, economical and rapid is 
the key effort of modern architectural science” (Cross 2006, 95).  The sensual world of 
embodied humanity and its multiplicity of choice was not given a chance; monarchist 
assumptions were replaced with the efficiency of the rationality of design in the machine 
age.  These early attempts to transform design into a scientific project were continued in 
the design methods movements of the 1960s.  According to design educator and 
researcher Nigel Cross, “the desire of the new movement was even more strongly than 
before to base design process (as well as the products of design) on objectivity and 
rationality” (Cross 2006, 95).  The design methods movement reached its peak when 
political scientist Herbert Simon, in The Sources of the Artificial, called for the 
development of “a science of design… a body of intellectually tough, analytic, partly 
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formalizable, partly empirical, teachable doctrine about the design process” (Cross 2006, 
96). 
 
Critique of Positivist Design 
Simultaneous to the peak of the design methods movement, there was a critical 
interrogation of its scientific bias.  In Notes on the Synthesis of Form, architect and design 
theorist Christopher Alexander rejected his earlier works on rational methods of design 
noting that the fields differed in that “scientists try to identify the components of existing 
structures, designers try to shape the components of new structures” (Cross 2006, 97).  
There was also a rising awareness that comparisons between science and design had been 
simplified and that there was, perhaps, more complexity in the distinctions between these 
two methodological endeavors than first assumed.  Many thought that “perhaps there was 
not so much for design to learn from science after all, and rather that perhaps science had 
something to learn from design” (Cross 2006, 97).  Cross further explicated this position 
when he noted that designers have “been seduced by the lure of Wissenschaft, and turned 
away from the lore of Technik; they have defected to the cultures of scientific and 
scholarly enquiry, instead of developing the culture of designerly enquiry” (Cross 2006, 
06).  A culture of designerly enquiry might be thought of as a middle ground culture based 
upon feminist critique of patriarchal systems and upon the functional intentionality of 
design practices.  This contemporary interrogation of a design methodology founded 
upon scientific principles, on scientific ways of knowing, on the romanticization of 
science as a paradigm for human life, led to a destabilization of design knowing, and 
consequently, to a destabilization of design education.  The rejection of Classism in favor 
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of a Modernist sensibility and the subsequent rejection of Modernism has left design 
education without a clear philosophical foundation. 
In light of this critique, I argue that it is not, perhaps, particular methodologies of 
design that must be rejected in order to ameliorate criticisms but, rather, the development 
and interrogation of the deep structure of thought that supports a history and philosophy 
of education in design that is necessary.  In asking what we know—what informs the 
structure of our beliefs and assumptions—as designers, we may be able to understand and 
justify approaches to how we teach design.  An interrogation of the deep structure of 
beliefs and assumptions that inform education in design should lead to a more robust 
understanding of what it means to know as a designer and thus offer up theories and 
practices that ensure the disciplinary veracity of design education.  In some ways, such 
an understanding might address the identity crisis of education in design and ensure that 
design education is substantially differentiated from the beliefs and assumptions 
associated with educational practices in both the sciences and the monarchist traditions 
upheld by design curricula based upon the communicative value of artistry. 
One significant challenge to both the positivist foundation of design as a scientific 
paradigm and the monarchist privilege of education based in the practices of artistry is 
the work of Donald Schön.  Critical of design science as structured to solve well-defined 
problems, Schön offered a constructivist paradigm that addressed the reality of design 
practices that deal with “messy problematic situations” (Schön 1983, 47).  Design 
methodologist S.A. Gregory notes that “the scientific method is a pattern of problem-
solving behavior employed in finding out the nature of what exists, whereas the design 
method is a pattern of behavior employed in inventing things of value which do not yet 
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exist.  Science is analytic; design is constructive” (Gregory 1966, 06).  The constructivist 
paradigm calls for “an epistemology of practice implicit in the artistic, intuitive processes 
which some practitioners do bring to situations of uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and 
value conflict” (Schön 1983, 49).   In these processes, the absolute control of the designer 
is relinquished in favor of appropriate responses to problems that might not be 
controllable in large systemic systems; in favor of synthetic solutions that actually work, 
not forced solutions that fail to address the complexity of lived experience.  Cross furthers 
this paradigm when he notes that admonitions of this type are “on the constructive, 
normative, creative nature of design.  Designing is a process of pattern synthesis, rather 
than pattern recognition.  The solution is not simply lying there among the data… it has 
to be actively constructed by the designer’s own efforts” (Cross 2006, 24). 
 
Artistry and Design Education 
In attempting to address contemporary criticisms of education in design as 
problems of educational thought rather than problems of design methodology, I have 
begun to examine the deep structure associated with ways of making that might 
conceptually extend the relatively recent history and philosophy of education in design.  
As such, I have begun to work toward the possibility of naming, describing, and 
interrogating those beliefs and assumptions that exist at the “rock bottom” of how we talk 
about and teach design.  These “rock bottom” beliefs and assumptions provide the 
foundation of the deep structure of our thoughts and practices in regard to education in 
design.  As the practices associated with artistry comprise one way of making that might 
extend the history and philosophy of education in design, it was necessary to theorize 
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whether those practices were designlike and, further, to determine if the beliefs and 
assumptions associated with an education in artistry were assets or liabilities that might 
impact practices in design education.  In addressing the designlike nature of the practices 
associated with artistry, I have concluded that those practices fundamentally differ from 
the practices necessary to the creation of design artifacts.  Works associated with artistry, 
as I have defined them, are intended to communicate the beliefs, assumptions, and 
aspirations of the communities from which they emerge.  Such artifacts do not fulfil the 
functional requirement of design artifacts to have a physical impact upon our 
relationships with and in the world.  The artifacts that result from practices of artistry are 
not intentional in the functionalist sense that design artifacts must be. 
While the artifacts that we call art do not satisfy the functional intentions of design 
artifacts, an accounting of the educational practices that inform our understanding of 
artistry remains beneficial in attempting to access the deep structure of thought in regard 
to education in design.  Educational practices associated with artistry predate our 
contemporary practices of design and, in some ways, provide some of the beliefs and 
assumptions that constitute the deep structure of educational thought concerning design.  
The canonical, patriarchal, and monarchist assumptions that underlie education in artistry 
can also be seen as underlying educational practices associated with design.  The 
patriarchal binary that enforces the gender bias in the fine arts is equally present in the 
established canons of design practices; canonical structures that continue to reinforce the 
oppressive nature of the patriarchal assumption.   Further, in some ways, design education 
emerged from the same sorts of educational practices that established both the patriarchal 
privilege of the master/student relationship associated with apprenticeships and the 
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monarchist sensibilities of formalized art and design education as practiced at the École 
des Beaux-Arts.  Later educational reactions to the École des Beaux-Arts—the rise of 
positivism associated with the École Polytechnique, and the design methods movement 
that associated design practices with scientific ways of knowing—can all be considered 
extensions of the two dichotomies, theorized by Martin, that form the foundation of the 
deep structure of Western thought.  These educational practices can be thought of as 
maintaining an oppressive cultural framework that reinforces the nature/culture split and 
the public/private spheres of society.  In continuing to promote concepts embedded within 
patriarchal assumptions and grounded in the monarchist traditions of the École des 
Beaux-Arts—traditions based upon the unquestioning appropriation and acceptance of 
the forms and traditions of antiquity—education in design stands opposed to the 
emotional and aesthetic human experiences and encounters existing within the messy 
vitality of lived experience; opposed to responsive practices that might allow for design 
to participate in the construction and maintenance of culture. 
As a result of their reliance upon canonical knowledge, upon the patriarchal 
assumption, and upon monarchist sensibilities, ways of making that might be associated 
with education in artistry can be seen to be burdened with liabilities that cannot alleviate 
contemporary criticisms of design and design education.  The history and philosophy of 
education in artistry does not appear to provide the conceptual strength necessary to 
extend the deep structure of education in design.  It does; however, allow us to expose 
and interrogate liabilities in design education that have arisen out of educational practices 
associated with artistry—it allows us to name the canonical, patriarchal, and monarchist 
assumptions that influence the deep structure of education in design.  Such naming might 
65 
then lead to discussions among educational theorists, design theorists, and design 
educators in efforts to address contemporary criticisms of education in design. 
Further, there appear to be assets that an education in artistry might bring to any 
reconceptualized theory of educational practices in design.  Artistry, as an educational 
practice, can provide design students with the manual skills and the practical wisdom 
associated with effective communication and with aesthetic judgment.  Artistry, as a 
practice, is traditionally concerned with communicating the beliefs, assumptions, and 
aspirations regarding our cultural and social relationships with and in the world and, 
resultantly, it can assist designers in understanding the necessity of grounding their works 
within the structure of beliefs that come out of our present cultural practices.   
Additionally, while traditional forms of artistry do not aspire to physical manipulation of 
the world but, rather, to the documentation and perpetuation of cultural beliefs, 
contemporary artistic practices eschew this reliance upon tradition and begin to 
interrogate our established beliefs and practices.  Particularly, the work of feminist artists 
has begun to destabilize the canon of fine arts.  Such practices may also be beneficial to 
education in design as we strive to address criticisms of our elitism and our problems 
related to race, class, and gender equality; our inability to participate in the creation and 
maintenance of culture. 
While the practices, beliefs, and assumptions associated with artistry as a way of 
making and with educational practices associated with artistry are not wholly appropriate 
to extending the deep structure of education in design, it has been beneficial in 
illuminating possible ways to understand and respond to criticisms of design education 
in relation to those practices, beliefs, and assumptions.  In the ways of making associated 
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with workmanship and craftsmanship we may find alternative practices that fulfil the 
functional requirements of design and that overcome liabilities that have led to criticisms 
of design education.  Chapter Two will explore education in workmanship and how that 
might move us closer to the type of making that does have a physical impact upon our 
relationships with and in the world.  It will also attempt to identify practices in the 
education associated with workmanship that continue to foster liabilities that exist within 




Chapter Two: An Accounting of Workmanship 
 
The Deep Structure of Design 
Previously, I theorized that as “a maker of everythings” I might be thought of in 
different ways; ways that cohere to three ways of making that I related to the practices 
associated with design.  I might be thought of as an artist, a worker, or a craftsperson.  As 
a maker, I might participate in practices of artistry, of workmanship, or of craftsmanship.  
In any of those three ways of making I theorized that there exists a relationship with the 
“know-how” of creating physical artifacts.  The artist, the worker, and the craftsperson 
depend upon their particular forms of “know-how” in creating the artifacts that define 
their practices.  As the “know-how” of their particular practices are passed down to future 
artists, workers, and craftspeople, it can be assumed that some form of education must 
occur.  These forms of education should be seen as embodiments of Jane Roland Martin’s 
educational agents. 
In order to understand the educational value of these different ways of making—
of these different educational agents—it is necessary to take account of the assets and 
liabilities of each in an educational setting.  As such, I have begun to critically engage the 
deep structure of educational thought that is associated with these ways of making.  In 
the last chapter, I discussed the possibility of the beliefs, assumptions, and practices 
associated with an education in artistry acting as a means of extending the history and 
philosophy of design in order to expose a deep structure upon which educational practices 
in design might be constructed.  After taking account of the beliefs and assumptions that 
exist at the “rock bottom” of thought associated with an education in artistry, I concluded 
that such an education, while providing some assets that we might consider beneficial to 
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an education in design, was not able to fully flesh out the theoretical structure that the 
history and philosophy of design education might require if it is to respond to 
contemporary criticisms.  This chapter will continue to engage making as a means of 
extending the deep structure of thought concerning education in design.  I will explore 
education in workmanship as a manifestation of the making associated with workers in 
order to engage the core beliefs and assumptions that exist in the deep structure of thought 
about such an education and how that structure might influence how we think about 
design and design education. 
 
Understanding Workmanship 
In order to engage in an accounting of the educational assets and liabilities of the 
making associated with workmanship as a means of conceptually extending the deep 
structure of education in design it is important to clarify what is meant when discussing 
the term workmanship. Further, it is necessary to identify the deeply held beliefs and the 
educational practices related to workmanship that might be considered either assets or 
liabilities that could have an impact upon education in design.  Workmanship, like 
artistry, involves some form of skill in the creation of physical artifacts; it requires a form 
of “know-how” appropriate to the act of making such artifacts.  Workmanship, as a 
practice, is “directly connected to the potential ability of the hand to work physical 
material” (Risatti 2007, 163).  As makers, workers, artists, and craftspeople equally have 
the potential to possess the technical ability to work physical materials in the creation of 
well-made objects—artifacts that can express and mediate our relationships with and in 
the world.  Resultantly, as noted previously, the “know-how” of making does not assist 
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in illuminating the differences between workers, artists, and craftspeople.  The work of 
workmanship, however, can be differentiated in that it does not attempt to engage those 
conditions necessary to the work of artistry or craftsmanship.  Workmanship, as a 
practice, does not imply the intentionality of the work produced by those that we call 
artists and craftspeople.  A worker is one who executes the intentions of others; the work 
of workmanship is not an intentional act in and of itself.  Workers only act to convert 
abstract notations—whether they be the intentional ideas of designers or artists—into 
physical artifacts.  Howard Risatti (2007, 163) defines workmanship as “labor produced 
by the noncreative hand.”  In this way, workmanship can be seen as a disinterested 
exercise; as the employment of the manual competence associated with “know-how” 
without the critical engagement associated with the intentionality of the making of artists 
and the making of craftspeople. 
  Workmanship can be thought of as containing only the knowledge related to acts 
of production; the manual competence of “know-how” that comes with performative acts 
of making and doing that do not involve intellectual engagement.22  There is no 
opportunity for the worker to engage her intellect beyond interpretation and translation.  
The primary concern of the worker is in interpreting the ideas, the drawings, and/or the 
models of others and then translating those interpretations into artifacts through the 
manipulation of the physical properties of various materials—materials generally chosen 
by a designer or an artist.  In this sense, workmanship can be thought of as simply a 
                                                 
22 I do not mean to imply that workers do not have agency, nor that they do not develop knowledge.  My 
contention is that these are not the primary intentions of workmanship.  Knowledge development by 
workers, and how that might lead to innovative practices, has traditionally not been encouraged and, as 
such, limits the possibilities for workers to express their agency.  In this way, workers might be thought 
of as suffering a form of oppression related to their work and their social class. 
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process whereby once the worker has learned the “how-to” of making she continues to 
produce with no intention beyond the act of production.  The knowledge of workmanship 
consists, primarily, in following directions and producing well-made things; there are no 
explicit acts of intentional judgment in the work of workmanship.  While there are many 
other ways of talking about workmanship; i.e., in the adjectival sense of something well 
made, in relation to making, it is only a disinterested process of labor.  In this way, the 
practice of workmanship is the exercise of productive skill without intellectual 
engagement.  When I talk about workmanship as a way of making, I mean that an 
individual is engaged in a rote process of production (labor) where she uses manual skill 
to manipulate physical materials in order to create physical artifacts.23  In this sense, there 
is no engagement with the intentionality of judgments that we might associate with artists 
and craftspeople; there is no sense of communication and no sense of problem solving.  
In the work of workmanship, there is no attempt to innovate that might lead to changes 
in the artifacts produced or in the means of production.  Resultantly, as we will see later, 
the productive skill of the “know-how” of workers is insufficient to insuring that 
education in workmanship can provide the deep structure of thought that might expand 
how we conceptualize of education in design prior to industrialization.  Engaging the 
productive labor of forms of making associated with workmanship cannot convey the 
practical knowledge and intentional judgements expressed in the work of artistry and the 
work of craftsmanship.  It is a combination of “know-how” and intentional judgments 
                                                 
23 The artifacts produced by workers do not necessarily serve solely in a capacity that could be construed 
as actively mediating our physical encounters with and in the world.  The artifacts produced by workers 
might be practical (possessing utility), communicative (stating beliefs about the world), or trivial (things 
that we might find appealing but that have no significant use value). 
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that appears to be crucial to insuring the creation of capable and competent designers; to 
responding to contemporary criticisms of education in design. 
The second task involved in taking account of workmanship—in identifying its 
deeply held beliefs and how they influence educational practices—is much more difficult.  
Few, if any, schools that teach design have touted their educational practices as invested 
in teaching students the skills necessary to attain competence in productive labor.  In my 
career as a design educator, I have only encountered discussions of the skill associated 
with workmanship in its negation.  Statements like “I don’t teach software (or any manual 
skill); that is something students can learn on their own or at a trade school” are common 
in faculty meetings when curriculum is discussed.24  This type of statement is generally 
not questioned and is usually followed up with “I have more important things to teach 
them.”  These “more important things” are normally theories associated with particular 
design methodologies.  Even in beginning level classes, manual skills are hastily 
discussed, seldom demonstrated, and rarely is their necessity reinforced in the classroom.  
The expectation is that students can learn these manual skills, through a process of trial 
and error, on their own time, by performing them.25  As such, it appears that most design 
educators hold that educational practices that prioritize “know-how” are not of 
significance to the education of designers; these practices are contingent to the knowledge 
required by a design education. 
                                                 
24 Here, software is meant to indicate computer programs that assist designers in documenting their ideas.  
Software is, seemingly, the realm of the draftsperson (the skilled laborer) and is not thought of as 
essential to the work of the designer.  I, however, do not hold this view. 
25 I have found that this lack of teaching manual skills results in dangerous and inefficient practices on the 
part of students; I am particularly thinking about the use of Xacto knives, box cutters, and other bladed 
instruments that are regularly used by students.  This lack of engagement with manual skills also limits the 
ability of both students and teachers to engage in evaluative practices that can produce capable and 
competent designers and allow those designers to participate in the creation and maintenance of culture. 
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In searching for educational practices in workmanship, as they relate to 
contemporary design education, it is necessary to broaden the scope of what we consider 
the realm of design education.  While I hold that competence in manual skills is something 
that is necessary to designers, it is not currently available in most design schools.  As 
suggested above, most design educators see manual skills as not related to design 
education and that these skills should, therefore, be learned in trade schools.  Since most 
design schools do not associate themselves with educational practices that allow for the 
teaching and learning of productive skill, it is beneficial to explore vocational education 
as a model case for education in workmanship.  It is within the vocational arts associated 
with design fields that we can find examples of educational practices that address the 
“know-how” associated with workmanship.  The vocational arts that engage in forms of 
technical instruction appropriate to the “know-how” of design can be thought of as falling 
into three broad categories.  The first of these are those traditional trades associated with 
fabrication: carpentry, machine operation, brick and stonemasonry, and welding.  
Generally, workers employ these fabrication skills in the production of artifacts 
conceived of and documented by designers.  There is also technical instruction associated 
with those more traditional trade skills that are now primarily considered recreational 
pursuits: woodworking, weaving, blacksmithing, and pottery.  Finally, there is instruction 
in those new fields of production that have arisen as a result of technological progress: 
Computer Aided Drafting (CAD), Computer Aided Machining (CAM), digital image 
editing, digital media production, and digital page layout.26  All of these productive skills 
                                                 
26 There are probably other vocational skills that can be thought of as “design-like;” however, those listed 
here at least provide examples that assist in establishing the nature of this relationship.  Additionally, many 
of these skills are directly related to domestic skills—a relationship that will be explored more fully later 
in this chapter. 
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are closely related to, and act in support of, the education of design professionals and 
reflect practices associated with the manipulation of physical materials in order to 
produce physical artifacts.27 
The association of workmanship with vocational education is beneficial in 
understanding why design schools do not align themselves with, or provide room in their 
curricula for, workmanship.  Education in workmanship, vocational education, is 
generally thought of as preparing individuals for employment in manual trades and 
clearly has negative connotations (See Hager and Hyland, Anderson, Crawford, Lewis, 
and Coffey).  This negative stance is expressed in judgments concerning the value of 
education in workmanship.  These negative values can be thought of as the result of a 
lack of privilege associated with workmanship; with the subjugated labor of the working 
and lower classes.  An exploration of the negative values associate with the vocational 
arts allows for ways of identifying and interrogating liabilities that exist within the deep 
structure of thought associated with education in workmanship.  As such, it allows us to 
make judgments about how these practices have had an effect upon education in design; 
how the negative values associated with workmanship impact design education. 
 
A Critique of Vocational Education 
The bias against workmanship, a type of making whose educational practices are 
now associated with vocational skills training, has a long history. The Greek myths are 
populated with stories that discuss the origins of practices associated with the production 
                                                 
27 Even those practices that are digital in nature generally end in the production of physical artifacts.  This 
might be a point of argument in skills like web design; however, I would suggest that we must accept the 
technical construction of the internet—if not its content—as a new form of physical and artefactual reality. 
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of physical artifacts.  These productive acts were seen as necessary to human life; 
practices that became the skills and labors that defined humanity.  These practices—
including weaving, masonry, metalsmithing, carpentry, and pottery—each required 
particular skills; particular technê in order to produce useful artifacts.  Technê, as I am 
using the term, just is the set of particular skills—the manual competence—employed by 
a maker in creating physical artifacts.  Technê represents the “know-how” of a particular 
practice; i.e., there is a technê associated with weaving, a technê associated with 
metalsmithing, and a technê associated with carpentry.  The Greeks associated these 
skills—the technê of material practices—with the Daimona Tekhne and placed them, like 
her, within the sphere of the domestic.28  This association with the domestic ensured that 
technê remained subordinate to the privilege given knowledge in epistêmê—knowledge 
associated with universal truths—and its associations with the universal character of the 
gods; an association with that which cannot be questioned.  In associating technê with the 
domestic realm, it was seen as beneath the dignity of culture; antithetical to the pursuits 
appropriate to the citizen.  The subordination of the domestic, of the technê associated 
with the production of physical artifacts, is a form of oppression that can be exposed by 
feminist critique.  This oppression acts to silence the “know-how” of technê and, 
therefore, undermines educational practices associated with workmanship. 
Once technê in domestic practices—what we might think of as those practices 
associated with vocational education—was acquired, there is an assumption that those 
skills were passed down to others; that there was teaching and learning associated with 
technê.  There is, however, no substantial exploration of how these skills were passed 
                                                 
28 The Diamona Tekhne and her relationship to Greek thought is discussed further in Chapter Four. 
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down; of how, over time, others became skilled in the production of physical artifacts or 
in the innovations necessary to create new artifacts that could mediate our relationships 
with and in the world.  Even though the Greeks did not provide us with a clear 
understanding of the curricular structure and practices associated with education in 
technê, vocational education—education in the domestic arts—can be thought of as one 
of the first, and most important, means of educating.  Theorist of vocational education 
David Coffey (1992, 11) has suggested that “life was primarily sustained by the passing 
on of manual skills from one generation to the next.  Most people were educated ‘on the 
job’, in particular by experiencing some sort of formal or informal apprenticeship.”   This 
passing on of skills should not be considered a formal education in the sense that we 
currently understand but, rather, as training that happened through making and doing; as 
on the job training that taught new learners the skills of their particular practices.  In a 
more contemporary context, historian of American culture Studs Terkel’s stonemason 
noted that his education was of an informal nature, consisting of on the job training:  
I started back in the Depression times when there wasn’t any [formal] 
apprenticeships.  You just go out and if you could hold your job, that’s it.  I was 
just a kid then.  Now I worked real hard and carried all the blocks I could.  Then 
I’d get my trowel and I’d lay one or two.  The second day the boss told me: I think 
you could lay enough blocks to earn your wages.  So I guess I only had one day 
of apprenticeship…I admired the men that we had at that time that were 
stonemasons.  They knew their trade.  So naturally I tried to pattern after them.  
There’s been very little change in the work (Terkel 1989, 19). 
This same stonemason also suggested that this form of educational mimicry was common 
to those who began as, and were considered, unskilled workers.  He noted that the laborer 
always feels that she is at the bottom of the scale “and always wants to get up to a skilled 
trade” (Terkel 1989, 18).  By mimicking the work of those who already possessed the 
requisite skill, she could eventually reach the same level. 
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The Roman architect Vitruvius expressed the necessity of vocational education 
when he suggested that the learning of technê was a matter of practice that consisted in 
“the ceaseless and repeated use of a skill…according to a predetermined design” (Book 
I, Chapter I, 1).  We can think about this “predetermined design” as embodying the 
educational practices that were provided by a teacher; skill that was acquired either 
formally or informally in the guidance of the learner’s hand.  It is from the formal and 
informal education that passed down generationally that the practices of vocational 
education arose.  As educational practices became more formalized, vocational 
education—for the most part—replaced the apprenticeship model in regard to the training 
of workers.  This transition was a result of cultural changes brought about by the 
emergence of formal education in other knowledge fields, the rise of enlightenment 
thinking that prioritized the objectivity of scientific practices, and the rise of 
industrialization that required uniformity in the education of workers.  Even in the 
transition from the “on the job training” associated with both informal and formal 
apprenticeship models, the formalization of vocational education did not exist 
independently, but was an integral component of the structure of general education.  At 
one time, shop classes, instruction in home economics, agricultural training, industrial 
training, and other skills classes were an inseparable part of our common curricula.29  The 
general education system intended that students have both the knowledge of epistêmê and 
the skill of technê as they were prepared to live productive lives; lives that supported their 
intellectual and vocational efforts and, likewise, mirrored cultural practices. 
                                                 
29 For further clarification of the relationship between vocational and general education and its eventual 
dissolution, see Matthew Crawford’s Shop Class as Soulcraft: An Inquiry into the Value of Work (2010). 
77 
Philosophers of vocational education Paul Hager and Terry Hyland (2002, 271) 
raise the question as to why general education and the education of vocational training 
“came to be differentiated, with different forms and strands distinguished in terms of 
prestige and status in ways that generally disfavor and disvalue vocational studies.”  
Theodore Lewis, also a philosopher of vocational education, suggests that this 
differentiation has been the result of class distinctions; that “vocational education has 
been conceived of as being unworthy of the elite, and more suited to the oppressed or 
unprivileged classes” (Lewis 1991, 97).  This class distinction can, likewise, be traced 
back to the Greek differentiation between technê and epistêmê.  Early Greek 
philosophers—who articulated what we might think of as the “rock bottom” of Western 
philosophical thought—in attempting to rationalize the beliefs and practices that arose 
from the age of myth led to an intellectually clear distinction between technê and 
epistêmê.  The knowledge of epistêmê was associated with universal and unwavering 
principles and, as such, was the domain of the citizen, the domain of culture.  In this sense, 
epistêmê exists within Carolyn Korsmeyer’s masculine binary—it exists within and 
continues to perpetuate the patriarchal assumption.  The “know-how” of technê—the 
manual competence of the worker that completes the binary pair—was associated with 
the contingent; it existed in the realm of the domestic.  Technê, as representational of the 
domestic was the province of the worker, the craftsperson, the artist, and the enslaved. 
The specialization of technê is unquestionably contingent; it depends on the 
particular materials used by the maker, the particular processes in which the maker is 
involved, and the physical artifacts produced.  The practices and artifacts associated with 
metalsmithing are quite different from the practices and artifacts associated with weaving 
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and; therefore, the technê associated with these practices and artifacts is necessarily 
different.  Through sustained practices of making and doing one can attain competence 
in the technê of any particular practice; however, these acts of production do not assure 
that knowledge beyond manual competence is acquired.  In Vitruvius’ theory of the 
education of the designer it is the knowledge of epistêmê coupled with technê in a 
particular practice that allows the designer to attain professional knowledge.  It is 
ultimately this reciprocal relationship between the universal knowledge of epistêmê and 
the contingency of technê that allows for what Aristotle referred to as phronesis; the 
attainment of practical wisdom.30 
In Plato and Aristotle, we see a distinction between those who acquire the practical 
wisdom of phronesis and those who only perform at the level of production.  The person 
who has attained phronesis is one who can give an account of what she produces; she 
knows why in relation to her “know-how.”  Aristotle further clarified this concept in the 
Metaphysics when he suggested that an account of the goal in mind is the basis for 
reasoning that ends in action (Parry 2014).  For the worker, there is no giving account; no 
engagement with practical wisdom, only an unquestioned act of production.   Over time, 
it appears that our privileging of the universal knowledge of epistêmê over the 
contingency of technê created a binary opposition of such magnitude that the idea of the 
attainment of phronesis became lost to educational practice.  Our polarization of the 
binary pair marginalized phronesis and has restricted its discussion in the realm of 
educational discourse.  The practical wisdom—the ability to make critical judgments—
                                                 
30 See Chapter 4 for a further discussion of the Aristotelian concepts of technê, epistêmê, and phronesis. 
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associated with an education in both epistemic and technical knowledge was lost to an 
oppressive conceptual framework embedded within the patriarchal assumption. 
 
The Liabilities of Workmanship 
The bias against workmanship and the education of workers can be further 
explored as embedded within more contemporary cultural liabilities that must be exposed 
and explained if we are to engage in dialog that may work toward eliminating them from 
the deep structure of our educational practices.  In Democracy and Education, John 
Dewey attempted to address this polarizing distinction when he suggested that “labour 
and leisure, theory and practice, body and mind,” are false oppositions (Dewey 1966, 
306).  More recently, Hager and Hyland have noted that our conception of vocational 
education has been heavily influenced by “a series of related and overlapping dichotomies 
inspired by the ancient Greeks, viz. body vs. mind, hand vs. head, manual vs. mental, 
skills vs. knowledge, applied vs. pure, knowing how vs. knowing that, practice vs. theory, 
particular vs. general, and training vs. education” (2002, 272).  Through these 
oppositions, we can begin to see the establishment of oppressive conceptual frameworks 
that act to differentiate individuals and marginalize the voices of those individuals; voices 
that might affect both educational practices and cultural creation. 
Dewey (1997, 19) implicates traditional education—which can be thought to 
include vocational education—as oppressive when he first theorized that any system of 
teaching that is “imposed from above” opposes the ideas of the expression and cultivation 
of individual identity that arises out of the value of individual experiences.  All systems 
that are imposed from above must be considered as oppressive in that they do not care 
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for, nor respond to, the needs of the individual members of an arbitrarily perceived unitary 
group.  In Shop Class as Soulcraft, social and educational theorist Matthew Crawford 
(2010) further implicates education as oppressive in that its goal appears to be the creation 
of a class of workers who are procedurally inclined; a class of workers that does not 
question but only performs as instructed.  As a result of the privilege given to the 
epistemic—to the knowledge that we associate with objectivity—educational 
opportunities that were intended to teach the manual and intellectual competencies of 
particular skills and trades have been marginalized.  The opportunities to engage in 
innovative practices and an ever-changing culture of progress were removed from 
schooling in favor of classes that prioritized an information economy grounded in rules, 
procedures, and uncritical processes.   While current procedural forms of education might 
state that their ultimate goal is to create workers who can respond to the challenges of the 
twenty-first century and regain a competitive edge in the global economy, I would argue 
that their practices do not actually achieve the goal of teaching students to respond to 
contemporary technical and cultural challenges.  On the contrary, their educational 
methods perpetuate oppressive frameworks that favor procedural practices over creative 
processes and over the attainment of multiple forms of knowledge necessary to solve 
difficult problems and make critical judgments. 
Crawford’s theory that we are creating a “class” of workers further appears to 
suggest the domination implicit in an oppressive conceptual framework.  Seemingly, 
educational practices that do not allow for multiple ways of knowing—multiple ways of 
engaging the world—appear to be representative of an oppressive conceptual framework, 
a framework that Warren describes as patriarchal in that “it explains, justifies, and 
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maintains subordination of women by men” (Warren 1990, 127-128).  In this case, 
education that denies multiple ways of knowing acts to subordinate all people, the 
environment, social constructs, and labor to an oppressive patriarchal system.  This is 
especially problematic when it comes to silencing the practical wisdom found in the 
physical acts associated with making and doing—with innovative practices that assist in 
mediating our physical relationships and experiences with and in the world. 
These acts of silencing, the elimination of those forms of education that do not 
cohere to the dominant epistemic binary, are oppressive liabilities.  Such liabilities do not 
allow for multiple ways of knowing and limit the ability of students to see that their 
experiences in making and doing can lead to forms of knowledge that exist outside of 
binary frameworks.  It is in this engagement with making and doing that students can gain 
problem solving skills; the ability to solve what philosopher and systems scientist C. West 
Churchman (1967) called “wicked problems.”  The ability to solve these problems come 
out of the ability to make practical judgments; they arise out of our ability to reconcile 
epistêmê and technê into the wisdom of phronesis.  The false oppositions of labor and 
leisure, practice and theory, and technê and epistêmê, can be addressed through feminist 
critiques of the oppressive character of binary oppositions and, as such, can be shown to 
be liabilities that we must eliminate from educational practice.  If the goal of education, 
and particularly design education, is to teach students the knowledge and skills to make 
the practical judgments necessary to solve “wicked problems” and to participate in the 
taking account necessary to ensure cultural progress, then the liabilities of oppressive 
conceptual frameworks must be addressed in all learning environments. 
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Vocational education, and likewise, education in workmanship, can no longer be 
seen as allowing for the practical wisdom of phronesis; it has become oppressive in that 
it maintains class and social distinctions.  It perpetuates a liability of oppression in 
allowing for the manual competence of technê but discouraging its relationship to 
knowledge in epistêmê and, therefore, limiting the possibility of realizing the heights of 
knowledge attainable with phronesis.  Vocational education if conceived of and 
implemented only as skills training for those who are othered by privilege—those who 
are not dominantly raced, dominantly classed, or dominantly gendered—is an educational 
liability that must be confronted if we are to reach the full potential of every individual 
and are to ensure that our cultural practices do not continue to limit our educational 
practices.  All individuals need to be encouraged to pursue forms of knowledge that exist 
beyond the privilege of the epistemic and should be able to access educational practices 
that will allow them to participate in the creation and maintenance of culture.  The 
oppressive educational framework that perpetuates race, class, and gender subordination 
must be reconceptualized.  If we create a framework that allows for multiple ways of 
knowing, for multiple educational voices, then we can allow all people to strive toward 
knowledge that will allow them to make critical decisions; that will allow all people to 
make judgments about their individual and social/cultural relationships with and in the 
world. 
 
The Hampton-Tuskegee Model of Vocational Education 
Historically, there have been schools that we might think of as having attempted 
to cast off the oppressive conceptual framework of race, class, and gender subordination 
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associated with vocational education.  Such schools were primarily established in order 
to provide vocational training; however, they also attempted to institute changes in the 
cultural contexts in which they existed; to participate in what I have termed a taking 
account of the deep structure of educational thought.  These schools, at least in some 
ways, might be thought of as engaging educational assets that would ensure that an 
education in workmanship was also an education that allowed for human dignity and 
equity; an education that ensured that the “how-to” knowledge of the technê of 
workmanship could be coupled with knowledge in epistêmê and, thus, provide an 
opportunity for students to attain the judgments of phronesis—to become capable 
practitioners of their vocations—and to participate in the creation and maintenance of 
culture.  Two such schools, related in cultural context and in educational theory and 
practice, were the Hampton Normal and Agricultural Institute and the Tuskegee Normal 
and Industrial Institute.31 
Hampton, founded in 1868 by Samuel Chapman Armstrong, has long been 
considered a model of educational progress for African-Americans after their 
emancipation.32  Tuskegee, founded in 1881 by Hampton graduate Booker T. 
Washington, was based upon and grew out of the model of vocational education 
                                                 
31 While there are many schools that might have been associated with thinking about the role of 
workmanship as educational practice, Hampton and Tuskegee allow me to discuss the critical reality of the 
educational models and the aspirational aims stated in regard to those models.  Many schools established 
to provide training for the professions (whether those professions were industrial, agricultural, or 
educational) did not do so in order to challenge cultural norms.  Further, Hampton and Tuskegee allow me 
to consider race as one form of subordination that acts to maintain the logic of domination associated with 
the patriarchal assumption that exists at the “rock bottom” of Western thought. 
32 This has been theorized to be a mistaken assumption.  It can be argued that those who considered 
Hampton a progressive model of educational practice were white people seeing it as a way to maintain the 
subjugation of newly emancipated Black people.  However, I will argue that there were previously enslaved 
people who, like Booker T. Washington, saw this model as a pragmatic means of contributing to and 
gaining a foothold in the culture that sought to suppress them.  See Anderson’s The Education of Blacks in 
the South, 1860-1935 (1988) for a more thorough discussion. 
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established at Hampton.  This model of education is generally regarded as one that would 
allow for recently emancipated Black people to attain intellectual and technical abilities 
that would allow them to engage their individual and cultural identities and to be 
completely equal participants in the creation, and economic life, of a newly emerging 
culture.33  Recent scholarship, particularly historian of education and critical race theorist 
James Anderson’s The Education of Blacks in the South, 1860-1935 (1988), provides an 
excellent critique of the claim that educational practices at both Hampton and Tuskegee 
were progressive.  Anderson suggests that these models of education, while viewed by 
whites as progressive, “represented the ideological antithesis of the educational and social 
movement begun by ex-slaves” (Anderson 1988, 33). 
The primary concept articulated by Anderson’s critique is that the educational 
models at both Hampton and Tuskegee were models that continued the oppression of the 
newly emancipated Black men and Black women of the United States.  Neither Hampton 
nor Tuskegee addressed the issues relevant to most previously enslaved people; issues of 
freedom and how that freedom influenced social order.  According to Anderson, 
education at Hampton—and by extension at Tuskegee—represented a curriculum 
supported by Armstrong’s social class and ideology.  Rather than providing a curriculum 
that supported the values of the newly emancipated Black people, Anderson notes that 
Armstrong, in addressing challenges to the oppression arising from the privilege of white 
culture, “developed a pedagogy and ideology designed to avoid such confrontations and 
to maintain within the South a social consensus that did not challenge traditional 
                                                 
33 While the enslaved Black people of the United States had attained both intellectual and technical 
abilities and had been participants in both cultural and economic life, their contributions had been 
silenced as a result of their enslavement and their marginalization at the hands of white culture. 
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inequalities of wealth and power” (Anderson 1988, 33).  Armstrong, as a result of his 
beliefs in the supremacy of white culture and in attempting to avoid confrontations, 
concentrated his efforts on creating a “nonskilled or semiskilled black work force that 
would support the southern economy” (Anderson 1988, 47).34  The educational 
philosophy indorsed by Armstrong served only to maintain an existing oppressive cultural 
framework that ensured the continued racial and class subjugation of a legislatively free 
people.  Current practices in vocational education, in an uncritical acceptance of the 
Hampton-Tuskegee model as representative of its history, have continued to further this 
oppression.  In separating vocational training from intellectual engagement, vocational 
education has failed to address criticisms of race, class, and gender equality.  Design, as 
representational of a variety of professional fields, has also struggled in regard to issues 
of race, class, and gender.  It may be that design’s educational identity as representing 
professional fields has similarly detached it from intellectual engagement and, in much 
the same way that vocational education has failed to address such criticisms, is limiting 
its ability to address instances of race, class, and gender inequality. 
 
The Hampton-Tuskegee Philosophy 
In contrast to Anderson’s claim of maintaining an existing oppressive cultural 
framework, the Hampton-Tuskegee philosophy of education, at least as implied in the 
writings of Washington, was intended to act as a means of helping eliminate the 
oppression of race and class disparity in the antebellum United States.  Nevertheless, the 
                                                 
34 Armstrong’s beliefs about the supremacy of the white race and its responsibility to rule over “the 
weaker dark-skinned races” (Anderson 1988, 38) is thoroughly delineated in James Anderson’s The 
Education of Blacks in the South, 1860-1935. 
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hopeful rhetoric associated with Washington’s descriptions of Tuskegee did not 
necessarily cohere to the actual educational practices employed.  The Hampton-Tuskegee 
model, in practice, can be criticized—in support of Anderson’s scholarship—as 
maintaining the race and economic privilege associated with white men in the United 
States.  Read generously, however, the curriculum at Tuskegee theorized in Up from 
Slavery (1986) intended to create students that could be employed and could establish 
themselves within a pre-existing and hostile culture.  This was to be accomplished 
through an education that dignified labor—similar to the dignity that came with skill as 
described by Terkel’s stonemason—by elevating it beyond technê, beyond the knowledge 
of skill associated with manual competence.  The curriculum at Tuskegee, at least 
according to the writings of Washington, was, resultantly, heavily invested in an 
education in technê.  An education elevated beyond the drudgery of labor, however, 
theorized an equality in the value of knowledge gained through manual competence and 
through traditional educational practices that provided epistemic knowledge.  Up from 
Slavery suggests that Washington held that both technê and epistêmê were necessary to 
the creation of new cultural practices that might ensure racial and class equality; 
educational concepts that were seen as necessary in challenging the cultural practices 
associated with white Northern industrialists and white Southern landowners. 
Prior to opening Tuskegee to students, Washington spent a month traveling and 
investigating what he found to be a subjugated community of impoverished and 
miseducated people.  Resultantly, he decided that “to take the children of such people as 
I had been among for a month, and each day give them a few hours of mere book 
education, I felt would be almost a waste of time” (Washington 1986, 118).  He further 
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clarifies this position when he suggests that there were Black people who had some formal 
education in grammar and mathematics but “had little thought or knowledge of applying 
these rules to the everyday affairs of their lives” (Washington 1986, 122).  As a result of 
this investigation, Washington was convinced that the teaching of epistemic knowledge—
of validating only the knowledge of epistêmê—would not suffice.  He clearly suggested 
an educational philosophy that valued multiple, and practical, sources of knowledge; “We 
wanted to teach them to study actual things instead of mere books alone” (Washington 
1986, 126).  There is, however, some question as to whether Washington effectively 
accomplished this task.  Educational practices at Hampton and Tuskegee are generally 
thought of as practices in effective vocational training, in teaching the “know-how” of 
technê as a means of attaining racial equity; however, Anderson has documented many 
examples of how the Hampton-Tuskegee educational model did not actually achieve 
these goals.  He suggests that the Hampton-Tuskegee model involved very little education 
in technê—Anderson suggests that an education at Hampton or Tuskegee only provided 
a level of instruction that produced semiskilled labor (See Anderson 1988, 47, 55, 59, 60, 
75, 77).  In accepting Anderson’s assertion that the Hampton-Tuskegee model produced 
only semiskilled labor, it suggests that this model of education did not achieve 
Washington’s philosophical goals.  Educational practices were, seemingly, more 
concerned with continuing to create laborers that would maintain the privilege of white 
industrialists and white landowners and continue the subjugation of Black labor. 
In Up from Slavery, Washington indicated that his intent to engage the students 
in labor was to have them understand “not only utility in labour, but beauty and dignity; 
[they] would be taught, in fact, how to lift labour up from mere drudgery and toil, and 
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would learn to love work for its own sake” (Washington 1986, 148).  “Work for its own 
sake,” in this sense, should not, however, be taken as representing the simple productive 
capacity of workmanship.  In the context of Washington’s hopeful account, the students 
at Tuskegee would be educated in both the technical and intellectual skills that would 
raise their work above drudgery, above the simple labor of the worker.  In an educational 
philosophy that provided instruction in both general and vocational practices, Washington 
was attempting to establish practices that, contrary to Armstrong’s practices, destabilized 
their cultural contexts, practices that would provide the practical wisdom that we might 
associate with phronesis.  Washington’s philosophy was attempting to move beyond 
oppressive binaries and allow for ways of knowing that did not cohere to his era’s cultural 
beliefs and assumptions.  Nevertheless, Washington’s philosophy of education in both 
manual and intellectual competence, while its rhetoric was hopeful and progressive, did 
not ultimately achieve his goals but, according to Anderson, continued to maintain 
conservative cultural values—cultural values that aligned with the greed of white 
industrialists and white landowners who wished for emancipated Black people to remain 
subjugated.  As Anderson (1988, 99) noted:  
They [white southerners] knew that blacks as a class had never submitted 
willingly to racist oppression or acknowledged the legitimacy of whites to rule 
over them.  Most white southerners, therefore, were naturally suspicious of the 
[northern] philanthropists’ claim that blacks could be formally schooled to accept 
subordinate social and economic roles.  Consequently, black education became 
the ideological medium of conflict between southern whites’ wishes for the 
preservation of traditional, coercive methods of subordination and the educational 
reformers’ demands for modern, subtle forms of social control.  The southern 
white opposition to universal education for both races was tied to entrenched 
social values, and it especially frustrated the philanthropic northerners. 
This statement strongly suggests that the fate of the newly emancipated Black people 
would not have improved regardless of educational philosophy or method of instruction.  
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Either educational system, the traditional denial of universal education proposed by white 
southerners or the subtle controls proposed by white northern philanthropists, was 
intended to ensure that Black people remained subjugated to the white race.  Such systems 
maintained the liabilities of race, class, and gender subordination.  Anderson’s critique of 
these systems, however, provides a means for educational theorists to engage the 
liabilities of other subordinating systems—particularly vocational education—that 
continue to be furthered through miseducative practices. 
While the educational model of Hampton-Tuskegee—by way of Anderson’s 
critical research and insights—has been shown to have both maintained and perpetuated 
cultural liabilities associated with race, class, and gender subordination, I would like to 
theorize Washington’s Up from Slavery as an educational model that could have 
addressed these liabilities.  Washington’s goal, the creating of an environment that 
encouraged the acceptance of new assets and the elimination of past liabilities, was one 
of hopefulness.  As a form of philosophical speculation, Washington’s work can be seen 
as offering a way to limit the liabilities of subordination and providing guidance in 
creating educational and cultural assets that can be of benefit to both general and 
vocational education.  Further, this speculation may also suggest methods of combatting 
oppression in regard to practices specifically associated with design education. 
 
Washington’s Idealist View 
Washington’s Up from Slavery offers a different, and arguably more idealistic, 
account of educational philosophy at Tuskegee; a philosophy that allowed for the 
education of previously enslaved people in the skills of manual competence—of technê—
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and in the educational subjects associated with epistêmê.35  Such an education would, 
ostensibly, provide ways for a newly emancipated people to participate in the economy 
and culture of the world that they now inhabited.  Washington suggested that the future 
of Black people “rested largely upon the question as to whether or not he [sic] should 
make himself [sic], through his [sic] skill, intelligence, and character, of such undeniable 
value to the community in which he [sic] lived that the community could not dispense 
with his [sic] presence” (1986, 202).  Washington suggests that educational practices at 
Tuskegee were successful in insuring the transition to an integrated community when he 
noted that voting practices had evolved such that “the disposition to vote against the white 
man merely because he is white is disappearing, and the race is learning to vote from 
principle, for what the voter considers to be for the best interests of both races” 
(Washington 1986, 111).   In this theory of skill, intelligence, and character, we can see 
the practical value of education; an education that provides a framework that is both 
vocational and intellectually engaging.  The ideas that Washington espoused in Up from 
Slavery, while perhaps idealistic and, as such, existing outside the reality of the historical 
narrative, can be thought of as offering a hopeful account of goals and practices that can 
ultimately be helpful in theorizing a means of evaluating the educational assets and 
liabilities that exist at the “rock bottom” of educational practices in workmanship.  From 
the diverse standpoints of the hopefulness of Up from Slavery and the critique provided 
by Anderson, we can begin to assess the assets and liabilities that support the deep 
                                                 
35 I argue that Booker T. Washington’s view, as expressed in Up from Slavery, was idealistic in that it 
portrays the hopefulness of Washington’s educational philosophy and may not represent the actual 
educational practices that existed at Tuskegee. 
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structure of educational thought and the resultant educational practices associated with 
vocational education and with the work of workmanship. 
 
Washington’s Educational Philosophy 
Up from Slavery presents a philosophy of education that may well be beneficial 
in re-theorizing both general and vocational education as they exist in contemporary 
society; in theorizing how the disjunct between education and lived experience—between 
a patriarchal culture that privileges objectivist ways of knowing over silenced 
epistemologies that exist as a result of race, class, and gender subordination—might be 
healed.  Washington’s philosophical position can be found within the narrative of his life 
and works and it is worthwhile to tease this position from the text of Up from Slavery and 
to explore it as a developed and grounded philosophy of education.  In any act of coaxing 
theory from a narrative account there is an element of interpretation; and with 
interpretation come the interpreter’s biases.  As I am a product of the deep structure of 
Western thought, one founded upon the patriarchal assumption, I must be continually 
mindful of how that bias allows for the danger of misinterpretation.  It is my intention to 
mindfully consider the broader theoretical notions in order to piece together a coherent 
philosophy that might suggest some means of addressing the liabilities present in my 
biases and, likewise, present in contemporary educational practices. 
In describing the beginnings of Tuskegee, as realized through the fog of time, 
Washington noted that both he and alumni of the school were “glad that we started as we 
did, and built ourselves up year by year, by a slow and natural process of growth” 
(Washington 1986, 162).  Tuskegee’s slow and natural building up can be held as the 
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foundation of Washington’s educational philosophy; all else builds from and is judged by 
this curricular foundation in educational—both general and vocational—and cultural 
engagement without endangering the fragile existence of a free but still subjugated race.  
As Washington stated, “The wisest among my race understand that the agitation of 
questions of social equality is the extremest folly, and that progress in the enjoyment of 
all the privileges that will come to us must be the result of severe and constant struggle 
rather than of artificial forcing” (1986, 223).  In this sense, Washington can be seen as 
not desirous of maintaining a subordinate position but rather of promoting a pragmatist 
stance that employed practical wisdom to address a particularly difficult situation.  
Education at Tuskegee can be viewed as opposing the oppressive framework of Western 
privilege not through the force of rhetoric but, rather, through the pragmatic acts of 
creating an environment of competence and confidence that would ensure the economic 
success of previously enslaved people and allow them to slowly integrate themselves into 
the resistive cultures of the industrial north and the agrarian south.  Washington’s teaching 
of “civilization, self-help, and self-reliance,” (Washington 1986, 149) a teaching of 
identity through the teaching of intellectual and manual competencies, provided the 
potential for his students lives to be meaningful, dignified, and fully participatory in both 
economic and cultural production. 
Of particular importance in theorizing his educational philosophy is Washington’s 
use of the term “ourselves” in describing a Tuskegee education.  This term is one that 
places the impetus of educating previously enslaved people on themselves; Washington 
is suggesting that, as he saw it, his work was not directed by the desires of white culture 
to continue exploiting the labor of Black people.   Washington’s assertion that “It means 
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a great deal, I think, to start off on a foundation which one has made for one’s self’” 
(Washington 1986, 162) reinforces this suggestion and stresses the importance of self-
direction, self-help, and self-reliance as fundamental to any educational process.  
Washington builds from the foundation of self-reliant engagement when describing the 
growth of the school and its students.  “But gradually, by patience and hard work, we 
brought order out of chaos, just as will be true of any problem if we stick to it with 
patience and wisdom and earnest effort” (Washington 1986, 161).  This statement 
codifies a narrative of problem solving; engaging in an experiential world and 
pragmatically solving problems as they are encountered; in making the critical judgments 
that we associate with phronesis.  Throughout the text, Washington identifies and then 
solves problems—pragmatic problems of individual identity, of utility, and of cultural 
integration.  He justifies a vocational education grounded in solving the problems 
presented in and through lived experience as a necessary complement to an academic 
education when he asserts that “The individual who can do something that the world 
wants done will, in the end, make his way regardless of his race” (Washington 1986, 155).  
This is not a denial of epistemic knowledge, simply a re-positioning of the necessity and 
value of the practical arts; an assertion that vocational education can act to destabilize the 
privilege associated with objectivist epistemology and allow for the possibility of 
multiple ways of knowing that are grounded in the practical wisdom of lived experience.  
An introduction of the practical arts—of engaged practices of making and doing—may 
likewise destabilize student expectations and encourage an acceptance of knowledge 
beyond the epistemic and beyond the binary of objectivity and subjectivity. 
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This pragmatic re-valuation of the vocational arts should be read as descriptive of 
the beliefs that Washington saw as necessary to education at Tuskegee.  Washington 
theorized the pragmatic when he advocated that the students be “taught the latest and best 
methods of labour;” (Washington 1986, 148) however, he did not mean for their 
education to stop at the level of labor, his intention was to teach them the wisdom “to lift 
labour up from mere drudgery and toil…” (Washington 1986, 148).  The building of the 
campus buildings by the students at Tuskegee represents a best practices means of 
accomplishing this educational task.  The buildings, and the knowledge that they were 
the products of student labor, provided a tangible and permanent sense of personal 
accomplishment; an educational knowledge of the value of individual life experiences.  
The buildings act as a pedagogy of “civilization, self-help, and self-reliance” 
(Washington 1986, 149) that is built upon Washington’s foundation of a slow and natural 
building up; a unification of theory and practice that leads to the ability to make 
judgments; a unification of multiple forms of knowledge associated with phronesis.  This 
can be seen as equivalent to a unification of the disjunct between education and lived 
experience theorized by Dewey; a unification that allows for making informed judgments.  
The unification of an education in technê and epistêmê provides a critical wisdom that 
just is phronesis. 
In The Souls of Black Folk, W.E.B. Du Bois presents a criticism of Washington’s 
privileging of vocational education over what Du Bois presents as a striving toward 
higher culture.  Du Bois, in his aversion to Washington’s educational beliefs, indicates 
that there are many who have “deep regret, sorrow, and apprehension” (Du Bois 2014, 
26) regarding Washington’s leadership.  It is possible that this criticism can be read as an 
95 
intellectualist explication of the differences between contemporary education grounded 
in what we think of as objectivist knowledge and educational practices that employ an 
experiential and material engagement with the world in order to broaden possible ways 
of knowing.  Du Bois noted that, in the cultural practices espoused by Washington, the 
ideals—Du Bois’ educational ideals related to a classical liberal education—implicit in a 
new cultural beginning for newly emancipated Black people had been abandoned in favor 
of industrial and commercial successes.   Du Bois argued that Black people bear the 
responsibility for critical discrimination, based in a liberal education, if they were to have 
cultural equality (Du Bois 2014).  While these differences between Washington and Du 
Bois are subject to criticism, it appears to explicitly highlight the binary discrepancy 
between technê and epistêmê; it suggests that it is this binary opposition that 
differentiated the educational philosophies of Washington and Du Bois.  While Du Bois 
advocated for an equality grounded in the dominant paradigm of epistemic knowledge, 
Washington proposed a pragmatist approach to cultural integration that foremost valued 
the necessity of both skill and knowledge.  While it might seem as if Washington 
prioritized the educational value of workmanship over the privilege of epistemic 
knowledge, I suggest that Washington’s educational philosophy—in advocating for 
dignity in labor—sought to unite technê and epistêmê as a means of addressing and 
overcoming the oppressive cultural frameworks that continued to subjugate people based 
upon their race, class, and gender identities. 
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Tuskegee: The Educational Value of Workmanship 
It is this heightened sense of the dignity of labor—the practical wisdom of 
phronesis—that can be attained through education in the “know-how” of technê and the 
intellectual engagement of epistêmê that established the educational philosophy that 
Washington suggests in Up from Slavery.  In order to ensure that the educational assets 
associated with workmanship, as an expression of manual competence, can support a 
conceptual framework for education in design, it must be taught and understood as part 
of a unified model of practical knowledge far more engaging than the toil of disinterested 
labor.  This “know-how” form of intelligence—the experiential knowledge of technê 
coupled with epistêmê, allows for students to attain phronesis—the practical wisdom that 
gives dignity to work, that raises manual labor to the heightened level of reciprocal 
engagement—the ability to work and to make intentional judgments about that work.  
Washington, in articulating the necessities of manual competence and intellectual 
engagement, noted that “no race can prosper till it learns that there is as much dignity in 
tilling a field as in writing a poem” (Washington 1986, 129).  This statement suggests an 
equality between the manual/technical/vocational and the intellectual; an equality that 
was necessary in challenging the oppressive conceptual frameworks of American 
antebellum culture. 
Washington recognized the need for dignified labor but he also realized that there 
must also be technological progress if the students of Tuskegee were to be recognized as 
active contributors to—and indispensable members of—a new American economy and a 
new American culture.  In describing his pedagogical goals—the teaching of the dignity 
of labor—Washington noted that he did not intend to “teach them to work in the old way, 
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but to show them how to make the forces of nature—air, water, steam, electricity, horse-
power—assist them in their labour” (Washington 1986, 148).  This goal provided a 
powerful and meaningful way forward in a time of social, political, economic, and 
environmental uncertainty.  Coupled with his call for dignity in labor—for the critical 
judgments associated with phronesis—this statement grounds a pedagogy that provides 
an understanding of the necessity of innovation; of technological progress.  The dignity 
of manual competence associated with technê, coupled with the intelligent knowledge of 
epistêmê, allowed students to employ the practical judgments of phronesis and allowed 
them to move beyond drudgery and toil to become problem solvers.  The exercise of the 
practical wisdom of phronesis positioned the students at Tuskegee to become creative 
innovators; to engage in the creation of physical artifacts that mediated their relationships 
with and in the world.  Relying upon a critical engagement with lived experience, the 
students at Tuskegee would be able to apply the wisdom of phronesis in solving problems 
that had an effect upon their daily lives and the economic and cultural lives of those 
around them. 
Also implicit in Washington’s statement concerning labor and technology is an 
understanding of the forces of nature as assistive forces to be harnessed in the progress 
of humankind rather than subjugated resources to be manipulated and exploited.  This 
understanding, while perhaps not fully intentional, can be seen as revolutionary in its 
view toward stewardship of the ecological world.  Speculatively, one might suggest that 
this view emerges from Washington’s own observations of white culture’s exploitation 
of Black people both before and after their emancipation.  It would be reasonable to 
assume that anyone who had felt the disinterested sting of oppression at the personal level 
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might also be painfully aware of exploitation at any level.36  When Washington noted that 
he “learned that assistance given to the weak makes the one who gives it strong; and that 
oppression of the unfortunate makes one weak,” (Washington 1986, 165) he provides an 
ethic of care that can be applied equally to the individual and to the environment. 
In an effort to ensure that the students of Tuskegee were able to participate fully 
in economic and cultural production, Washington theorized a pedagogy of intellectual 
engagement and of experience in manual competence; he had the students erect their 
buildings, construct their furniture, and even grow and prepare their own food.  He was 
obviously satisfied when he noted that “hundreds of men [sic] are now scattered 
throughout the South who received their knowledge of mechanics while being taught how 
to erect these buildings” (Washington 1986, 149).  These lessons were lessons concerning 
the material engagement of making and the reflective judgments of phronesis that arose 
from the knowledge of intellectual engagement.  From these lessons students learned the 
skills necessary to find dignity in labor; they learned to solve real problems, to think 
critically about what they were doing, and to think creatively in an effort to improve their 
technologies and their lives. 
Without the self-confidence learned through self-reliance, the students of 
Tuskegee would not have been prepared to contribute to the social and economic health 
of a struggling nation.  They would have assumed the menial positions of drudgery 
associated with laborers and would have experienced similar exploitations that 
emancipation was intended to correct.  With an educational foundation in manual 
competence and intellectual engagement, Washington noted that the skills learned by his 
                                                 
36 Of course, there are marginalized people who do not recognize systemic oppression and, as such, might 
not be willing to equate human oppression with environmental exploitation. 
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students “caused many of the white residents of the neighbourhood to begin to feel that 
the education of the Negro was not making him worthless, but that in educating our 
students we were adding something to the wealth and comfort of the community” 
(Washington 1986, 153).  This community engagement was a nascent form of the 
construction of a new social paradigm.  Washington and his students were beginning to 
employ the lessons of their manual competence to initiate a dialog of change; a shift from 
racial discrimination to economic and cultural inclusion. 
The ability to employ the practical judgments of phronesis in initiating cultural 
dialog concerning the equality of all subordinated people and concerning the concept of 
human dignity can be thought of as missing from traditional forms of education in 
workmanship.  It is only in theorizing education at Tuskegee as hopeful—only in my 
theoretical speculation—that we can elevate workmanship to something more than 
disinterested labor.  While this appears to have been Washington’s goal, other forces 
seemingly conspired to ensure that the education of previously enslaved Black people did 
not attain that level of engagement. As such, it appears that the Hampton-Tuskegee 
model—at least as realized in practice—does not assist in establishing an education in 
workmanship as fully extending, and providing a foundation for, the deep structure of 
educational thought in design.  It appears that the educational value of workmanship, in 
its present forms, is not yet sufficient to ensure that education in design accounts for the 
assets and liabilities necessary to counter contemporary criticisms. 
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Vocational Pedagogy and Design Education 
Washington’s pedagogical model does, however, possess critical similarities to 
the contemporary educational/social critique theorized by Crawford (2010) in his Shop 
Class as Soulcraft.  Crawford theorizes a return to the teaching of manual competencies 
as a means of engaging knowledge of the physical attributes of the world; as a means of 
engaging ways of knowing that exist outside the binary knowledge associated with 
contemporary educational practice.  Crawford’s theoretical position presents a critical 
and creative education as necessary to escape the inherent oppressions of procedural and 
objectivist knowledge.  It appears; however, that the practical wisdom originally espoused 
as a means of educational inquiry by Washington—and recently echoed by Crawford—
has become marginalized as a form of common education in the United States.  This has 
not always been the case.  As stated previously, vocational education was originally 
theorized as an integral part of general education.  Historically, general educational 
practice included courses that we now think of as vocational; shop classes, home 
economics, agricultural training, and other skill classes.  These classes, as originally 
conceived and implemented, were not focused on teaching manual labor, but rather were 
intended to teach the competencies—both manual and intellectual—necessary to prepare 
students for mastery of particular trades and to give them the intellectual abilities to 
participate in economic, technological, and cultural progress.  The skill training programs 
offered by U.S. high schools served as excellent working examples of educational 
practices grounded in the intellectual merits of material and manual competence.  
Crawford has noted that the shift away from education in manual competence became 
readily evident in the mid-1980s when educational journals began promoting a 
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technology revolution, the high-tech job market, and a globalized future.  Crawford noted 
that we had shifted from a material economy to a virtual futurism; to a “vision of the 
future in which we somehow take leave of material reality and glide about in a pure 
information economy” (Crawford 2010, 03).  This shift to a pure information economy is 
analogous to the critique of monarchist structures that exist in forms of design education 
that do not acknowledge the necessity of lived experience; of experiences associated with 
the domestic nature of technê.  Such curricula suggest that design students need have no 
concern for site, for client, for materiality, or for the environment; these concerns being 
contingent to the purity of intellect associated with monarchist theories of design.  All of 
the contingencies of lived experience exist in a state of subservience to the monarchist 
will of the designer. 
In American educational systems, this shift away from skills training culminated 
in the 1990s when skills training was removed from most schools as educators substituted 
the intelligence associated with manual competencies—with technê—for coursework that 
would allow students to become knowledge workers.  Along with the demise of shop 
class, there was a concurrent shift away from the intellectual competencies promoted by 
a liberal arts education.  The shift away from these core competencies in general 
education further reinforced the monarchist model of design education that subjugated 
the value of the ‘know-how’ of technê to the idea of pure design—design associated with 
the will of the designer and the universal character of epistêmê supplanted the ability of 
the designer to make practical judgments.  Within the information economy, the practical 
judgments afforded by manual competence engaged with knowledge in the liberal arts—
a critical and curiously engaged intelligence that we understand as phronesis—is removed 
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as a valid way of knowing and as a valid means of education in design.  With this shift 
away from a reciprocal and engaged knowledge, we, seemingly, no longer cared to know 
how to till a field or how to write poetry.  As Crawford put it, this “disappearance of tools 
from our common education is the first step toward a wider ignorance of the world of 
artifacts we inhabit” (Crawford 2010, 01).  This disappearance of tools implies a 
disappearance of both the physical artifacts that we commonly call tools and the 
intellectual capabilities that are necessary tools of critical engagement with the physical 
world, with the creation of culture, and with multiple forms of knowledge.  The 
intelligence of homo faber has shifted from the material world of making to that of homo 
sapiens—knowing man—to a realm of disinterested knowledge and information that is 
not informed by the wisdom of phronesis; by the reflective judgments available through 
a coupling of the intelligent ‘know-how’ of technê and the knowledge of epistêmê. 
In an effort to re-engage the world, an approach to design education that embraces 
practical wisdom and its requisite engagement with the intellectual, the manual, and the 
material appears to be as least one promising response.  The idea of practical wisdom, 
one encompassing both the physical acts of making and the intellectual skills necessary 
to facilitate judgments in regard to those acts is, perhaps, an appropriate framework upon 
which to build a new theory of educational practice.  This model of education founded in 
making judgments grounded in lived experience might most readily emulate the model 
of learning dignity in labor theorized by Booker T. Washington as he led the students of 
Tuskegee toward integration within an established and dominant system that still viewed 
newly emancipated Black people as not capable of participating in the social, political, 
and economic culture from which they were disenfranchised yet inextricably tied. 
103 
Up from Slavery provided a new means of viewing the world that Washington 
hoped might eventually become accepted practice.  An education tempered with the 
manual competence associated with technê, likewise, might change the currently 
dominant educational model founded upon procedural and objectivist epistemologies.  
The inclusion of educational practices that lead to an engaged practical wisdom and its 
goal of creating creative and critical learners might replace the paradigm of the singularity 
of epistemic knowledge with one of multiple ways of knowing. 
The narrative works of Washington and Crawford are essential in conceiving of 
an educational philosophy that is both grounded in practical wisdom and aware of the 
necessity to move beyond methodologies that are objectivist in nature. The historical 
narrative of Washington is particularly valuable in that it was conceived of in response to 
cultural uncertainties very similar to our own; a period of social, political, economic and 
environmental uncertainty.  The educational philosophy provided in Up from Slavery, in 
responding to the particular context of a newly emancipated people, is beneficial in 
elucidating educational wisdom.  Washington’s theories might be appropriately 
employed to interrogate the oppression of race, class, and gender subordination and allow 
educational practice to engage other ways of knowing.  As such, we might be able to 
work toward the creation of creative and critical learners who are not limited by the 
cultural biases that exist in the deep structure of Western thought that favors procedural 
and objectivist knowledge.  In advocating a space for the inclusion of an education in 
manual competence—for an education in technê—in design pedagogy, a similar outcome 
might be expected.  If we teach our students the dignity of labor, the critical judgments 
required to move beyond the drudgery of disinterested labor, and the self-confidence that 
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comes from self-reliance, then design education can begin to repair and resume its relation 
to cultural discourse and the ethos of contemporary culture.  Washington believed that 
“the individual who can do something that the world wants done will, in the end, make 
his way regardless of his race” (Washington 1986, 149).  This statement, if interpreted as 
a call for educational practices that embrace manual competence, may well be the means 
to construct an effective framework for design education.  Such philosophical 
speculation, however, eliminates contemporary vocational education—education in 
workmanship—as beneficial to practices in design education.  However, in the ways of 
making associated with craftsmanship we find an alternative that appears to cohere to a 
model of beliefs and practices that will benefit design education; beliefs and practices that 
can assist in theorizing the deep structure of education in design. 
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Chapter Three: The Origins of Craftsmanship 
 
An Examination of Craftsmanship 
In an effort to come to terms with several longstanding criticisms of design 
education, criticisms of pedagogical effectiveness, of curricular content, and of academic 
identity, I suggested that these criticisms were erroneously focused on design 
methodology—on what counted as design—rather than upon any perceived limitations 
in regard to educational thought.  Critics of design education have generally delineated 
their beliefs about what they have considered good design—methodological practices that 
represent matters of taste and opinion—and how those beliefs might be implemented in 
educational practice.  In concerning themselves solely with methodological critiques, 
most critics have failed to consider how educational thought might impact educational 
practices in design.  They have failed to realize how an exploration of the deep structure 
of educational thought in design might change how we think about and teach design.  This 
reconceptualization of those criticisms of methodology in design education as, more 
appropriately, criticisms of educational thought has paralleled my attempts to situate 
myself as a designer and as a design educator.  In identifying as “a maker of everythings,” 
I have begun to explore what a maker might be—how one who identifies as a maker 
might have an impact upon educational thought. 
As a maker, as one who produces physical artifacts, I began to explore ways of 
making that might have an impact upon how I work as a designer and how I teach others 
to become designers.  In order to gain some perspective on how I might conceive of what 
it means to be a maker, I came to the conclusion that there were three ways that I might 
think of myself—I could be a maker that created artifacts associated with artistry, with 
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workmanship, or with those practices that we call design.  As noted earlier, however, 
being a maker that identified as a designer did not lend any clarity to what it is that I 
thought I did.  In digging deeper into the idea of what being a designer might mean, I 
found that the term design was of relatively recent origin—it came to have its present 
meaning during the rise of industrialism when acts of making were mechanized and, 
resultantly, removed from the hands of craftspeople.  This association of design with 
earlier practices of craftsmanship allowed me to think of a designer as a craftsperson, as 
one who produces physical artifacts that are associated with mediating human (and non-
human) relationships with and in the world.  A craftsperson was a type of maker who 
conceived of and produced useful things.  The work of craftsmanship implies a continual 
and reciprocal process from conception to the completion of physical artifacts that, in 
some way, are useful in the daily lives of humans.  While this association of design with 
craftsmanship was helpful in beginning to understand myself as “a maker of everythings,” 
I was still not satisfied with how I could clearly distinguish between makers that identified 
as artists, as workers, or as craftspeople. 
I was not yet sure how each of these three ways of making might influence how I 
thought about and taught design; of how my identity as a maker might impact educational 
thought.  In each of these ways of making there are similarities that can be perceived of 
as beneficial to educational practices associated with design.  Generally, artists, workers, 
and craftspeople are engaged in processes that involve physical materials and that 
produce physical artifacts as a result of those processes.37  An engagement with physical 
                                                 
37 Here, I qualify my assertion with the term “generally” as some of the practices associated with artistry 
do not produce physical artifacts.  I am thinking primarily about theatrical and musical productions and 
performance art.  I would argue, however, that for the most part, even these involve some processes that 
depend upon physical materials for their execution.  For the purpose of distinguishing these three as types 
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materials and the aptitudes necessary to produce physical artifacts appears to be an 
essential component in the education of designers.  The communicative skills of the artist 
and the productive skills of the worker and the craftsperson seem appropriate to the 
education of designers; contemporary designers employ these skills in order to conceive 
of, study and refine through a process of prototyping, and successfully communicate their 
ideas to others.  Both the skills associated with making and with visual communication 
are assets that should be developed in young designers through educational practices.  
These similarities, however, are outweighed by differences in the intentionality inherent 
in each of these ways of making.  The intentions of the artist, the worker, and the 
craftsperson differ radically. 
As noted earlier, it is not the means of production or the artifacts produced that 
primarily differentiate artists, workers, and craftspeople.  It is the intentionality of the 
artist, worker, or craftsperson that distinguishes their ways of making.  I have suggested 
that the intention of the artist is to create artifacts and/or events that communicate a 
culture’s beliefs about the world; communications that express how a particular group 
perceives of the world or wishes their world to be perceived.  In this case, the physical 
characteristics of the artifact produced are not necessarily as significant as the idea or 
ideas communicated.  In the case of the worker, I have suggested that there is no intention 
beyond the act of making; the worker makes as an end in itself.  The craftsperson, on the 
other hand, intentionally works to create physical artifacts that assist in mediating human 
(and non-human) relationships with and in the world.  The artifacts produced by 
                                                 
of makers, I think it is an appropriate claim if we agree that making is thought of as related to the 
production of artifacts. 
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craftspeople are primarily concerned with utility; with the value that the artifacts have in 
doing things that need to be done. 
While the skills, processes, and intentions of artists, workers, and craftspeople can 
be seen as assets in regard to each of their particular ways of making, they serve distinctly 
different purposes.  These skills, processes, and intentions also begin to differentiate 
educational practices that might be implemented in regard to the teaching of artists, of 
workers, and of designers.  Even though some of the assets associated with the practices 
of artistry, workmanship, and craftsmanship may be beneficial to education in design, 
there are also beliefs and practices that exist in regard to each of these ways of making 
that can be perceived of as liabilities to design education.  In an attempt to identify 
liabilities that might negatively influence educational practices related to design, I 
theorized the necessity of exploring what Jane Roland Martin called the deep structure of 
thought; the fundamental beliefs and assumptions that support our understandings of and 
influence educational practices in relation to artistry, to workmanship, and to 
craftsmanship.  Resultantly, I have begun to engage the deep structure of thought in regard 
to each of these ways of making in an attempt to think about contemporary criticisms of 
design from an educational standpoint.  In doing so, I have begun to identify liabilities 
that exist within the deep structure of Western thought and to explore how these liabilities 
might have an impact upon education in design.  An exploration of this deep structure 
attempts to reach the “rock bottom” that grounds our beliefs and assumptions about the 
world and, as such, provides a foundation for educational thought; for how we think about 
and teach design. 
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Having previously taken account of the ways of making associated with artistry 
and workmanship—the deep structure of thought that influences how we understand the 
work of artists and the work of workers and how we understand education in artistry and 
workmanship—I have come to the conclusion that it is primarily liabilities that exist at 
the “rock bottom” of Western thought that are most detrimental to educational thought.  
Resultantly, it is important to return to an examination of this deep structure of thought 
and its association with craftsmanship to determine if this way of making can assist in 
challenging those liabilities.  An exploration of the deep structure of thought that supports 
an education in craftsmanship may provide direction in identifying and mitigating 
liabilities that currently exist in educational thought and, as such, in practices related to 
education in design. 
 
The “Rock Bottom” of Western Thought 
In theorizing the deep structure of thought that conceptually grounds our beliefs 
and assumptions in regard to the history and philosophy of education in design, it is 
beneficial to engage the conceptual origins of craftsmanship.  Practices associated with 
craftsmanship—the making of physical artifacts that are useful to humans in living their 
daily lives—can be thought of as practices that stand in as the precursors of those 
practices that we currently associate with design.  These practices have produced physical 
artifacts that can be identified and understood as useful throughout the entirety of the 
historical record.  We have identified and collected artifacts produced by craftspeople 
from almost all periods in the archeological record of humankind; useful artifacts that 
existed prior to recorded history.  Museums are filled with artifacts that contain, that 
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cover, and that support; artifacts that have, over time, described and explained human 
relationships with and in the world.  Recorded history is also filled with references to the 
artifacts that humans have created and used.  Our earliest recorded documents also give 
us a glimpse into how early humans understood craftsmanship and how they explained 
its origins and necessity.  In the Western historical tradition, some of our earliest accounts 
of craftsmanship are found in Greek mythology.38  These same myths also contain what 
might be thought of as the “rock bottom” beliefs and assumptions about the world that 
are the foundation of Western thought.  The mythical stories recorded by the Greek poets 
begin to flesh out our understanding of what it means to be human; they construct and 
explore our human relationships with and in the world.  Social psychologist Émile 
Durkheim has noted that myths provide the basis of our means of categorizing the 
world—of making the world understandable—and, as such, myths can be seen as forming 
the basis of philosophy and science (Durkheim 1995).  Further, social anthropologist 
Perry Cohen has theorized that “one of the important functions of myth is that it anchors 
the present in the past” (Cohen 1969).  Myths, in this way, act to establish the historical 
basis of our contemporary beliefs about the world.  Popularizer of classical Western 
mythology Thomas Bulfinch, in attempting to expose the Greek myths to a broader 
audience, suggested that the origins of mythology might be thought of as allegorical; “that 
all the myths of the ancients were allegorical and symbolical, and contained some moral, 
religious, or philosophical truth or historical fact… there are many myths which have 
                                                 
38 While craftsmanship certainly exists in other cultural traditions, I limit myself to Western sources for 
three reasons.  First, the temporal scope of this project does not allow for the scholarship necessary to 
explore these ideas from within different cultural perspectives.  I leave that work in the capable hands of 
others as they explore other traditions.  Secondly, I am writing from, and am a product of, a Western 
tradition that gives me a particular knowledge base to work from/within.  Finally, I have focused upon 
Western traditions as they establish the foundational beliefs and assumptions of which I am critical. 
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arisen from the desire of man [sic] to account for those natural phenomena which he [sic] 
cannot understand” (Bulfinch 1990, 228 – 229).  Bulfinch’s suggestion that myths be 
considered allegorical, coupled with Durkheim’s assertions, allows us to think about them 
as a pre-rational way of comprehending things that we could not easily explain. 
In accepting that the Greek myths are allegorical lessons that describe our beliefs 
and assumptions about the world and our relationships within it, these myths can be 
thought of as the “rock bottom” of Western thought.  They constitute the foundation from 
which all subsequent thought arises, responds to, and is structured.  As such, the deep 
structure of thought in regard to our understanding of craftsmanship can be thought of as 
emerging from the same foundation that anchors the beliefs, assumptions, and practices 
that are responsible for what Martin called the nature/culture split and the binary 
relationship associated with the public and private spheres.  In theorizing craftsmanship 
as the historical and philosophical progenitor of design, it is necessary to engage 
craftsmanship at this “rock bottom”—in the allegorical stories of the Greeks that underlie 
the origins of Western thought.  Taking account of some of the assets and liabilities 
contained within these allegorical foundations—and how each might influence 
educational practices in design—may prove beneficial in conceptualizing how we think 
about and teach design.  In engaging craftsmanship at its “rock bottom” it may be most 
beneficial to begin with an exploration of the relationship between the origins of 
craftsmanship and the patriarchal assumption.  The patriarchal assumption—what I have 
described as the deeply embedded bias toward the oppression associated with the 
masculine binary—appears to be intimately tied to the origins of craftsmanship.  As I will 
suggest, the patriarchal assumption embodies those beliefs and assumptions that—at least 
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to the archaic Greek mind—made craftsmanship necessary; those beliefs and assumptions 
that created both the nature/culture split and the public/private realms of human behavior. 
 
The Origins of the Patriarchal Assumption 
Greek mythology provides us with the landscape for exploring the most basic 
beliefs and assumptions that have informed Western thought concerning human 
relationships with and in the world.  These myths constitute the ‘rock bottom’ of Western 
thought; they are the origin of, and foundation for, the deep structure of Western thought 
and, resultantly, contain both assets and liabilities that affect how we think about the 
world and our relationships with and in it.  They originate the dominant beliefs and 
practices that shape the structure of our contemporary lives.  At a “rock bottom” level, 
they inform how we understand the world and our place in it.  It is within the allegorical 
tales of the Greek myths that we find both the origins of the patriarchal assumption and, 
as a result of that assumption, the need for humans to engage in the practices of creating 
useful artifacts in order to negotiate our relationships with and in the world.  After an 
account of the origins of the patriarchal assumption and the needs that arose from it, I will 
engage and re-vision the role of Pandora in originating the necessity of craftsmanship.  
The origins of the patriarchal assumption and the allegorical origins of craftsmanship—
of making physical artifacts that assist in mediating human relationships with and in the 
world—begin with Prometheus and his gifts to humanity—a humanity that originally 
consisted only of men. 
In order to theorize the origins of the patriarchal assumption, it is necessary to 
turn to the archaic Greek understanding of the creation of the world and the position of 
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humankind within it.  Prior to this exploration of the origins of western thought, it is 
important to understand that the stories that we collectively call the Greek myths are a 
later, written, compilation that selectively combined, condensed, and editorialized 
multiple oral traditions.  Classical scholar Timothy Gantz has suggested that we should 
“adhere to the concept of a general corpus of traditional tales known to professional 
storytellers of the time of Homer and earlier, and while each of these storytellers made 
his [sic] own selection (and, no doubt, some innovations), the appeal of this corpus surely 
derived from a certain canonical element maintained despite the diversity of individual 
treatment” (Gantz 1993, xviii).  In other words, even though the Greek myths as we know 
them today are a compilation of multiple stories told by multiple tellers, we should accept 
them as basically cohering to and explaining a more-or-less unified Greek worldview. In 
this sense, the basic structure of the creation of the world is generally understood as 
having evolved from a need for order, a need to organize Chaos.  Further, while the place 
of humanity within an organized world is not completely clear, most agree that it has been 
codified into the story of Prometheus and his defiance of Zeus.  These stories, of creation 
and being, can be seen as providing an etiological understanding of humankind’s 
relationship to the world; they act as causal explanations of the human condition.  The 
creation of the earth and its subsequent population with men arose out of the desires of 
Gods and Nature to differentiate the discordant singularity of Chaos.39  As Bulfinch 
described it, they separated:  
earth from sea, and heaven from both.  The fiery part, being the lightest, sprang 
up, and formed the skies; the air was next in weight and place.  The earth, being 
                                                 
39 I use the term “men” here only because, according to the archaic Greeks, there were no women in the 
initial creation.  All of humanity consisted solely of men.  Women, and most particularly Pandora, came 
later as it became necessary to differentiate men from the gods.  This, of course, differs from primitive 
Greek theology which was matriarchal. 
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heavier, sank below; and the water took the lowest place, and buoyed up the earth.  
Here some god—it is not known which—gave his [sic] good offices in arranging 
and disposing the earth.  He [sic] appointed rivers and bays their places, raised 
mountains, scooped out valleys, distributed woods, fountains, fertile fields, and 
stony plains.  The air being cleared, the stars began to appear, fishes took 
possession of the sea, birds of the air, and four-footed beasts of the land (Bulfinch 
1990, 25).40 
After the formation of the world, the Greek stories are not consistent in their explanations 
concerning the creation of mankind.  Bulfinch does, however, remind us that there was a 
race of giants, the Titans, that inhabited the earth before the age of man.  It was two of 
the Titans, Prometheus and his brother Epimetheus, who—at least in some stories—are 
said to have been tasked with creating mankind and equipping these men with everything 
necessary to ensure their continued lives on earth.   This differentiation of mankind from 
the world—one where men were a secondary act of creation and, as such, not an integral 
part of the world—can be thought of as the first of two binary distinctions that foreshadow 
the patriarchal assumption.  In creating this first binary there is also an act of privileging.  
There is an implied privileging of the world over humanity in that men must be 
additionally equipped in order to survive; men—in that their survival is not assured—are 
made contingent to the assumed permanence of the world.  In this binary pair the power 
of nature is privileged over the perceived physical weakness of man.  This first binary 
differentiation is representational of Martin’s nature/culture split and is one of the most 
basic of our “rock bottom” assumptions.  
While it is not completely clear in Greek accounts as to how or when mankind 
came into being, it is consistently understood that the original men—the anthropoi—lived 
“like gods, without toil or cares, without even old age, and they feast constantly, as the 
                                                 
40 This description of the creation of the world from Chaos may have been influenced by Bulfinch’s 
Christian beliefs.  See, particularly, Genesis Chapter I. 
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earth produces an abundance of food for them” (Gantz 1993, 153).  While these men were 
mortal and did experience death, new men were created and inhabited subsequent ages 
until we arrive at Hesiod’s final race of men.  This process of death and rebirth further 
solidifies the claim of man’s being contingent to the permanent character of both the 
world and the gods.   Regardless of their origin, the men who were to benefit from the 
largess of Prometheus consisted of the final race—the iron race—of the Five Ages of 
Man.41  This iron race is assumed to have been a lesser race of men who were required to 
struggle in the world as opposed to the first and golden race of the anthropoi.  As a result 
of their struggles, Prometheus acted as a benefactor to the race of iron on two different 
occasions.  The first of these occurred when he represented mankind in the sacrificial 
division at the banquet of Mekone where Prometheus divided a sacrificial cow between 
the gods and men.  In dividing the cow into what should have been equal portions—of 
which Zeus would have first choice—Prometheus deceived Zeus, and benefited mankind, 
by covering the choicer cuts with entrails and covering the bones and offal with coveted 
fat.  For this deception, the angered Zeus withheld fire from mankind.  Interpretations of 
this story suggest that it provides the etiological basis of offering only the bones and offal 
as sacrifice to the gods while humankind benefits from the more nourishing cuts.42  
Another possible interpretation of this story suggests that this act of deception explains 
the initial differentiation of mankind from the gods, who, prior to the Mekone feast, 
existed with equal standing—an equality that allowed both to participate in a common 
                                                 
41 See Hesiod’s Works and Days for a more complete explanation of the Five Ages of Man. 
42 See Carlos Paradas’ The Era of Zeus for a more comprehensive discussion of sacrificial practices in 
ancient Greece. 
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banquet.43  In accepting this interpretation, Prometheus’ deception created the second of 
a pair of binaries that predated and influenced the patriarchal assumption. 
When the lives of men were not differentiated from the lives of the gods—when 
men could sit at the same banquet table as the gods—there was an implied equality of 
existence.  Both the gods and men coexisted in an eternal state with no privileging in their 
differences.  As a result of the deception at Mekone and Zeus’ subsequent retribution, this 
differentiation became one of privilege; the gods were made superior to men by virtue of 
their association with fire.  Like the initial binary created between man and nature—the 
nature/culture split—the distinction between the gods and men appears to be a binary 
pairing that manifests as an oppressive conceptual framework.  In the differentiation of 
the gods and men, in the denial of fire by Zeus, it is clear that a dominant/subordinate 
relationship was created that privileged the gods over men.  This privileging of the gods 
over men provides the basis for the monarchist privilege described by Susan Laird and 
applied to my critique of education in artistry and its reliance upon canonical systems. 
In most interpretations of this privileging of the divine, the subsequent 
introduction of Pandora can be seen as the ultimate degradation of man in his relation to 
the gods.  Pandora, the first woman in most tellings of the story, releases great suffering 
and evils upon the lives of men.   This degradation is also characterized by the necessity 
of the “lesser” womankind to ensure the continuance of human life whereas the gods—
who existed beyond temporal constraints—needed no external means of reproduction.  
Again, humanity is contingent in relation to the universal character of the world and the 
universal character of the gods who exercise control over the world.  Pandora’s story is 
                                                 
43 Eliot Wirshbo’s The Mekone Scene in the Theogony: Prometheus as Prankster provides a more 
thorough explanation of the interpretation posed above. 
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further characterized by the introduction of the domestic; a sphere of existence associated 
with the feminine and seen as subordinate to civic life.  It is in this binary pairing that we 
find the second of Martin’s “rock bottom” assumptions, the differentiation of the civic 
and the domestic—the privileging of the public over the private realms of human 
existence.  The creation of woman as both a punishment for the actions of Prometheus 
and as a means of allowing the continued existence of humanity places women and their 
domestic sphere as secondary to the civic life of men.  This third oppressive conceptual 
framework, built upon the nature/culture split and the divine/human differentiation, is the 
basis of the patriarchal assumption.  In re-visioning the role of Pandora, in reinterpreting 
the allegory, there is a possibility of addressing some of these “rock bottom” liabilities 
that continue to influence the structure of our beliefs and practices in regard to education 
in design. 
 
The Gift of Fire 
Prometheus second transgression against the gods was his stealing of fire and 
providing it to mankind against the wishes of Zeus.  After the withholding of fire as a 
result of Prometheus’ deception at Mekone, he purposefully stole fire from the gods and 
gave it to mankind in order to ensure their survival.  In maintaining the allegorical 
character of Greek myth, the gift of fire might readily be thought of as the gifts of culture 
and civilization—a gathering of people around the fire; the creation of place out of 
undifferentiated space.  Fire can also be construed as the first gift of technology; the first 
tool that allowed humans to mediate their relationships with the hostile world in which 
they lived.  Fire gave humankind the ability to push back the night, to control irrational 
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fears, and, ultimately, to plan for the future.  Fire also gave humankind the ability to cook 
food, to distill spirits, to forge metals, and to clear land.  These advantages led to 
permanent settlements and the possibility of civilization.  Additionally, fire gave 
humankind charcoal to draw and, the leisure, confidence, and need to create art.  In this 
way, it can be theorized that fire allegorically represents civilization, culture, and 
craftsmanship; the “know-how” that allowed humankind to make a place for itself in the 
world. 
While it is generally suggested that the allegorical fire gifted to the race of iron 
originated in Zeus’ chariot of the sun, there is some speculation that the fire Prometheus 
stole was actually taken from the forge of the blacksmith god Hephaestus.  Having taken 
the fire from Hephaestus rather than from Zeus himself would further align Prometheus’ 
gift with the origins of craftsmanship.  Hephaestus, as god of the forge, is known as the 
god of craftsmanship.44  He is the first god associated with the making of physical 
artifacts.45  In this light, Zeus’ original withholding of fire after the feast of Mekone—
when man became differentiated from the gods—can be thought of as the denial of the 
skills necessary for men to live in relation to the world; a judgment that would force 
mankind to suffer against the natural forces of the earth for all time.  Prometheus’ acts to 
benefit the race of iron should, therefore, be thought of as a gift providing necessary 
skills—providing the practices of craftsmanship—so that mankind might manipulate the 
physical and material environments in order to both survive and thrive in the world. 
                                                 
44 Hephaestus is variously considered the god of fire, the god of the forge (metalsmithing), the god of the 
building arts (stonemasonry), the god of the Fine Arts (sculpture), and the god of craftsmanship.  I take it, 
allegorically, to mean that he was the god of making those things necessary to allow humans to live their 
daily lives—the god of craftsmanship. 
45 Later, we will see many of these skills associated with the Diamona Tekhne, but in the original 
narratives (narratives that are, perhaps, clouded by the patriarchal assumption) it is Hephaestus that 
represents the “know-how” of craftsmanship. 
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Another work, Aeschylus’ Prometheus Desmotes appears to support the 
suggestion that Prometheus gave more than the simple gift of fire to mankind.  More 
correctly, the Desmotes further supports the suggestion that fire acts as an allegorical 
stand in for the “know-how” associated with craftsmanship.  In the Desmotes, as 
Prometheus begins his suffering chained to a rock, he provides his account of the acts that 
led to this retaliation by Zeus.  First, Prometheus explains that he significantly aided Zeus 
in his rise to power and was responsible for Zeus acquiring the thunderbolt—an outward 
manifestation of fiery power and, quite possibly, a representation of the gods’ dominion 
over the world (PD 219-221).  Prometheus then makes us aware that at some point in the 
past—possibly after the deception at Mekone—he had convinced Zeus not to eliminate 
the human race (PD 232-36).  In these statements, Prometheus shows us both his respect 
for the position and power of Zeus and his affection for humanity.  These statements also 
support the binary distinction between gods and men and the oppressive conceptual 
framework that privileges the gods. 
Finally, after establishing the differentiated relationship between the gods and 
men, Prometheus confesses that the gifts that he had given to mankind far exceeded the 
gift of fire.  Prometheus’ gifts included advances in agriculture, the domestication of 
animals, writing, divination, and architecture (PD 442-506).46 These gifts can be 
interpreted as forms of craftsmanship—as the “know-how” necessary to create and use 
physical artifacts that mediate human relationships with and in the world.  While 
architecture is the only of these that might be most readily associated with a contemporary 
understanding of design, they all provide an etiological understanding of humankind’s 
                                                 
46 Divination, in this sense, is what we might think of as medicine. 
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shift from a pre-technological world to one where humans were able to create those 
artifacts necessary to their survival.  The gifts of Prometheus establish humankind’s 
ability to create useful artifacts and, as such, differentiate themselves from the world.  
Having accepted these abilities as gifts, humankind is afforded the opportunity to avoid 
the pitfalls of hubris.  In accepting that the “know-how” of craftsmanship is not derived 
from any intrinsic ability but, rather, is the result of Prometheus’ gifts, humans can 
actively create those artifacts necessary to their survival without seeming to challenge the 
supremacy of the gods.  Nonetheless, these gifts associated with craftsmanship are the 
necessary result of the privileging of both the world and the gods over humanity—they 
are the skills needed for humans to be equipped to survive in the world. 
The Desmotes, in focusing upon the relationship between Prometheus and Zeus, 
eliminates any mention of Pandora.  In disregarding the Pandora story arc, Aeschylus 
minimizes the relationship between the feminine and the domestic and, resultantly, the 
privilege associated with the public over the private realms of human life. While this 
minimization of the generally accepted story of Pandora might seem beneficial to feminist 
criticisms of Western thought, it might also be thought of as a patriarchal/political move 
to attribute to Prometheus assets that might otherwise be associated with the feminine.  
While most stories attribute Prometheus only with the gift of fire—a gift that might 
allegorically be representational of culture—the Desmotes further attributes to 
Prometheus those gifts that we might think of as allowing for civilization and the “know-
how” skills necessary to survival.  The gifts of the “know-how” associated with 
craftsmanship, and the survival of the race of iron, honor the reputation of Prometheus 
alone. 
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The story of Pandora can be re-visioned in such a way that it is Pandora that 
provides humankind with the gifts necessary to survival in the world; the gift of 
childbearing and childrearing, the gift of domestication, and the gift of the “know-how” 
that we associate with craftsmanship.  Aeschylus’ failure to mention Pandora in relation 
to the gifts bestowed upon the race of iron eliminates from Western thought any concept 
of the feminine as beneficial to humankind.  A re-visioned story of Pandora allows us to 
view the feminine as an asset to the needs of humanity rather than as a liability that, in 
some way, degrades the human condition.  In failing to address Pandora, the Desmotes 
continues to perpetuate oppressive conceptual frameworks that privilege men and 
minimize the contributions of women.  In re-visioning the role of Pandora—in 
depoliticizing the masculine/feminine binary—it may be possible to begin to counter 
some of the “rock bottom” assumptions that affect our understandings of craftsmanship 
and any value that it might have upon educational thought. 
 
Pandora and the Origins of Craftsmanship 
While the story of Prometheus has traditionally been associated with his providing 
the gifts necessary for humans to live their daily lives—an allegorical fire that provides 
us with the origins of culture, of civilization, and of craftsmanship—there is another story, 
the story of Pandora, that might be thought of as more accurately representing the origins 
of craftsmanship.  Most people are somewhat familiar with the myth of Pandora; she is a 
figure that I remember from a childhood fascination with history and with the stories of 
mighty heroes, fearless warriors, and adventurous explorers.  The Pandoran stories that 
most of us know—the contemporary retellings of the ancient Greek originals—have been 
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modified to reflect more accurately changes in Western thought; changes that resulted 
from the rise of Judeo-Christian beliefs and a rationalist worldview.  Contemporary 
interpretations of the Greek myths have cast them as outdated stories, as entertainments, 
rather than as explanations of our beliefs about the world.  In the contemporary version 
of the Pandoran myth, the most important element of the plot revolves around Pandora 
opening a box and releasing evils upon humanity.47  If we reflect a bit more upon the 
story, we might recall that Pandora was created by the gods.  For the majority of people, 
that is the extent of the story of Pandora; we know that she was a woman and that she 
was—in a very clear sense—the root of all evil.  This understanding of the role of 
Pandora, the association of the feminine with evil, can certainly be viewed as representing 
an oppressive conceptual framework.  In the binary opposition of masculine and 
feminine, to associate the feminine with evil suggests that the masculine—associated with 
good—should rightfully be considered superior to the feminine.  This interpretation of 
the story of Pandora, which does not differ substantially from the Hesiodic version, is 
fundamental to the patriarchal assumption; it supports the rationale for prioritizing the 
masculine binary and marginalizing the feminine. 
Since contemporary renderings of the role and significance of Pandora have been 
influenced by changes in Western beliefs, it is necessary to turn to the ancient texts in 
order to recount her role such that we might find more clarity in regard to how she was 
understood in the archaic context.  There are two major works, both by Hesiod, that 
address Pandora.  In both, Pandora is discussed only in regard to the transgressions of 
Prometheus.  The first account of Pandora occurs in the Theogony.  Zeus, in his anger at 
                                                 
47 While most contemporary stories suggest that Pandora opens a box containing evils, the original myths 
suggest that this container was a jar; a pithos that was intended for bulk storage. 
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Prometheus for gifting men with fire, plots against humanity in an effort to ensure that 
further evils fall upon them.  He has Hephaestus mold earth into the form of a woman; a 
woman intended to embody the anger of Zeus and the punishment of men.  This unnamed 
woman—for she is not yet known as Pandora—is dressed by Athena and crowned by 
Hephaestus.  In the Theogony, Hesiod—paraphrased here by Gantz—tells us that this 
beautiful maiden “will be an inextricable snare and evil for mankind, for from her will be 
born the (or a, since the Greek could mean either) race of women, who will be lazy and 
draw men of their prosperity” (Gantz 1993, 155).  Pandora is then given to Epimetheus 
and it is assumed that the race of women was the result of their union.48  The Theogony, 
much like in contemporary versions of the story, associates Pandora with evils being 
bestowed upon mankind.  Unlike more recent versions of the story, Pandora is explicitly 
discussed as the actual bearer of evils—there is no reference to a container from which 
she releases those evils—and as the first woman.  Resultantly, she directly assumes the 
archetypes of both evil and of the feminine. 
The second account of Pandora, in Hesiod’s Works and Days is, likewise, a 
negative account of women and their relationships to mortal men.  In the Works and Days, 
we are reminded that prior to the deceptions of Prometheus men lived an idyllic life.  
While that life was not as easy as the one enjoyed by the anthropoi, the suffering of the 
race of iron was not such that it significantly affected their leisure.  There was no need 
for strenuous labor; the earth was said to have produced enough in one day to last men an 
entire year.  This is not Hesiod’s first mention of the life of ease that mortals led.  As 
previously noted, the Theogony suggests that mankind lived an idyllic life before the 
                                                 
48 While I use the term “race” in regard to women, I only do so to contrast the earlier declaration of a race 
of men being created. 
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introduction of the first woman.  Bulfinch also tells us that “the earth brought forth all 
things necessary for man, without his labor in ploughing or sowing” (Bulfinch 1990, 26).  
As the Works and Days seems to suggest that the suffering of mankind began before the 
introduction of Pandora—a suffering that might have been the result of an earlier 
punishment by Zeus—Prometheus’ gift of fire might be construed as an act of kindness 
toward mankind.  Prometheus’ act of kindness was, however, still an act that angered 
Zeus, the patriarch of Olympus.  Zeus punished Prometheus for the theft of fire, and for 
the earlier deception at Mekone, by chaining him to a rock where an eagle daily consumed 
his liver. 
In order to cause additional suffering to mankind as a punishment for their 
possessing fire, Zeus orders Hephaestus to mix earth and water in creating a woman 
whom men would “embrace and delight in to their own ruin” (Gantz 1993, 156).  She is 
described by Hesiod as a woman of beauty and a woman of cunning.49  This order by 
Zeus might be theorized as having been a retaliation against Hephaestus as well; a 
retaliation for allowing the fire of the forge—the “know-how” of craftsmanship—to be 
acquired by humans.  In the Works and Days, Zeus then has other gods contribute to the 
creation of this first woman.  Athena is tasked with providing her with clothing—
representational of weaving—and with other skills associated with the hands.  
Aphrodite—the goddess of love, beauty, and fertility—is to ensure that this woman is 
desirable to men and able to bear children.  Hermes, messenger of Olympus and a god 
associated with trade, husbandry, language and thievery, is to give her a wicked and 
                                                 
49 The use of the term “cunning” here has two interesting associations with the feminine.  The first is its 
association with witchcraft; with cunning women who possessed the skills to heal and to curse.  The 
second association is with craftsmanship; with the cunning of the hand.  In both instances “cunning,” at 
least in the contemporary sense of the word, is seen as a liability. 
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thievish character and to fill her with lies and flattering words.  Hermes also gives this 
first mortal woman the name Pandora as she is a gift to man from all of the Olympian 
gods.  As related earlier in the Theogony, Pandora is then given to Epimetheus who takes 
her as a bride.  Hesiod makes it clear that Epimetheus had been warned not to accept gifts 
from Zeus. 
In the Works and Days, Hesiod goes on to relate to us the story of the jar.  While 
the origin of the pithos is not clear—it may have been a part of Pandora’s dowry or it may 
have already been in the care of Epimetheus—Hesiod tells us that Pandora opened the 
pithos and, in doing so, allowed evils to escape into the world.  Rather than Pandora 
herself being the source of the evils released upon men, she is now cast as the one who 
knowingly removes the lid of the pithos “with her own hands and scattered into the world 
evils, and sickness, and painful labor” (Gantz 1993, 156).  In either telling; however, 
Pandora is inextricably associated with the fall of man; with the ruin of an idyllic life and 
the origination of evil, of sickness, of suffering, and of labor.  All of these conditions are 
bound to the feminine binary and, as such, provide a foundational justification for the 
oppression associated with the patriarchal assumption.  The subjugation of women by 
men is positioned as an appropriate response to the degradation of mortal men through 
the creation of women.  Pandora’s story constitutes another of the “rock bottom” of our 
Western beliefs—it is the foundation of an oppressive conceptual framework of beliefs 
that continue to influence Western thought.  This oppressive framework—the basis of the 
patriarchal assumption—privileges the masculine binary and vilifies the feminine.  While 
the archaic myth of Pandora is the first instance of this framework that we see in recorded 
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history, it appears to recur in other allegorical stories that we hold as equally essential to 
Western beliefs. 
An interesting parallel to the story of Pandora that may further clarify my assertion 
that Pandora is an allegorical story that explains humankind’s differentiation from and 
subsequent relationship with the world can be found in the Biblical account of the Garden 
of Eden.  In the second chapter of Genesis, we are told that God created the heavens and 
the earth.  He then formed a man from the dust and breathed life into him.  Upon creating 
this first man,  
the Lord God planted a garden in Eden, in the east, and placed there the man 
whom he had formed.  Out of the ground the Lord God made grow every tree that 
was delightful to look at and good for food, with the tree of life in the middle of 
the garden and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (NABRE, Gen. 2. 8,9). 
God then placed this man, Adam, into the garden and told him that he could eat of the 
fruit of any tree except that of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; to eat from this 
tree would result in death.  Chapter Two concludes with the creation of the first woman; 
a woman created as a companion and helper to man (NABRE, Gen. 2. 18-25).  This 
account provides us with the origins of the masculine/feminine binary; however, it has 
not established the conceptual framework that privileges the masculine over the feminine.  
The origins of the privileging of the masculine comes with the story of Eve and the 
Serpent.  In Chapter Three, paralleling the story of Pandora, we find that Eve, in 
consorting with the Serpent and taking the forbidden fruit, gives knowledge to 
humankind.  God, like Zeus, is angered by this attainment of knowledge and in retribution 
He punishes humanity:  
To the woman he said: 
I will intensify your toil in childbearing; in pain you shall bring forth children.  Yet 
your urge shall be for your husband, and he shall rule over you. 
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To the man he said: 
Because you listened to your wife and ate from the tree about which I commanded 
you, You shall not eat from it, Cursed is the ground because of you!  In toil you 
shall eat its yield all the days of your life.  Thorns and thistles it shall bear for you, 
and you shall eat the grass of the field.  By the sweat of your brow you shall eat 
bread, Until you return to the ground, from which you were taken; For you are 
dust, and to dust you shall return (NABRE, Gen. 3. 6-19). 
God then banishes Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden; their newfound knowledge 
creating a rift separating humankind from an idyllic life in the garden and exposing them 
to a difficult existence in the world. 
Being removed from the abundance provided in the Garden required the need for 
the “know-how” associated with craftsmanship to ensure humanity’s survival.  In the 
biblical account, this “know-how” is the acquisition of the skills associated with weaving, 
with agriculture, and with architecture—those practices of craftsmanship that define our 
relationship with the world outside the Garden.  The “know-how” associated with 
weaving, agriculture, and architecture can also be thought of as those skills that distinguish 
humankind as different than nature; they are the skills that allow for civilization and 
culture.  The biblical accounts do not tell us how these skills were acquired by humans, 
but we can assume that Eve’s disobedience is the allegorical equivalent of the Greek myths 
concerning Prometheus and Pandora.  Further, the banishment from the Garden is 
equivalent to Martin’s nature/culture split; humankind is removed from the idyllic and 
placed into an antagonistic relationship with the world.  The shame that comes with 
knowledge—as related by Adams response to God; “I heard you in the garden, but I was 
afraid, because I was naked, so I hid” (NABRE, Gen. 3. 10) and the creation of clothing 
for man and woman—might also be considered as representational of the origin of the 
separation of the public and private spheres.  These biblical accounts, the expulsion and 
the awareness of shame, can be theorized as “rock bottom” beliefs and assumptions that 
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support the patriarchal assumption.  They also establish the binary pairings of masculine 
and feminine, sacred and profane, and culture and nature; binaries that, as a result of the 
patriarchal assumption, privilege the masculine and denigrate the feminine. 
The oppressive conceptual frameworks established in the biblical account of the 
creation and population of the world are further reinforced throughout the Bible.  Of 
particular importance is the account of proper beliefs and customs offered in the Wisdom 
of Ben Sira.  This account is critically important to the maintenance of the patriarchal 
assumption as it has been extensively used in presenting moral truths to the Christian 
faithful.50  As such, the title has been appended with the classification Liber 
Ecclesiasticus; a “church book” that represents beliefs that are necessary to the 
maintenance of doctrine.  The scribe and sage Ben Sira gives us an account of the 
differences between day and night, between humanity and the world, and between good 
and evil:  
7
 Why is one day more important than another, 
when the same sun lights up every day of the year? 
8 By the Lord’s knowledge they are kept distinct; 
and he designates the seasons and feasts. 
9 Some he exalts and sanctifies, 
and others he lists as ordinary days. 
10 Likewise, all people are of clay, 
and from earth humankind was formed; 
11 In the fullness of his knowledge the Lord distinguished them, 
and he designated their different ways. 
12 Some he blessed and exalted, 
and some he sanctified and drew to himself. 
Others he cursed and brought low, 
and expelled them from their place. 
13 Like clay in the hands of a potter, 
to be molded according to his pleasure, 
So are people in the hands of their Maker, 
to be dealt with as he decides. 
                                                 
50 The Catholic Church, particularly, has used this text in teaching the moral philosophy of the church to 
its catechists.  
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14 As evil contrasts with good, and death with life, 
so are sinners in contrast with the godly. 
15 See now all the works of the Most High: 
they come in pairs, one the opposite of the other 
(NABRE, Ben Sira. 33. 7-15). 
These contrasting pairings mirror and reinforce the Genesis account of the establishment 
of binary relationships and oppressive conceptual frameworks.  In the teachings of the 
Bible we have another historical document that echoes and reinforces the “rock bottom” 
assumptions of early Western thought.  While both the Greek myths and the Bible 
establish the foundations of the deep structure of Western thought, there are divergent 
accounts—at least in primitive Greek theology—that might act to destabilize the 
conceptual frameworks associated with the oppression present in binary distinctions.  In 
exploring these destabilizing accounts—in this case an alternative account of the role of 
Pandora—there is the possibility of theorizing alternatives to the concepts that support 
contemporary thought in regard to the oppression of the feminine and that maintain 
Western privilege of epistemic knowledge over the “know-how” associated with 
craftsmanship. 
While Hesiod’s works—the Theogony and Works and Days—establish the “rock 
bottom” structure of thought that can be theorized as having established the patriarchal 
assumption, there are earlier references to Pandora that may be useful in re-visioning her 
story in a way that might be of benefit to feminist educational theory and to the 
educational value of craftsmanship.  In feminist and classical scholar Jane Ellen 
Harrison’s Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion, we find a different explanation 
of Pandora and of Hesiod’s works in relation to her.  In opposition to Hesiod’s treatment 
of Pandora as first emerging as a punishment ordered by Zeus, Harrison tells us that “to 
the primitive matriarchal Greek Pandora was then a real goddess, in form and name, of 
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the Earth, and men did sacrifice to her” (Harrison 1908, 283).  As a goddess 
representational of the Earth, Pandora was revered for giving humanity everything 
necessary to life.  She represents a symbiotic relationship of humankind and nature; a 
relationship without the toil and hardship decreed by Zeus.  In the matriarchal theology 
of the primitive Greeks, Pandora was presented as a maiden, as a pure representation of 
the bounty of the earth.  However, the image and role of Pandora are changed in the 
archaic period; “in the patriarchal mythology of Hesiod her great figure is strangely 
changed and [di]minished.  She is no longer Earth-born, but the creature, the handiwork 
of Olympian Zeus” (Harrison 1908, 284). 
Harrison suggests that this retelling is the result of a shift in Greek thought—a 
shift from matriarchal beliefs to a patriarchal assumption of the world.  Resultantly, she 
suggests that Hesiod’s reshaping of Pandora is in keeping with changing political views 
in Greece and, further, in support of “his own bourgeois, pessimistic ends” (Harrison 
1908, 284).  Harrison, in criticizing this shift, notes:  
Through all the magic of a poet, caught and enchanted himself by the vision of a 
lovely woman, there gleams the ugly malice of theological animus.  Zeus the 
Father will have no great Earth-goddess, Mother and Maid in one, in his man-
fashioned Olympus, but her figure is from the beginning, so he re-makes it; 
woman, who was the inspirer, becomes the temptress; she who made all things, 
gods and mortals alike, is become their plaything, their slave, dowered only with 
physical beauty, and with a slave’s tricks and blandishments.  To Zeus, the 
archpatriarchal bourgeois, the birth of the first woman is but a huge Olympian jest 
(Harrison 1908, 285). 
In a world associated with the matriarchal Earth-goddess, a world where humanity existed 
in concert with the world, there is an implication that the skills of craftsmanship were an 
integral part of living.  The hubris associated with knowledge was not conceivable; 
humanity and nature were completely interrelated—acts of making just were acts of 
living in the world.  With the introduction of a patriarchal pantheon, humanity was 
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marginalized; the divine and the earth were privileged over humankind and the masculine 
was privileged over the feminine. 
It is Harrison’s early feminist account of Greek matriarchal theology that inspires 
me to attempt a re-visioning of the myth of Pandora.  Through a re-visioning of the story 
of Pandora and the allegorical evils that she released on humankind, there appears to be 
a way to approach a pre-rational explanation of both the end of an idyllic life and the need 
for and development of the “know-how” necessary to survival.  Pandora, rather that 
burdening mankind with evils, can be re-visioned as gifting humanity with the practices 
of craftsmanship.  She, in this retelling, provides humankind with the “know-how” 
necessary to survive in a hostile world.  Further, this re-visioning suggests the formation 
of a system of beliefs and assumptions that do not support the oppressive cultural 
frameworks that marginalize the feminine, the domestic, and the knowledge found in 
making.  My re-visioning does not revert to a matriarchal theology; I accept the archaic 
shift to a patriarchal theology and, therefore, maintain the archaic Greek patriarchal 
pantheon.  This re-visioning, like Hesiod’s original, begins with Prometheus. 
Prometheus, in conjunction with his brother Epimetheus, created animals, birds, 
fish, and, finally, the race of men.  In this creation, Epimetheus attempted to give each of 
these creations the skills necessary to ensure their continued existence in a world created 
from Chaos.  As some renditions suggest, Epimetheus was not prudent in his bestowing 
of skills and, resultantly, mankind was left weak in relation to the world and the other 
creations.  In an attempt to mitigate this weakness, Prometheus deceived Zeus at the feast 
of Mekone and, in doing so, allowed men the greater portion of sacrifices to the gods.  
This deception allowed mankind to survive in the world more easily; however, this 
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survival did not guarantee man’s continued existence.  Resultantly, Prometheus stole fire 
from Olympus and gave it to mankind.  This fire, which allegorically represents the gifts 
of culture and civilization, allowed men to create place and to settle on the earth.  Like 
Hesiod’s account, this theft of fire and its gift to men angered Zeus such that he resolved 
to punish both Prometheus and men.  In punishing mankind, it can be theorized that he 
made them to struggle upon the earth—to endure the evils of sickness, suffering, and 
labor.  If we consider Hesiod’s account as one biased by the patriarchal assumption, we 
might think of the additional gift of Pandora as a punishment—the necessity of women 
being a degradation of mankind in that humanity must now rely upon childbearing as a 
means of insuring their survival.51 
However, we can also think of Zeus’ gift of Pandora as generous rather than 
malicious.  In this way, Pandora can be theorized as an expression of Olympian 
benevolence; a noble concession that provided a means for humankind to survive.  
Pandora, in being created by Hephaestus, the god of craftsmanship, can be seen as a 
means of providing humanity with skills necessary to survival—the “know-how” to 
create the physical artifacts needed to mediate human relationships with and in the world.  
This interpretation is further borne out by the name Pandora—she is a gift from the gods 
and has been imbued with positive benefits, with assets worth fostering, by the other 
Olympians.  Athena, particularly, gives her the skills of the hand—skills that include 
weaving and other domestic arts.  The skills of the hand might also be representational of 
cunning; the “know-how” associated with the medicinal properties of plants and healing.  
Pandora, as a manifestation of the domestic and in conjunction with Prometheus’ gift of 
                                                 
51 I consider Pandora as an “additional” gift in that she was a later addition to the patriarchally influenced 
myths of the archaic period and was, quite possibly, a political addition by Hesiod. 
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fire, allows humankind to establish culture, civilization, and the skills of craftsmanship.  
Further, the “know-how” of craftsmanship—problem seeking and problem solving—is 
essential in helping to alleviate the physical suffering of humankind; it allows humans to 
thrive in a hostile environment.  While this re-visioning does not directly resolve the 
nature/culture split or the public/private divide, it does minimize the privileging of one 
over the other—it begins to counteract the oppressive conceptual frameworks associated 
with the patriarchal assumption. 
In recalling Cohen’s assertion that myth anchors the present in the past, we might 
think of this re-visioned story of Pandora as a means of allowing the Greeks an 
understanding of how humankind formed civilizations and gained the abilities and 
aptitudes necessary to modify the physical environment to their needs.  As such, this story 
can be seen as an explanation of the transition from a non-temporal and idyllic lifestyle 
within an idealized world to a temporal struggle to survive and thrive within an oftentimes 
hostile environment; a transition that requires the skill of craftsmanship and, resultantly, 
allows for the formation of civilization and culture.  In contrast to Hesiod’s politically 
motivated stories, this re-visioning establishes a non-privileged expression of binary 
conditions; it denies an oppressive conceptual framework.  In re-visioning Pandora as an 
allegorical message explaining the shift from idyll to struggle and the transition from 
natural to political suggests that the Pandoran story arc provides a way of understanding 
and a means of mediating the physical environment.  It provides for a way of 
understanding the world that is unbiased in differentiating humankind from nature and 
that, additionally, explains the possibility of human progress.  In both instances, the 
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“know-how” of craftsmanship appears to be this necessary means and, concurrently, to 
be thought of as a necessary evil. 
 This explanation for the necessity of craftsmanship further acts to support an even 
more fundamental issue in regard to humankind’s quest for identity; for an etiological 
understanding of humankind’s relationships with and in the world; a causal explanation 
of the human condition.  It has been theorized that the defining characteristic of Homo 
Habilis (skillful one)—that portion of the fossil record that establishes the genus Homo 
and, therefore, the most significant ancestor of Homo Sapien (wise one)—was Homo 
Habilis’ ability to manipulate the environment; to create physical artifacts that were 
useful in living their daily lives.52  As etiological narratives, the stories of both Pandora 
and Eve are meant to provide us with explanations of humankind’s place within and 
relationship to the world. 
Pandora and Eve, two women who have become synonymous with evil and the 
forbidden, are deeply embedded in Western consciousness.  They are both associated with 
the loss of an idyllic relationship with the world and, as such, created the necessity for 
humankind to labor in order to survive.  It can be argued that their stories exist at the 
“rock bottom” of Western thought and, resultantly are at the foundation of the patriarchal 
assumption.  They are responsible for the marginalization and subjugation of all people 
and all ways of knowing that do not readily fit the ideal of the privileged—an ideal 
founded in both our early equality with the gods and our first relation with the Garden; 
with a romanticized relationship with an ideal world.  In re-visioning their stories, they 
                                                 
52 See Jamie Shreeve’s National Geographic article, “Mystery Man” (October 2015) for more on the story 
of Homo Habilis.  In addition, Tony Fry’s Becoming Human by Design provides an excellent discussion 
of evolution in relation to our relationships with artifacts. 
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can be associated with providing humanity with the skills of craftsmanship.  These 
mytho-poetic stories establish the etiological explanation of craftsmanship—now 
design—as the creation of useful physical artifacts that mediate human relationships with 
and in the world.  Additionally, these stories allow educational theorists to name those 
foundational assumptions as liabilities—oppressions that are a result of the patriarchal 
assumption—and to employ race, class, and gender critiques to contemporary practices 
in design education.  In such critiques, we can explore how an acceptance of these stories 
as the “rock bottom” of Western thought have led to false assumptions about, and the 
marginalization of, the race, class, and gender identities of designers and to a disregard 
of the veracity of knowledge in design.  These stories allow theorists to address more 
fully the privilege, and exclusion, associated with design as both an educational activity 
and as a professional practice. 
 
The Roman Development of Design and Design Education 
When we seek to discover the deep structure of thought that supports our 
contemporary beliefs and assumptions in regard to craftsmanship—one that, resultantly, 
supports and defines the contemporary practices of the disciplines that constitute the 
broader field of design—we are faced with two distinct areas of exploration. The deep 
structure of thought that grounds any traditional conception of craftsmanship can be 
thought of as having its origins in both the mythological and historical records of the 
Western world.  The Greek myths provide us with a means of theorizing the relationship 
between craftsmanship and those beliefs and assumptions that predate, and act as a 
foundation to, the patriarchal assumption.  It is in this relationship that we find the 
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marginalization of craftsmanship.  In its domesticity, craftsmanship was subjugated to the 
privilege of public life; craftsmanship and the “know-how” associated with it were 
devalued by an oppressive conceptual framework. 
This exploration into the mythical, into allegorical stories that explain how 
humans understand the world, exposes us to the “rock bottom” beliefs and assumptions 
that have shaped Western thought.  The historical record, on the other hand, exposes us 
to the ideas and concepts of those thinkers and practitioners who are generally held to be 
the intellectual foundations of the Western cultural tradition.53  A philosophical 
exploration beyond the mythological and into the historical origins of craftsmanship 
therefore appears necessary in an effort to continue the conversation about those beliefs 
and assumptions that anchor the deep structure of thought regarding the practices 
associated with contemporary design education. 
While the age of mythology sets the scene for basic Western beliefs and 
assumptions that underlie those practices that constitute design, it is not until the era of 
Roman Imperialism that we find the first written treatise that can be considered a 
professional guide to design practice and design education.  Marcus Vitruvius Pollio 
authored the first known treatise on design education to have survived the ancient world.  
Written in homage to the emperor Augustus, the de Architectura was composed in order 
both to educate Augustus about the buildings, devices, and machines known to the Roman 
Empire and to provide the foundational structure of the discipline of architecture.  While 
Vitruvius called himself an architect and discussed architectural education, I argue that 
                                                 
53 While there are critical issues of patriarchy embedded within any exploration of the historical record, I 
must ask that one accept such an assertion and temporarily withhold any such critical judgments.  A 
critical assessment of the damages of patriarchal systems will follow and becomes a part of the larger 
project at hand. 
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he should be more accurately thought of as a designer, a craftsperson creating useful 
artifacts that were intended to mediate human experience with and in the world.  
Likewise, the de Architectura should be read more broadly as an introduction to the 




Chapter Four: A Vitruvian Educational Philosophy 
 
The Historical Origins of Craftsmanship 
The allegorical stories of early Greek mythology can be viewed as a means of 
explaining the complex dimensions of human relationships with and understandings of 
the world.  They can be read as both descriptions of natural phenomena—a sort of pre-
scientific knowledge of the physical world—and as explanations of the origins of human 
beliefs and assumptions about our place in the world.  The Greek myths provide 
explanations of the origins of our cultural and technological practices and distinguish 
those practices as different than the practices of the gods, of nature, and of non-human 
animals in their relationships with the world.  Understood in this way—as a means of 
explaining human relationships with and in the world—the interrelated stories of 
Pandora, Prometheus, and Hephaestus can be read as providing one possible explanation 
regarding these relationships.  Further, these stories suggest that practices of 
craftsmanship are practices arising in response to “rock bottom” beliefs and assumptions 
that support the patriarchal assumption.  The myths of Pandora, Prometheus, and 
Hephaestus are allegorical stories that provide us with the origins of the skill of technê.  
Further, they inform us that these skills are necessary in order to ensure that human beings 
survive in the world.  Addressing craftsmanship in an allegorical form allowed the Greeks 
to avoid the pitfalls of hubris.  The Greek myths tell us that humankind’s ability to survive 
in the world was not of human origin but, rather, a gift from the Gods.  These stories also 
offer a means of naming and understanding the “know-how” of craftsmanship; they 
provide a way of explaining the origins of innovative practices which produce physical 
artifacts that assist in mediating human relationships with and in the world. 
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In their capacity to provide an understanding of the origins of, and the skills 
associated with, craftspeople, I have suggested that the Greek myths established the 
underlying structure for contemporary Western conceptions of the practices of 
craftsmanship and, relatedly, of design.  Craftsmanship—as a representation of that form 
of making that produces useful physical artifacts—enacts a system of beliefs about the 
world, a technological bias, that differentiates human striving from the forces of nature.  
As historian of technology George Basalla has noted; “Humans have a different 
relationship with the natural world than do animals.  Nature simply and directly sustains 
animal life.  For humans, nature serves as the source of materials and forces that can be 
utilized in pursuit of what they choose to call for the moment their well-being” (Basalla 
1988, 14).  The necessity of craftsmanship implies that human beings are weak in the face 
of the nature and, as such, require technological innovations—useful physical artifacts—
that allow us to exist in a tenuous relationship with and in the world.  Because the 
mythological accounts of craftsmanship should be thought of as representing the deep 
structure of thought that has influenced the contemporary professions associated with 
design, they should be thought of as having the potential to influence practices related to 
design education. 
While the age of myth establishes an allegorical foundation for the practices of 
craftsmanship as necessary to human survival, there is no explicit reference as to how 
contemporary design disciplines might respond to those practices; how contemporary 
designers might benefit from the “know-how” associated with practices of craftsmanship.  
Further, there is no point of reference as to how a philosophy of design education might 
engage and respond to a foundation of craftsmanship grounded in the Greek myths.  
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Through an exploration of etymological relationships and a reflection upon how the 
concepts of skill and knowledge were considered by the Greek philosophers, I will 
theorize that education in design—in response to contemporary criticisms—can benefit 
from a taking account of the assets and liabilities that exist at the foundations of Western 
thought.  In taking account of these foundations, we can incorporate those assets and 
eliminate those liabilities that exist within the deep structure of thought that supports a 
history of design before the Industrial Age. 
Beyond an exploration of these Greek works, it is not until the era of Roman 
imperialism that we find an additional historical source that further unites the practices 
of design with the practices of craftsmanship.  In de Architectura Libri Decem (On 
Architecture in Ten Books), written by Marcus Vitruvius Pollio—commonly known as 
Vitruvius—we find a text that begins to unite our contemporary understanding of design 
with a Greek conception of the practices of craftsmanship.  The de Architectura 
illuminates those practices, and the educational requirements necessitated by them, that 
we might think of as describing the skills and knowledge required of the contemporary 
practice of design.  Because, in contemporary culture, the de Architectura has been 
narrowly associated with the educational and professional practices of architecture, it is 
essential to provide a means of bridging the conceptual gap between the Greek notion of 
craftsmanship, the Vitruvian term architectura, and the contemporary professions of 
design.  In doing so, it becomes possible to view the de Architectura as a treatise on 
design education and design practice that is useful in theorizing how we might more 
productively think about and teach design.  The de Architectura, understood in this way, 
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begins to reframe criticisms of design methodology and, resultantly, establishes the 
possibility for an educational approach to contemporary criticisms of education in design. 
 
Etymological Considerations 
In order to transition from the allegorical representations of domesticity and 
craftsmanship associated with Pandora, Prometheus, and Hephaestus, it is necessary to 
situate those stories within the larger context of Greek thought and its enduring influence 
upon Roman thought and culture.  This is best accomplished by beginning with the Latin 
terms architectus and architectura, exploring their etymological origins, and then 
associating those primary terms with concepts of craftsmanship arising from Greek 
mythology and later characterized in Greek philosophical thought.  In an attempt to 
understand how Vitruvius thought about the profession of the architectus and applied the 
term architectura, it is useful to explore the Greek archetecton, the roots associated with 
that term, and the ways those roots came to be understood in Greek philosophy.  The 
Latin architectura, our architecture, is derived from the Greek archetecton—normally 
translated as “master builder”—which is constructed from the root words arche (ἀρχή) 
and tecton (τέκτων).  It is generally accepted that arche primarily translates as beginning 
or origin; of being first in a sequence; of having primacy (Crane 2013).  Additionally, it 
can be translated as ruler, as master, as one with dominion over another.  In the context 
of its adjectival use as an inseparable prefix, i.e., architect and/or architecture; it 
predominantly refers to mastery in the sense of exceptional competency.  Arche, then, as 
a prefix just means to be highly accomplished, to have mastery of a particular skill.  Archi, 
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in the Latin usage of Vitruvius, simply implies one who is superior in—has mastery of—
her trade.54   
The Greek noun tecton, the root word modified by the inseparable prefix arche, 
is the more critical term in understanding Vitruvius’ contextualized architectus.  Early 
references suggest that tecton was a specific descriptor of the trade of carpentry, of 
builders, of those working in wood as opposed to those working in trades such as 
weaving, pottery, and metalsmithing (Liddell & Scott 1940).  Since its use by Homer, 
however, tecton has more commonly referred to acts of fabrication, of making, in general.  
According to architectural theorist Kenneth Frampton, in the fifth century BCE the 
meaning of tecton further evolved to a more general notion of the making of any physical 
artifacts and was intimately tied to the innovation of poesis (Frampton 1996).  Poesis, in 
the sense used by Plato and other early Greek philosophers roughly translates to 
“something where before there was nothing” (Sennett 2008, 70).  Poesis is a bringing 
forth, a creation of something new.  For Aristotle, poesis is represented as a form of 
“knowledge involved in the making, producing, or creating of something” (Risatti 2007, 
162).  The modification of meaning that poesis brings to tecton more readily aligns the 
term with contemporary ideas of craftsmanship as the creation of useful physical artifacts 
and of design as an innovative bringing forth.  Tecton, in the Greek and, likewise, Roman 
understanding of the term evolved in meaning as representational of a particular form of 
knowledge and was firmly associated with the idea of creating as an innovative, 
deliberate, and critical act of production.  This relation of poesis to the tecton also 
                                                 
54 Trade is important here as it begins to allude to a hierarchal privilege that is prevalent in Greek (and 
thus Western) thought.  A tradesman, and her associated skill—a practical knowledge—is viewed as 
somewhat lesser than one who is not required to practice a trade but, instead, is in possession of 
theoretical knowledge. 
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supplements the significance of the prefix arche in that it elevates the tecton from one 
who is merely a builder—a worker—to the status of a maker, one who has achieved 
mastery in deliberately bringing forth useful physical artifacts.55 
The Greek noun technê—a term that I have associated with the “know-how” of 
making—is etymologically related to the acts of innovation and production associated 
with the tecton.  While Frampton suggests that the terms are etymologically distinct—he 
suggests that technê is derived from the Greek verb tikto, meaning to produce (Frampton 
1996, 23)—I argue that the relationship of technê to tecton remains significant to an 
understanding of the archetecton as representational of craftsmanship.  Phenomenologist 
Martin Heidegger, in Basic Writings, states: "The word technê, technique, belongs to the 
verb's root tec.  To the Greeks technê means neither art nor handicraft but rather, to make 
something appear, within what is present, as this or that, in this way or that way.  The 
Greeks conceived of technê, producing, in terms of letting appear" (Heidegger 2008, 
337).  Heidegger’s explanation of technê as a bringing forth is consistent with the later 
Greek understanding of technê in its association with poesis.  Further, as noted in my 
earlier discussion of workmanship, the term technê is a concept embodied in the Daimona 
Tekhne.  In the Greek pantheon, Daimones are the personified spirits of the human 
condition and represent the abstract personal qualities that arise from human traits. 
Tekhne, in her association with Hephaestus and the Muses is the personified spirit of art, 
                                                 
55 There is also a negative association when tecton is associated with poesis—a sense that cunning has 
been employed in that bringing forth.  In this sense, cunning is a negative attribute in that it involves an 
act of hubris.  We can see this understanding of cunning in literature when witches are referred to as 
“cunning women;” they have acted against the natural order—often in conjunction with the 
supernatural—in an attempt to impose their will upon that order.  In instances such as this, the 
etymologically related technê can be further associated with the feminine and, as such, be seen as outside 
the hierarchy of privilege. 
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craft, and technical skill.56  Tekhne is associated with those allegorical representations of 
craftsmanship; of the embodied knowledge of technê and its relationship to producing 
those physical artifacts necessary to human survival.  Tekhne is also associated with the 
domestic sphere, with farming, with the enslaved, and with the manual arts (Atsma 2016).  
This association of technê with the domestic stands in opposition to the privilege 
bestowed upon Greek public life and, as such, established a subservient position to other 
ways of knowing—particularly to the related concept of epistêmê; to theoretical, or pure, 
knowledge.  In establishing the relationship of technê to tecton, we can infer that the work 
of the tecton involved an engagement with technê; it involved the “know-how” of making 
in the production of physical artifacts.  The architecton—Vitruvius’ architectus—would, 
therefore, be an individual who had acquired mastery in the “know-how” of creating 
physical artifacts that were useful to humankind. 
 
Philosophical Considerations 
Another means of exploring the early Greek understanding of the term technê—
and how it might relate to the Vitruvian architectus—is through its use by the Greek 
philosophers.  While use of the term technê by these philosophers varies greatly, it is 
worth engaging as a means of gaining an understanding of its relationship to Greek 
conceptions of knowledge.  Technê, in the context of the Greek philosophers is generally 
translated as craft; as a practice of skill.  Technê, the practical knowledge associated with 
particular skills, is understood as contingent, as dependent upon particular circumstances.  
                                                 
56 There is very little distinction between art and craft to the ancient Greek mind; however, technê in craft 
is more valued than in its artistic manifestations.  See the works of Howard Rissati and Richard Sennett, 
among others, for a more thorough discussion of the distinctions made by the Greeks. 
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The knowledge associated with technê is a different way of knowing than that associated 
with theoretical knowledge—what we might think of as descriptive or factual knowledge.  
In the Greek, this descriptive knowledge is thought of as universal—as unchanging—and 
is referred to as epistêmê.  While these distinctions more readily mirror our contemporary 
assumptions about theory and practice, the early Greek philosophers did not generally 
hold epistêmê and technê in strict opposition.  These philosophers did recognize 
differences between the two terms; however, they also describe them as having positive 
relationships (Parry 2014).  In the work of Vitruvius, practical knowledge is contrasted 
with theoretical knowledge; therefore, I will limit this exploration of Greek concepts of 
knowledge to the terms technê and epistêmê.57   
In the Socratic works of Xenophon, particularly the Memorabilia and the 
Oeconomicus, we see that Socrates uses the knowledge terms technê—what we now 
associate with the contingent knowledge of “know-how”—and epistêmê—a universal and 
descriptive knowledge—almost interchangeably (Marchant 1979).  As discussed by 
historian of ancient philosophy Richard Parry, the Socratic sense of knowledge is:  
intimately tied to knowing how to do things, especially the more organized kind 
of knowing-how designated by technê. There is no distinction between epistêmê 
as theoretical knowledge and technê as mere craft or skill. Socrates explicitly 
identifies as technai such activities as playing the harp, generalship, piloting a 
ship, cooking, medicine, managing an estate, smithing, and carpentry; by 
association with these technai, we can include housebuilding, mathematics, 
astronomy, making money, flute playing, and painting. Without marking any 
difference, he also calls many of these activities epistêmai (Parry 2014). 
In the interchangeability of these two terms, Socrates collapses knowledge in a way that 
dismisses the abstractions of the physical philosophers who were interested in universal 
                                                 
57 Aristotle actually makes a distinction between five concepts of knowledge of which technê and 
epistêmê comprise only two.  See Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, particularly 1139b15, for a full 
accounting of these. 
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truths rather than the experiential truths of human relations with and in the world.  In this 
interchangeability, Socrates seems to further suggest that practical knowledge, his technê, 
is of greater value than knowledge of theory.  The value of technê is a result of its being 
productive; the practices of technê culminate in the production of physical artifacts.  
Resultantly, the artifacts produced assist in humankind’s ability to survive and thrive in 
the world— technê generates knowledge that is innovative rather than descriptive. 
The dialogs of Plato present understandings of technê and epistêmê in 
contradictory ways; their relationship is varied dependent upon the context and intent of 
the particular dialog.  In general, most of the dialogs associate the following activities 
with technê:  
medicine, horsemanship, huntsmanship, oxherding, farming, calculation, 
geometry, generalship, piloting a ship, chariot-driving, political craft, prophecy, 
music, lyre-playing, flute-playing, painting, sculpture, housebuilding, 
shipbuilding, carpentry, weaving, pottery, smithing, and cookery (Parry 2014). 
In this list of practices, we see Platonic technê—much like Socratic technê—as more 
representational of the skills associated with the domestic.  However, as with the earlier 
philosophers, some of the activities mentioned might be more generally associated with 
epistêmê in that they are not considered as producing artifacts.  Plato’s confounding of 
productive and non-productive activities appears similar to the Socratic uses of technê 
and epistêmê interchangeably.  Plato, in contrast to Socrates, begins to privilege 
epistêmê—in the way that scientific knowledge is seen as having privilege in the 
contemporary sense—when, in the Republic (477b), he asserts that epistêmê is the ability 
to know the real as it is; to know the forms.  In the eternal nature of the forms we 
apprehend pure theory; this is in opposition to the sensory knowledge—the knowledge of 
contingent things—implied in technê (Bloom 1991).  While this dialectic opposition 
147 
provides us with only one way of understanding Plato’s perceived relationship between 
technê and epistêmê, it is the Republic’s dialectic relationship that underpins 
contemporary understandings of these ways of knowing. 
While at times, particularly in the Republic, Plato’s epistêmê does represent a 
more dialectic interpretation of theoretical knowledge, in most instances it is generally 
thought of as expressing an understanding of when to apply technê to a particular 
situation.  For Plato, epistêmê provides the craftsperson with the ability to explain why 
she does what she does.  Epistêmê begins to provide the craftsperson with the ability to 
give account of the why of technê; this giving account is a form of knowledge that 
suggests mastery.  This relationship, where epistêmê gives reasons for technê, provides a 
further characteristic that may be beneficial in distinguishing practices of technê.  The 
practices of technê bring forth artifacts; artifacts that exist separate from the technê 
engaged. 58  Epistêmê, as descriptive or theoretical knowledge, does not produce artifacts.  
Epistêmê produces concepts; it produces conceptual knowledge and the ability to reason.  
It is in this way, as theoretical, that epistêmê allows for a giving account of the productive 
nature of technê.  In employing the knowledge of epistêmê to give account of the “know-
how” of technê, the craftsperson attains the wisdom of phronesis; the ability to make 
judgments in reference to the work at hand. 
Building upon Plato’s distinction, Aristotle provides us with the strongest 
differentiation between technê and epistêmê in his Nicomachean Ethics (Irwin 1999).  In 
Book VI, Aristotle offers a clear distinction between the intellectual virtues of technê and 
                                                 
58 The term “artifacts” is used here without any modifying adjective as the artifacts produced through 
technê can, in the Greek sense of art and craft being indistinguishable, be both physical artifacts and/or 
performative acts. 
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epistêmê.  Technê is associated with things that admit of change; with lived experience.  
Epistêmê is associated with that which does not change; with everlasting truths that are 
beyond question.  Technê is associated with things that can be otherwise, with 
contingency, so includes the realm of what can be produced (1140a, 1).  Aristotle goes 
on to say that epistêmê, as associated with the certainty of the everlasting, is teachable 
(1139b, 25).  Technê, as contingent, is not necessarily teachable but is learned in practice; 
it is learned by making and doing.  Technê is the contingent “know-how” gained through 
acts of making as opposed to the “knowing that” in the sense of certainty associated with 
epistêmê.  This Aristotelian binary provides us with the classic division between the 
purely theoretical and the purely practical; a distinction that privileges the universal 
certainty of the theoretical.  For Aristotle, the certainty associated with epistêmê is a result 
of his belief that the primary principle of those things that exist by nature is attained 
within the things themselves (1140a, 1-20).  There is no additional information required 
to understand and explain the universal.  By way of contrast, technê has the primary 
characteristic of producing something by way of utility; it is concerned with the bringing 
into existence of physical artifacts that serve a function.  The primary existence of these 
physical things is attributable to the one who makes them; she possesses the “know-how” 
necessary to production. 
In making these assertions, it appears that Aristotle is also distinguishing between 
actions, acts of virtue where the end is in itself, and acts of making, where the end is a 
physical product separate from the activity of making (Parry 2014).  In making this 
distinction, Aristotle further privileges the universal character of epistêmê over the 
contingency of technê.  In distinguishing technê as production rather than as an action of 
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virtue, the produced artifacts must give account of the action of production in a similar 
way to Plato’s conception of the accounting nature of epistêmê.  This giving account by 
the artifacts produced by craftspeople exists within the realm of epistêmê but is also 
necessary to attaining mastery in technê.  In order to bring forth, to innovate, there is a 
required reciprocal relationship between technê and epistêmê.  Frampton suggests that 
this creates a “state of affairs in which knowing and making are inextricably linked; to a 
condition in which technê reveals the ontological status of a thing through the disclosure 
of its epistemic value” (Frampton 1996, 23).  Again, this linkage between knowing and 
making just is phronesis. 
The Aristotelian concept of technê as “know-how” further strengthens the 
relationship of technê with Hephaestus, with Prometheus, and with Pandora—with 
allegorical tales that illustrate the acquisition of the “know-how” necessary to human 
survival.  Technê just is those practices of technical innovation that produce useful 
physical artifacts.  As such, technê can be seen as one of the primary traits describing the 
practices of the tecton; of the craftsperson.  We might think of technê as representing the 
most essential skill of the tecton; the skill of deliberately bringing forth, of innovating, of 
creating physical artifacts that we can call technologies.  This association of technê with 
technical innovation, with the creation of technology, allows us to think about 
craftsmanship as representational of a process of innovation that produces physical 
artifacts that assist in mediating human (and non-human) relationships with and in the 
world. 
While I hold that technological innovation has, on the whole, had positive impacts 
upon human lived experience, some have had serious reservations concerning 
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technology.  Heidegger has argued that technology can overwhelm and that it appears to 
be otherworldly. (Frampton 1996).  J. Robert Oppenheimer, in his Reith Lectures for the 
BBC argued that we should not treat technology as an enemy; however, he could offer no 
suggestions as to how we might live with its often terrifying prospects (Sennett 2008).  
Regardless of these reservations—reservations that are echoes of the distant stories of 
Prometheus and Pandora—I suggest that technological innovation, as represented by its 
etymological relation to the tecton; to the craftsperson, is fundamentally necessary to any 
understanding of the relationship of humankind to the world.  Craftsmanship—those 
practices representational of technological innovation—just is how humankind creates 
and uses physical artifacts to mediate its relationships with and in the world.  It is a 
primary descriptor of human experience. 
 
Craftsmanship and Design 
While Vitruvius’ architectus—the Greek archetecton—would have referred to an 
individual who had mastered her trade, it is not certain that this understanding of the term 
would have been equivalent in meaning to the way that we use the term architect today.  
In present usage, the term architect narrowly defines those licensed professionals who 
conceive of, develop, and create construction documents for buildings that will be built 
by others.  Vitruvius’ description of the architectus is of an individual who is concerned 
with the design and construction of buildings, of aqueducts, and of machines (Schofield 
2009).  In accepting this definition, it can be taken that Vitruvius’ architectus was more 
broadly a master craftsperson in the Greek sense; one who possessed mastery over the 
creation of physical artifacts in response to the needs of humans in our relationships with 
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and in the world.  This architect, Vitruvius’ architectus, if thought of as a manifestation 
of the Greek archetecton, appears to be a craftsperson in the sense that both Howard 
Risatti and Richard Sennett describe.59  It should be cautioned that in reading the de 
Architectura today, one should consider later translations of Vitruvius’ use of the term 
architectus as transitional.  This transitional usage begins to evolve the meaning of 
architectus from the more generalized Greek master craftsperson to the more specialized 
use related to the design and construction of buildings that is specific to the contemporary 
discipline of architecture. 
In describing the craftsperson—the tecton—as one who brings forth innovative 
physical artifacts, one can say that Vitruvius’ architectus is the ancient progenitor of the 
contemporary field of design.  The concept of the tecton—and her technê as bringing 
forth—derives from the “rock bottom” of Western thought; it is a component of the 
foundation that supports the deep structure of our contemporary understanding of design.  
Resultantly, Vitruvius’ de Architectura can be read as the first significant treatise 
regarding the broader concept of design professions and the related education of 
designers.  It provides a first glimpse into a portion of the historical record that can link 
the innovative practices of craftsmanship to the innovative practices of design.  As such, 
the text of the de Architectura can be interpreted as having the potential to support a 
philosophy of education in design; it can be thought of as the scaffolding—resting upon 
the foundation of Western thought—that might support educational beliefs and practices 
related to design.  The de Architectura very clearly illuminates what Vitruvius considered 
to be the necessary components of the theoretical education of the architectus—an 
                                                 
59 See Chapter 2 for this description and for a more complete discussion of craftsmanship as it is 
differentiated from both artistry and workmanship. 
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education based in Aristotelian epistêmê—but, also, provides fertile grounds for an 
interpretation of what might be thought of as the first text that suggests the additional 
necessity of the “know-how” associated with making.  As such, the de Architectura can 
be read as providing an explanation of the need of designers to have an education in 
craftsmanship; an education in both the theoretical knowledge of epistêmê and the skill 
found in technê. 
 
Vitruvius’ Life and Work 
Very little documentary evidence, outside the text of the de Architectura itself, 
exists concerning the life of Vitruvius.  It is thought that the de Architectura was first 
published near the end of the first century BCE (Tavernor 2009, xiv).  This estimation is 
based upon Vitruvius’ references to known events in Roman history.  Particularly, the 
text is dedicated to Augustus—a title granted to Octavian in 27 BCE.  Vitruvius also 
refers to his field service to Augustus’ father Julius Caesar where he served as a military 
architect and engineer in Gaul.  This reference to the Gallic campaign would indicate that 
the majority of Vitruvius’ military service would have occurred between the years of 58 
and 50 BCE.  He also mentions that he served in other, later, campaigns.  Further, 
Vitruvius mentions that as a result of his military service to Rome, he was awarded a 
pension at the recommendation of Augustus’ sister Octavia.  Reconstructing his life based 
upon these known milestones, it is thought that Vitruvius would have been around sixty 
years old when the de Architectura was completed. 
Vitruvius also provides some autobiographical information in the de Architectura 
that assists in defining his professional experience and lends credibility to his endeavor 
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to codify the disciplinary boundaries of design.  Vitruvius tells us that during his 
campaigns in service to Julius Caesar, “with Marcus Aurelius, Publius Minidius, and 
Gnaeus Cornelius, I was put in charge of the supply and repair of ballistae, scorpiones, 
and other types of artillery” (Book I, Introduction, 2).  During these campaigns, he would 
have been exposed to innovations in military hardware and to construction materials and 
methods employed in different provinces within the empire.  Later, during the rule of 
Augustus, the city of Rome experienced a building boom and significant upgrades to its 
infrastructure.60  Vitruvius was involved in this work; primarily lending his expertise to 
the redevelopment of the Roman water supply. As a result of this experience, he provides 
a thorough discussion of aqueducts in Book 8 of the de Architectura (Kruft 1994, 21).  
Interestingly, Vitruvius describes only one building that he designed, the Basilica at Fano, 
and then only in relation to a discussion of the concepts of proportion and modularity 
(Book V, Chapter I, 6).61  Vitruvius’ broad experience and his exposure to, and acquisition 
of, technê—of “know-how” in the techniques and materials associated with making—
would have provided Vitruvius with an awareness of the educational requirements 
necessary to the craftsperson; to one whose knowledge results in innovative practices that 
result in the production of useful physical artifacts. 
Other knowledge of Vitruvius can be assumed based upon interpretation of 
information implied by or provided within the text.  Based upon his career as an 
architectus and his military service, Vitruvius was most likely a freeborn Roman citizen.  
                                                 
60 Caesar Augustus, in order to maintain a positive relationship with the Senate and Citizens of Rome, 
launched an ambitious campaign to renovate, rebuild, and further develop the city and its public 
infrastructure.  As such, the de Architectura would have been a timely and appropriate addition to 
Augustus’ knowledge of both design and construction. 
61 Again, this broad experience beyond the narrow specificity of buildings further suggests that in 
Vitruvius’ text the practice of architecture was construed much more broadly than how we think of it in 
professional terms today. 
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In describing the pension awarded to him, there is the implication that he was not born of 
a wealthy family.  He thanks Augustus for the pension and states that it “was such that I 
need have no financial anxieties for the rest of my life” (Book I, Introduction, 3).  His 
familiarity with the natural materials and environments of Rome and Campania suggest 
that he was most likely raised and/or spent the greater portion of his life in those areas.  
Educationally, it can be assumed that Vitruvius received both a general education and 
served as an apprentice under practicing architects (Rowland and Howe 2001, 5).  
Throughout the text, he refers to the knowledge imparted by his teachers, praeceptores, 
as well as to his reliance upon knowledge gained from texts both general and discipline 
specific.62 
It was near the end of his professional service that Vitruvius composed the de 
Architectura.  Vitruvius devoted these practical volumes to Caesar Augustus and 
conceived of them as providing “recommendations so that by examining them, you 
yourself may become familiar with the characteristics of buildings already constructed 
and of those which will be built; in these books I have laid out all the principles of the 
discipline” (Book I, Introduction, 3). As this treatise also contains detailed accounts of 
technological devices and other complex machines, it can be assumed that, for Vitruvius, 
the term architectura included all design fields—those fields dealing with the practical 
and appropriate creation of an artefactual world.  As such, the de Architectura can be 
positioned as the first text concerning the discipline of design; the first document that 
describes the knowledge and skills necessary to the practice of design and provides an 
understanding of the scope of design education. 
                                                 
62 While Vitruvius refers to design texts that were essential to his education, none of those texts remain as 
part of the historical record. 
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Given what little we know of Vitruvius, it can be assumed that writing the de 
Architectura was probably the most significant achievement of his professional career 
and the culmination of his lived experience.  Vitruvius intended that the de Architectura 
would serve as a guide for both the architectus—one who had gained mastery of those 
innovative practices that, through their association with craftsmanship, constitute the 
practices of design—and her patrons.  Vitruvius also intended that the de Architectura 
would provide a foundation for future design education and design practice in the Roman 
Empire.63  In his dedication of the de Architectura to Augustus, Vitruvius noted that he 
began writing the text so that Augustus might “ensure that both public and private 
buildings will so match the majesty of your achievements that they will be handed down 
in the memory of future generations” (Book I, Introduction, 3).  The de Architectura was 
composed in order to educate Augustus about the buildings (cities and their civic and 
private buildings), devices (sundials, water screws, aqueducts), and machines (siege and 
other military weapons) of the Roman Empire and to provide the foundational structure 
of the disciplines that conceive of and produce these artifacts. 
  While portions of Vitruvius’ work were mentioned by other ancient 
commentators—most significantly Pliny the Elder—the de Architectura as a whole likely 
had little impact upon the classical world.  Like many other ancient texts, it was lost to 
history until its rediscovery in the Renaissance.  The fifteenth century rediscovery of the 
de Architectura, and its extensive dissemination, ensured that Vitruvius’ text would not 
remain an historical footnote.  The Renaissance revival of Vitruvius ensured that the de 
                                                 
63 Again, I suggest that the text is in a transitional period between the broader definition of the work of 
the architectus as representational of craftsmanship and the disciplinary specificity of those practices that 
we now associate with the design professions. 
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Architectura has been impactful upon subsequent conversations about design and the 
education of designers (Tavernor 2009, xiii).  While most of Vitruvius’ influence has 
been limited to the specialized practices of architecture and mechanical engineering—
due to a narrow interpretation of the term architectus—it should; nonetheless, be 
considered the foundation for contemporary design education, for design practice, and 
for all subsequent discussions of design and its impact upon our relationships with and in 
the world. 
 
Historical Impact of the de Architectura 
As evidenced by the works that he references in relation to his own education, 
Vitruvius was not the first to write on those innovative practices that we now call design; 
however, all earlier works on the subject have been lost.  As the only surviving treatise 
on design from the ancient world, the de Architectura has had a significant impact upon 
architectural theory and practice.  As noted above; however, Vitruvius’ work probably 
had little influence on the classical world.  Pliney the Elder lists the de Architectura in 
his bibliographies of botany and mineralogy in Natural History and Sextus Julius 
Frontinus referenced Vitruvius in his de Aquaeductu.  Other references to Vitruvius’ work 
appear in texts concerning private houses, gardening, and agriculture.  It was not until 
humanist scholar Poggio Bracciolini’s rediscovery of the de Architectura—at the library 
of St. Gall—in the early fifteenth century that Vitruvius’ ideas began to have any impact 
on architectural theory and practice (Tavernor 2009, xxvii).64 
                                                 
64 Resultantly, by the time the term architect had come to have a different meaning than Vitruvius’ 
architectus, the impact of the de Architectura has primarily been upon architectural education and 
practices.  I argue that its influence should be more broadly accepted as representational of other 
designlike practices. 
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During the Renaissance, several prominent Italian scholars produced annotated 
editions of the de Architectura.  The reputations of these scholars ensured the 
dissemination of Vitruvius’ work and ideas throughout Italy.  Leon Battista Alberti’s de 
re Aedificatoria (On the Art of Building), published in the mid-fifteenth century, relied 
heavily upon Vitruvius and his explications of Greek and Roman building.  Leonardo da 
Vinci’s famous drawing, the Vitruvian Man—more correctly known as the Canon of 
Proportions—was inspired by Vitruvius’ commentary on proportion and helped to 
reestablish the relation of the human body to design.65  Later, in 1570, Andrea Palladio 
published his I Quattro Libri Dell’ Architettura—The Four Books on Architecture—
which relied heavily upon his knowledge of Vitruvius.  It was Palladio’s text, coupled 
with his renown as an architect, that led to a Vitruvian revival beyond Italian shores.  
Sebastiano Serlio, Inigo Jones, and Thomas Jefferson were among the more famous 
adherents of Vitruvian Classicism insuring that both European and American 
architectural practice and education were recognizable as being influenced by the de 
Architectura. 
Vitruvius’ text provides almost all of our contemporary knowledge of the 
language of building design and construction as practiced by the Greeks and the Romans.  
In the de Architectura we are given the terminology related to the types and elements of 
columns.  It also provides commentary on the various components that made up the 
temples, houses, and civic buildings of Roman life.  Additionally, Vitruvius’ work 
provides an introduction to the principles of design in Book I, Chapter II, and a 
                                                 
65 This use of Vitruvius by da Vinci furthers my argument for a broader interpretation of Vitruvius’ work 
and firmly links it to the broader discipline of design.  Vitruvian proportion is still taught in the curricula 
of design disciplines including architecture, interior design, industrial design, and many of the 
engineering fields.  It is a staple of STEM education in relation to proportion and human scale. 
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commentary on aesthetics in Books III and IV.  From the Renaissance until the age of 
industrialization, this Vitruvian knowledge of architecture manifest itself in a Classicist 
methodology of design practice and, likewise, provided a concise history of ancient 
architectural practices.  The Classicist methodology handed down by the Renaissance, 
however, is no longer the predominant methodology of architectural practice.  
Resultantly, instruction in Classical design methodology and the history of the Classical 
tradition have been marginalized in contemporary educational practice.  While the 
methodology of Classicism has been supplanted by successive methodologies influenced 
by both the continued development of technologies and by changing cultural practices, 
awareness of its history has been exiled in favor of preparation for professional 
employment.  Interestingly, neither of these displacements has lessened the canonical 
status of Vitruvian Classicism.  It is still the foundation of design to which we must 
continually respond.  This response is both methodological—a response to the design 
methodologies of Classical practice—and a cultural response—a response to the impact 
that the deep structure of beliefs and practices associated with the Classical have had on 
contemporary practices; beliefs and practices that can be seen as liabilities to design 
education and to professional practice in the design disciplines. 
 
Educational Influence of the de Architectura 
As design—predominantly expressed in architectural form—became an academic 
discipline, it was Vitruvius’ theories, terminology, and principles that acted as a 
foundation for all design curricula—a Classicist understanding of design that was held as 
canonical and, as such, emphasized the privilege of wealth and power associated with 
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acts of building.66   In this sense, design became the visible manifestation of the state; and 
in practice and education it differentiated itself from any acts of making that were related 
to the daily life of the common people.  Design became the realm of the privileged; the 
monarchy, the wealthy, and the powerful.  It is at this time that we also see artifacts that 
were originally conceived of and produced for their utility embellished such that they too 
signify the privilege of the upper classes.  This Classicist approach to design practice 
stood in opposition to the vernacular buildings and artifacts that supported everyday 
life—buildings that, later, Bernard Rudofsky would present in Architecture without 
Architects.  Arguably, the most famous school of classical design was the École des 
Beaux-Arts established in Paris during the reign of Louis XIV.  Students from across the 
globe attended the École des Beaux-Arts, spreading Vitruvius’ influence far beyond 
Europe.  As noted in Chapter One, the École des Beaux-Arts established a method of 
educational practice that espoused the preservation of tradition; the preservation of 
privilege established in monarchist beliefs and practices.  It was not until the 
establishment of the École Polytechnique in 1794 that architectural education had any 
alternative to a Vitruvian inspired curriculum.  The design curriculum at the École 
Polytechnique was developed to produce scientists and technically skilled specialists and 
tended to eschew the influence of the liberal arts, as presented by Vitruvius, in favor of 
design practices that favored rationality and scientific precision. 
With the rise of the École Polytechnique and Enlightenment thinking, Vitruvian 
Classicism was almost completely abandoned as educationally relevant.  The universality 
of reason and the rise of Modernity—both in relation to design and to intellectual 
                                                 
66 The introduction of architectural education predates the Industrial Revolution and, as such, predates the 
separation of artistry, craftsmanship, and design. 
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pursuits—ensured that Classicism was relegated to courses in history and Vitruvius’ work 
was seen only as an antiquated methodology of which contemporary design theory was 
critical.  Ironically, the holistic curriculum proposed by Vitruvius—a curriculum that 
suggested the necessity of both the epistemic knowledge supplied in the liberal arts and 
the “know-how” of making—was virtually lost as a result of a call for rational approaches 
to knowledge and disciplinary specialization.  While Vitruvius’ Classicist influence still 
has a very limited relevance in contemporary architectural education, it does not exist in 
the totality that Vitruvius intended. 
 
Vitruvian Education and Epistêmê 
Vitruvius, in our contemporary usage of the terms, has been labeled an architect 
and, in some cases, an engineer.  His de Architectura has predominantly influenced the 
professional practices and the education of architects and mechanical engineers; however, 
this impact has been primarily limited to the principles and methodologies of architectural 
Classicism and his writings on water and aqueducts and their associated machines. 
Though many—at least within the narrow fields of architectural theory and practice—
consider Vitruvius an architect (in the sense that we use the term today), the de 
Architectura firmly positions him as a designer—a creative thinker involved in the 
development of technologies that support human beings’ physical relationships with and 
in the world.  These technologies, as manifestations of the practices of craftsmanship, 
predate the specializations of our contemporary era and span the fields of architecture, 
engineering, and all other fields associated with the practices of design—with practices 
that culminate in the creation of useful physical artifacts.  Vitruvius’ work has generally 
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been considered highly discipline specific and has not been viewed as having a significant 
impact on the broader category of design education.  It has certainly not been explored in 
relation to more general theories of educational practice.  While his work is not normally 
associated with either educational practice or the broader professions that make up the 
discipline of design, I will suggest that the de Architectura be considered a commentary 
on educational practice and that Vitruvius be thought of as a philosopher of education in 
design.     
There has been a great deal of commentary concerning the impact of the de 
Architectura on architectural theory and practice as a traditional Classicist methodology.  
Vitruvian Classicism is foundational to the canon of architecture and, in that capacity, 
has been thought of as being of value to architectural education.  The de Architectura has 
repeatedly had a place in dialog about design education, particularly in its relation to 
Classical methodology and architectural history; however, very little has been written 
concerning Vitruvius’ commentary on educational philosophy as presented in Book I, 
Chapter I of the text.  Because it is mainly viewed as a canonical document concerning 
the principles and practices of architectural Classicism, there has been very little dialog 
about it as a philosophy of education qua education; as an educational framework that 
might provide the deep structure of thought necessary to theorize appropriate responses 
to criticisms of contemporary practices in design education. 
While Vitruvius called himself an architectus and discussed the education 
necessary to architectura, I have argued that he should be more accurately thought of as 
a designer, a technologist creating physical artifacts that mediate human experience with 
and in the world.  Vitruvius suggests that “invention is the resolution of intricate problems 
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and the discovery of solutions thanks to intellectual versatility” (Book I, Chapter II, 2).    
In thinking of the architectus as a manifestation of craftsmanship—as the progenitor of 
design practices—the de Architectura can be read more broadly as an introduction to the 
disciplinary fields of design and to the education necessary to produce capable and 
competent designers.  Vitruvius meant that the de Architectura not only be a compendium 
of methods and practices but, more significantly, be an educational treatise that decisively 
codified all of the essential subjects of study necessary to the disciplines of design; of the 
knowledge and practices that constitute the professions associated with design.  For 
Vitruvius, architectura—the practices associated with design—necessitated both 
knowledge of epistêmê and the “know-how” of technê.67  He states:  
So architects who have struggled to achieve practical proficiency without an 
education have not been able to achieve recognition commensurate with their 
efforts: by contrast, those who have relied only on theory and book-learning were 
evidently chasing shadows rather than reality.  But those who have mastered both, 
like men [sic] supplied with all the necessary weapons, have achieved recognition 
and fulfilled their ambitions more quickly (Book I, Chapter I, 2). 
This combined knowledge of both theory and material practice defines the knowledge 
necessary to the practice of the architectus—it suggests that this knowledge is the wisdom 
of phronesis—and, if we broaden the scope of what an architectus might be, it also 
encompasses the forms of knowledge necessary to the designer. 
Book I, Chapter I of the de Architectura, titled “The Education of the Architect” 
begins to lay out Vitruvius’ theory of design education.  He explicitly identifies the 
educational subjects that one must master in order to hold the title architectus.  In 
theorizing the education of the architectus—of one we might consider as practicing the 
                                                 
67 Vitruvius actually uses the term theoria in reference to the educational elements of the liberal arts; 
however, this is just a finer parsing of Aristotle’s epistêmê.  Vitruvius appears to consider both technê and 
theoria as forms of epistêmê, thus, theoria is used as the more specific term in contrasting technê. 
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innovative disciplines of design—Vitruvius appears to have modeled his curriculum upon 
the Greek model of education described by Marcus Terentius Varro in his Disciplinae 
Libre Novem (Tavernor 2009, xvii).  In the nine books of the Disciplinae, Varro describes 
education as consisting of the trivium—grammar, logic, and oratory—and the 
quadrivium—geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and music.  Varro additionally devotes 
two books to education in the subject areas of medicine and architecture.68  It is from the 
Disciplinae that future educational theorists derived the seven classical liberal arts—
medicine and architecture seen as practical specializations beyond a classical education 
in theory (Lindberg 2007). 
Vitruvius builds upon Varro’s work as he describes the specific disciplines and 
fields of knowledge in which the architectus must have competency.  Vitruvius asserts 
that the architectus:  
should have a literary education, be skillful in drawing, knowledgeable about 
geometry, familiar with a great number of historical works and should have 
followed lectures in philosophy attentively; he should have a knowledge of music, 
should not be ignorant of medicine, should know the judgments of jurists and have 
a command of astronomy and of the celestial system (Book I, Chapter I, 3). 
Vitruvius, in describing the subjects that provide knowledge in epistêmê, goes on to offer 
explanations as to why one must be proficient in these areas of knowledge in order to 
successfully practice in the disciplines that we associate with design.  A literary education 
was necessary in order that the architectus might “leave a more dependable record when 
writing up his [sic] commentaries” (Book I, Chapter I, 4).  The skills of drawing and 
geometry are described as allowing the architectus to represent more clearly the actual 
                                                 
68 Varro’s work on architecture is not considered to have been influential to classical audiences nor—
since copies no longer exist—has it had an impact upon contemporary educational practice in the design 
fields. 
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appearance of the artifacts she designs.  Talent in drawing allowed the architectus to 
produce prototypes of her designs more accurately and to communicate her intentions by 
producing plans of buildings and their sites.  Geometry allowed her to solve problems of 
symmetry and modularity.  A firm understanding of arithmetic assisted the architectus in 
calculating costs for construction and in more accurately measuring and understanding 
lengths, volumes, and areas (Book I, Chapter I, 4).  Vitruvius spent a great deal of time 
in explaining why familiarity with history—a history that emphasized the Roman 
fondness for Greek culture—was of importance to the architectus.  A knowledge of 
history ensured that the ornamentation of buildings and other artifacts would be 
appropriate to their context and could be explained to those who might inquire.69  Study 
of history also provided examples of how the design of buildings could express the glory 
and power of the state (Book I, Chapter I, 5 and 6). 
For Vitruvius, a study of philosophy both ensured that the architectus would 
maintain her moral integrity and that she would have an understanding of what we would 
now term the natural sciences (Book I, Chapter I, 7).  An understanding of music assisted 
the architectus in creating harmonic relationships in the artifacts of her design, in 
understanding balance, and in understanding acoustics as a necessary component in 
designing theaters (Book I, Chapter I, 8 and 9).  Knowledge of medicine, much like 
knowledge of philosophy, related to an understanding of the natural sciences.  Such 
knowledge allowed the architectus to determine the siting of buildings, to understand the 
properties of air and water, and to understand the properties of materials used in the 
                                                 
69 Some of this history might be the allegorical explanation of mythology which just is understanding and 
stating a worldview.  In regard to ornamentation, see George Hersey’s The Lost Meaning of Classical 
Architecture (1988) for further information on the meaning that the Greeks and Romans associated with 
ornamentation.  
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creation of machines and other physical artifacts.  In order for the architectus to ensure 
that all legal requirements related to sites and buildings were met and in order to possess 
the ability to understand and execute contracts, she was required to study the knowledge 
of jurists.  Knowledge of the celestial systems allowed the architectus to make favorable 
judgments about building orientation and the placement of fenestration.  This knowledge 
also allowed her to understand the principles of sundials (Book I, Chapter I, 10). 
Vitruvius concluded his discussion of the specific subject matter necessary to an 
epistemic foundation for design education by asserting that because the architectus 
required an understanding of so many disciplines that people could not claim to practice 
architectura without “having climbed the steps of these disciplines from their youth” 
(Book I, Chapter I, 11).  He also noted that acquiring proficiency in such a broad range 
of subjects would likely never allow the architectus to be a specialist in any one particular 
subject.  “For, given the vast variety of these subjects, nobody can attain mastery in each 
because it is hardly possible for anyone to absorb and assimilate their theoretical 
principles” (Book I, Chapter I, 13).  Vitruvius does, however, suggest that even though 
there exists this “vast variety” the architectus can manage her generalist knowledge of all 
of these disciplines as they are interrelated and necessary to each other. 
Vitruvius’ educational subjects, in echoing Varro, basically cohere to the two 
culture binary—elucidated by C.P. Snow—of education in the humanities (the trivium) 
and education in the physical sciences (the quadrivium).  While these subjects describe 
an education in the knowledge of epistêmê, they offer no meaningful assistance in 
establishing the educational concepts that would allow for an education in technê.  The 
Seven Liberal Arts alone are not effective in creating an educational philosophy that 
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addresses the “know-how” associated with making and, resultantly, cannot be thought of 
as a comprehensive body of knowledge that might establish the educational practices in 
design that would allow for the attainment of the wisdom of phronesis.  Without the 
attainment of phronesis—the ability to make judgements in regard to acts of making—
educational practices in design cannot hope to produce capable and competent designers. 
It is from this point that Vitruvius’ text delves into the practical aspects of design; 
the principles and divisions of architecture as a tradition of building.  His writing in Book 
I, Chapter I is generally thought of as concluding Vitruvius’ discussion of the proposed 
subject matter necessary to the study of design; however, I suggest that it does not 
necessarily conclude his commentary on design education.  Vitruvius clearly furthers 
Varro’s model of education by insisting that the architectus—or, by extension, any 
disciplinary specialist—combine the knowledge of theory (epistêmê) with knowledge 
grounded in practice (technê).  He asserts that every discipline consists of two distinct 
aspects—the theory that is implicit in the work and the practical skills needed to produce 
the work (Book I, Chapter I, 15).  Theory, according to Vitruvius is common to all 
cultivated individuals in that all theoretical knowledge is interrelated and all disciplines 
build upon the knowledge of theory.  It is the continued practice of a specific discipline 
that refines and validates the theoretical understanding.  As a result, the substance of any 
specific discipline cannot be found in theory alone, but must be fleshed out in practice; 
in technê.  In this way, the liberal education—adopted from the work of Varro—in the de 
Architectura must be seen only as the initial starting point for a design education.  The 
architectus must gain experience through the practice of technê if she is to “reach the 
highest sanctuary of architecture” (Book I, Chapter I, 11). 
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Technê and the Wisdom of Phronesis 
While the remainder of the de Architectura catalogs design practices associated 
with knowledge in epistêmê, the educational practices that lead to knowledge in technê 
are not clearly articulated.  Vitruvius did define technê as consisting of “the ceaseless and 
repeated use of a skill by which any work to be produced is completed by working 
manually with the appropriate materials according to a predetermined design” (Book I, 
Chapter I, 1).  This definition of technê, while suggesting that it is learned, does not 
explain how we might view technê as knowledge that could be perceived of as possessing 
educational value.  Without an articulated educational theory of this second realm of 
knowledge in technê, Vitruvius’ educational practices—practices that parallel Snow’s 
two cultures—can be read as privileging theoretical knowledge; as privileging epistêmê.  
This educational prioritization of the theoretical, in relation to Aristotelian certainty, over 
the contingency of technê can be seen as the establishment of a dominant/subordinate 
relationship that, at least in the contemporary era, privileges theory—and epistemic ways 
of knowing—over practice and the knowledge associated with making.70  Sennett has 
suggested that “this view, in which the educated generalist dominates the craftsman [sic] 
specialist, reflected a clear hierarchal structure in the Roman state” (Sennett 2008, 133).  
This privilege of the epistemic; however, may prove inconsequential if Vitruvius’ 
educational philosophy can be thought of as also relying upon contingent forms of 
knowledge associated with technê—with the “know-how” of making—and, resultantly, 
with the wisdom of phronesis. 
                                                 
70 I do not know that Vitruvius knowingly privileged the theoretical, as he was writing in a time when that 
distinction had not been fully realized.  What I am most interested in suggesting here is that since ancient 
times there have been different ways of knowing and that at some point these ways of knowing were—
either explicitly or implicitly—given hierarchal status.   
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Vitruvius’ educational philosophy remains incomplete without a theory of the 
educational concepts that validate technê; concepts that provide educational value to the 
architectus.  These concepts that provide the educational value of technê are what I want 
to think of as practices of craftsmanship that can only be gained through the creating of 
physical artifacts and then making judgments about the effectiveness of those artifacts.  
This ability to engage in technê in order to create physical artifacts and to apply the 
knowledge of epistêmê in order to make judgments about those artifacts parallels 
Aristotelian thought and provides the practical wisdom of phronesis.  In Book I, Chapter 
III, Vitruvius provides a means of interpreting his educational philosophy as including an 
education in technê.  Resultantly, this knowledge of the material properties of things and 
the skills of artefactual innovation, coupled with a foundation in the knowledge of 
epistêmê, leads to the practical wisdom associated with phronesis.  It is from Vitruvius’ 
coupling of knowledge in epistêmê and knowledge in technê that we might find a 
complete educational philosophy beneficial to education in design. 
While Vitruvius’ de Architectura does not hold the influence that he intended, a 
re-visioning of its most famous passage may provide a means of reasserting Vitruvian 
thought in contemporary design education.  This re-visioning may provide a 
philosophical framework for practical wisdom, the phronesis attained by master 
craftspeople, that eclipses the methodological differences at the heart of contemporary 
criticisms of design education and addresses the race, class, and gender hierarchies that 
are liabilities to design education—differences and liabilities that prevent design 
education from producing capable and competent designers and from participating in the 
creation and maintenance of culture.  It is within the text concerning the divisions of 
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architecture—Book I, Chapter III—that we come to the most noteworthy of Vitruvius’ 
assertions.  After subdividing architectura into the practices associated with buildings, 
with sundials, and with machines, Vitruvius states that “all these buildings must be 
executed in such a way as to take account of durability, utility, and beauty” (Book I, 
Chapter III, 2).71  While this assertion appears particular to buildings—what we might 
narrowly define as architecture—in the context of the remainder of the chapter it suggests 
a more general statement of the necessity of making judgments; of employing knowledge 
in epistêmê to evaluate material knowledge and the “know-how” associated with 
craftsmanship in order to ensure that artifacts produced are appropriate to their desired 
function—that artifacts have functional value in relation to their desired durability, utility, 
and beauty. 
The functionalist nature of Vitruvian phronesis allows for practical, material, and 
aesthetic judgments that are a product of both knowledge in epistêmê and knowledge 
gained in the practice of technê.  As it is a result of the necessary combination of both 
these forms of knowledge, phronesis can be seen as embodying a form of relativism.  This 
relativism, however, cannot be considered a pure relativism but, rather, a mitigated form 
of relativism that has taken account of both these ways of knowing.  This claim of 
relativism results from the relationship of the craftsperson to the artifact produced; the 
craftsperson makes individual judgments that determine use, materials, and aesthetic 
value—these choices are contingent upon the intentions of the craftsperson.  This 
                                                 
71 In the text I have used, Schofield interprets the Latin firmitas, utilitas, and venustas as durability, 
utility, and beauty.  Others—particularly older editions of the de Architectura—have interpreted these 
terms as firmness, commodity, and delight.  I think that either works well; however, I have chosen to 
maintain Schofield’s translation as the other terms seem antiquated and do not cohere to contemporary 
usage. 
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relativism of choice is mitigated by the requirement of making judgments, by engaging 
knowledge and experience in order to evaluate the durability, utility, and beauty of the 
artifact produced.  The mitigated relativism of phronesis might be best understood in 
relation to philosopher of feminist epistemology Lorraine Code’s claim—in relation to 
moral systems—that “the values and regulative principles invoked are appropriately 
responsive to the context” (Code 1991, 108).  This suggests, in the context of Vitruvius, 
that decisions regarding the production (technê) of artifacts must be tempered by 
evaluation (phronesis) that is not limited to universal principles (epistêmê) but must also 
address the functional reality of the durability, utility, and beauty of those artifacts being 
held in judgment.  In this way, knowledge claims find space within the subtleties of 
experienced life—they are not relegated to the exclusion required of the universal 
character of epistemic forms of knowledge; forms of knowledge that exist in and 
perpetuate oppressive conceptual binaries.   In the context of craftsmanship, phronesis 
just is a mitigated relativism that guides the experiential expertise of the craftsperson in 
creating useful artifacts that assist in mediating our relationships with and in the world.  
In durability, utility, and beauty, we can find the foundation of a pragmatic and non-
hierarchal educational philosophy that can address the liabilities that exist at the “rock 
bottom” of the deep structure of Western beliefs and assumptions about design and, more 
generally, address issues of the veracity of multiple forms of knowledge and that address 
race, class, and gender marginalization in a variety of educational environments. 
Vitruvius’ assertion that all buildings—what textual context suggests should be 
thought of as all of those activities that produce useful physical artifacts—must take 
account of utility, durability, and beauty places them as educational topics outside of the 
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Classicist and historical contexts of the epistemic knowledge presented in the de 
Architectura and firmly associates them with both the technê and the phronesis necessary 
to the craftsperson.  As such, Vitruvius’ call for a taking account of durability, utility, and 
beauty establishes a practical knowledge that exists outside the canonical educational 
binary established by both Varro and, later, Snow.  It is from this practical knowledge 
that material judgments can be made; utility, durability, and beauty provide access to a 
mitigated relativism that allows a practical means of taking account of the artifacts that 
result from the disciplinary practices of technê. 
Utility, durability, and beauty—as appropriate means of making judgements 
concerning the physical artifacts produced by craftspeople—can, therefore, be seen as the 
virtues of craftsmanship.  These Vitruvian Virtues—virtues that arise out of the wisdom 
of phronesis—should be considered as informing the practical knowledge that is required 
of the designer.  The implications of the Vitruvian Virtues of durability, utility, and 
beauty, in some way, act to re-establish a direct relationship between design practice, as 
mediating and innovative, the messy vitality of lived experience, and the physical 
attributes of a material world.  They suggest that design, at its most fundamental level, is 
intimately tied to the contingencies of function; that design must be concerned with 
producing physical artifacts that are useful to humans (and non-human animals) in our 
relationships with and in the world.  The Vitruvian Virtues, when understood as providing 
access to a form of mitigated relativism, ground the technical knowledge of craftsmanship 
within a physical world where the pragmatic awareness of the appropriateness of 
particular materials defines the durability of design artifacts; the function of those 
artifacts—how they are appropriately used by humans—is a condition of their utility; and 
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the particular aesthetic value we place on those materials defines their beauty.  Durability 
and utility can easily be recognized as pragmatic concerns related to the physical 
properties of artifacts and to the engaged practices of making and making judgments—
the reciprocal practices of craftsmanship.  Likewise, beauty acts to emphasize our 
aesthetic relations—psychological, emotional, and physical—to the artifacts of our 
design.  Beauty, might also be explained as elegance, a term employed in engineering 
fields to denote simplicity of design.  Elegance is achieved when an artifact is executed 
such that it serves its purpose and could serve no other with the same ease.  Antoine de 
Saint-Exupéry, the French aviator and author—probably best known for his classic 
children's book The Little Prince—poetically suggests the achievement of elegance when 
he states that “a designer knows he has achieved perfection not when there is nothing left 
to add, but when there is nothing left to take away” (de Saint-Exupéry 1939, 9). 
Durability, utility, and beauty, questions of judgment, represent an Aristotelian 
taking account of what is produced.  These judgments provide a conceptual vocabulary 
to the designer that reconciles most contemporary critiques of design education.  
Questions of utility, durability, and beauty represent the wisdom necessary to the 
fulfilment of mastery in any particular trade.  From Aristotle we learn that the craftsperson 
who attains phronesis in regard to her trade is wiser than the person of experience because 
she knows the causes of her making; she has knowledge of the reasons that things are 
done.  The artisan, on the other hand, acts without this knowledge (981a30-b5).72  
Aristotle goes on to suggest that the distinction between the attainment of phronesis and 
non-critical acts of making is the ability to teach.  The craftsperson who possesses technê 
                                                 
72 Aristotle’s use of the term artisan here is probably more accurately a representation of the worker that I 
have discussed earlier—one whose only intention is in production. 
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is able to teach only if she has knowledge (epistêmê) of the reasons why things are done 
in her technê and, resultantly, has attained the wisdom of phronesis.  In this way, it can 
be concluded that the craftsperson who has attained phronesis possesses both knowledge 
in epistêmê and the “know-how” associated with her technê; she has attained the heights 
of the profession of the architectus.  Proficiency in both forms of knowledge, in attaining 
phronesis, allows its possessors to make judgments—judgments that give designers the 
ability to know the causes of their decisions—and to teach those skills as a means of 
perpetuating their professional practices. 
In this Vitruvian triad of durability, utility, and beauty one can theorize a practical 
and mitigated relativism; production is not solely a product of the desire of the maker but 
a reciprocal bringing forth of physical artifacts that the craftsperson intends to meet 
particular needs in relation to human interactions with and in the world.  These technical 
virtues, coupled with the theoretical, complete the educational needs of the designer and, 
as such, can provide for a renewal of practices in design education that reunite the 
designer with the world of lived experience and with the physical properties of materials 
that exist in the world.  The Vitruvian Virtues, the virtues of craftsmanship, are the 
deliberate and normative standards that describe a particular way of being in the world 
and act to populate the knowledge that should be at the core of design education; they 
enact the knowing that—epistêmê—and knowing how—technê—that can ground the 
deep structure of thought that supports education in design.  In supporting education in 
design from such a structure, as a form of mitigated relativism, we might be more readily 
positioned to address those liabilities to education in design that arise as the result of the 
patriarchal assumption; liabilities of race, class, and gender subordination.  In asserting 
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that Vitruvius’ de Architectura is describing the practices of what we would now call a 
designer and that these practices are related to the practices of craftsmanship—practices 
in technological innovation—an adoption of the knowledge available in the practices of 
craftsmanship provides the basis for an educational philosophy of design; it provides a 




Conclusion: The Educational Value of Craftsmanship 
 
An Educational Theory 
As a design educator, I have found that my students begin their design educations 
with imperfect expectations as to what design education might be; expectations that seem 
antithetical to the exploration and discovery that I associate with design practices.  I have 
also found that while there have been calls to address the lack of diversity in both the 
professions and in educational institutions, educators have not been able to articulate how 
this might effectively happen in educational settings.  Design educators have not yet 
begun to address issues of race, class, and gender disparity beyond shallow attempts at 
inclusion.  These issues—misguided educational expectations and a lack of significantly 
addressing diversity—are, at their deepest levels, liabilities to educational practice that 
have led me to begin this inquiry into the structure and practices associated with education 
in design. 
When I began this project, I began with two questions.  First, I wanted to know 
how I might respond to criticisms that, at first glance, suggested there were problems 
related to pedagogical practices and curricular content in design and to the identity of 
design as an academic discipline; problems that were responsible for generating a state 
of crisis in design education.  These criticisms manifest themselves in claims that 
education in design did not have the ability to produce capable and competent designers 
and, concurrently, was unable to participate in the creation and maintenance of culture.  
The second, and more personal, question concerned how I might think of myself as a 
designer and as a design educator; how I might be able to understand and explain how I 
think about and teach design.  In a very tangible way, I have a responsibility for insuring 
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that the things I teach work to positively impact education in design.  I expect that it 
makes me a better educator to reflect upon those concepts that are at the foundation of 
my beliefs and assumptions about design and how, as an educator, those beliefs and 
assumptions have an impact upon my students.  My need for reflection upon my beliefs 
and assumptions takes seriously Jane Roland Martin’s claim that the primary role of 
education is “to form the best individuals and cultures it can” (Martin 2011, 204).  
These questions—how I might respond to criticisms of design and how I might 
conceive of myself as a designer—are critical to me.  They are critical to my career as a 
design educator and in my role as a student of the philosophy of education.  Upon 
reflection, I have come to understand that these questions are interrelated.  For me to be 
an effective educator, I have to scrutinize and address criticisms of design practice and 
design education in order to come to terms with what I believe about design, how I 
practice design, and how I teach others design.  These questions are also related such that 
in order to conceptualize my role as a designer—and what that might mean to my 
educational practices—I have to have a fundamental idea about what design is; a way of 
positioning myself in a field that seemingly does not have a significant history of 
foundational beliefs and assumptions that might influence how it is understood in its 
contemporary manifestations.  In the Introduction, I suggested that theorizing and 
exploring a more significant history and philosophy of design, and its impact upon the 
education of designers, might allow me to come to terms with both of my questions.  In 
exploring these questions, in coming to terms with how I might understand design, I have 
come to several significant conclusions.  First, in attempting to understand the underlying 
structure of the various criticisms of design education, I realized that the criticisms voiced 
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by design theorists and design educators were not necessarily criticisms of educational 
practices but, rather, criticisms related to design methodology.  The second conclusion 
that has come to influence my thought is that it is beliefs and assumptions that exist at the 
“rock bottom” of Western thought in general—not specific to the practices associated 
with artistry, workmanship, and craftsmanship—that are the most detrimental to 
educational practices in design.  Both of these conclusions have led me to seek an 
educational philosophy that might be applied to education in design; have led me to 
engage the crisis of design education from the standpoint of educational philosophy. 
 
Criticisms of Design Methodology 
In re-conceptualizing criticisms of design education as methodological, it became 
important to explore the methodologies that were at the heart of those criticisms; to find 
the root causes that initiated those criticisms of design education.  Christian Norberg-
Schulz dissatisfaction with young architects was a dissatisfaction with the 
universalization of Modernism.  Bernard Rudofsky’s reaction to architectural practice 
was, similarly, a reaction against the system of beliefs that support the intellectual agenda 
associated with Modernity.  The criticisms presented by Norberg-Schulz and Rudofsky, 
as design phenomenologists, can be thought of as expressions of their beliefs in the 
significance of human experience.  They held that communicating the variety of our 
human experiences was more appropriate to design than expressions of the dream of a 
universal narrative.  The criticisms of Monica Ponce de Leon and Don Norman—
criticisms of design’s reliance upon a Euro-centric canon—are, likewise, not criticisms 
of particular educational practices but, rather, of methodologies of thought that have 
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resulted in educational inertia that has, resultantly, led to an elitism that prevents the 
practice of design and education in design from participating in an ever evolving culture. 
Generally, these methodological criticisms are not criticisms of educational 
philosophy; they are criticisms of more deeply held beliefs that illustrate how designers 
perceive of their work.  These criticisms have been grounded in their authors beliefs and 
opinions about what might count as design.  For the most part, methodological criticisms 
can be considered responses to architectural historian and theorist Sigfried Giedion’s 
suggestion that the role of design, particularly architecture, is in providing “the 
interpretation of a way of life valid for our period” (Giedion 1974, xxxiii).  For Giedion, 
and our other critics, the project of Modernity has not been an appropriate interpretation.  
Modernist thought in relation to design, and the last several decades of responses to the 
Modernist agenda, has led to confusion in design practice and in design education.   
Unfortunately, the confusion of responses has only produced further methodological 
criticisms.  In remaining methodological, these responses have not engaged educational 
theory.  They have certainly dealt in subtleties concerning theories of the role of design 
but they have not addressed theories of education in design that might assist in redressing 
some of the deeply held beliefs that are the root of those criticisms.  As such, it appears 
productive to address these criticisms from the standpoint of educational theory in order 
to find clarity in response to my first question. 
 
Understanding Design 
To answer the first question—how I might respond to contemporary criticisms of 
design and design education—I had to come to terms with the second.  How did I think 
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of myself as a designer; as a design educator?  I realized that being “a maker of 
everythings” was not a helpful way to describe what I thought it meant to be a designer.  
In order to be able to think about what it meant to be a designer—especially in regard to 
educational philosophy—I thought it beneficial to engage the history and philosophy of 
design.  As a relatively new term describing a profession that arose concurrent to the 
Industrial Revolution, design did not appear to have a history robust enough to help me 
understand, at a fundamental level, what it might mean to be a designer.  Similarly, design 
did not appear to have a philosophical stance that was not tied to methodological 
positions.  Because the practices that we call design are recent, and because the artefactual 
record would suggest that something like design has been occurring throughout human 
history, I began to explore ways of making—ways of producing physical artifacts—that 
might conceptually extend the history and philosophy of design and design education.  As 
“a maker of everythings,” I found it reasonable to engage the ways of making that are 
employed by artists, by workers, and by craftspeople in order to find a more 
comprehensive accounting of design. 
 
Taking Account of Design Education 
To examine the histories and philosophies associated with artistry, with 
workmanship, and with craftsmanship in search of an educational philosophy that would 
assist me in clarifying what it meant to be a designer and a design educator, and in 
addressing criticisms of design, I needed to employ some method of educational critique.  
I needed educational criteria, an educational theory, that might allow me both to reframe 
and respond to the criticisms of design educators and to begin to search for educational 
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value that would assist me in understanding and enacting my role as a design educator.  
As the framework for an educational critique of ways of making that might be beneficial 
to education in design I turned to what I call taking account of the beliefs and assumptions 
that influence those ways of making that might have an impact upon practices in design 
education.  This taking account is based upon and employs Martin’s concept of cultural 
bookkeeping.  Her bookkeeping project, in engaging “fundamental beliefs about the 
social order” (Martin 2011, 26) offers a feminist methodology that is supported by the 
works of Karen Warren, Carolyn Korsmeyer, and Lorraine Code.  Resultantly, my 
intention was to integrate this feminist critique in order to take account of the assets and 
liabilities that lie at the “rock bottom” of our beliefs and assumptions about the ways of 
making associated with artists, with workers, and with craftspeople.  Taking account of 
those beliefs and assumptions provides a framework for examining how they might 
influence education in design.  The goal of this exploration has been to identify and 
cultivate assets and eliminate liabilities in order to ensure that education in design can 
produce capable and competent designers and participate in the creation and maintenance 
of culture. 
In order to identify the assets and liabilities that conceptually extend the history 
and philosophy of design and, resultantly, influence how we think about and teach design, 
it was necessary for me to engage the beliefs and assumptions that support the deep 
structure of thought that influences the practices of artistry, of workmanship, and of 
craftsmanship.  On the surface of each of these ways of making, floating well above the 
deep structure of each, are similarities that can be thought of as assets to educational 
practices associated with design.  In a general sense, these surface assets are not thought 
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of as impacting educational theory.  They do, however, impact educational practices.  
Artists, workers, and craftspeople are engaged in processes that are productive. All three 
of these ways of making produce artifacts—either physical or not—as a result of those 
processes.  An engagement with the production of artifacts and the skills necessary to that 
production are indispensable to the education of designers.  Further, the communicative 
skills necessary to the artist and the productive skills of the worker and the craftsperson 
are equally necessary to the education of designers.  The skills associated with the 
productivity of making and with visual communication are assets associated with 
educational practices that should continue to be cultivated by design educators.  
Explorations beneath the similarities that exist at the surface, however, expose liabilities 
inherent in each of these ways of making.  Engagement with the deep structure of thought 
associated with artistry, workmanship, and craftsmanship predominantly expose 
liabilities that must be addressed if we are to hope for an educational philosophy that 
might address criticisms of education in design and be beneficial in how we think about 
and teach design.  In engaging these ways of making, I have found that the beliefs and 
assumptions that we hold in relation to artistry, workmanship, and craftsmanship are built 
upon even more fundamental beliefs and assumptions that exist at the foundation of 
Western thought.  Resultantly, it becomes imperative to engage the foundations of 
Western thought in order to identify liabilities to education in design.  Taking account of 
the deep structure of Western thought exposes us to the “rock bottom” beliefs and 
assumptions that influence how we understand the world and how we think about design. 
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The Educational Liabilities of Artistry 
Taking account of the deep structure of thought associated with education in 
artistry began with a realization that Martin’s two primary dichotomies—a nature/culture 
split and a distinction between public and private life—represented oppressive cultural 
frameworks that were the result of gendered assumptions.  Korsmeyer’s concept of deep 
gender allows us to become aware of those basic beliefs and assumptions that are the 
result of the privileging of the masculine and the marginalization of the feminine in their 
binary relationship.  In associating the masculine/feminine binary with other binary 
systems; i.e., mind and body, culture and nature, public and private, and any other number 
of seemingly neutral ideas and beliefs; we find a representation of oppression.  This 
oppression—the privilege associated with the masculine and the marginalization of the 
feminine—is fully embedded in Western culture and, resultantly, influences all of our 
subsequent beliefs and practices.  The privileging of the masculine is a fundamental 
assumption in Western thought.  The influence of this bias—the oppression associated 
with the privileging of the masculine binary—upon all subsequent thought is what I have 
called the patriarchal assumption. 
Recognizing the oppressive nature of gender asymmetry as a cultural liability, 
Korsmeyer theorizes ways that deep gender analysis might begin to address the 
oppression associated with the canon of fine arts.  Identifying the canon of fine arts as 
gendered, as maintaining its authority as a result of its association with the privilege of 
the masculine binary, allows others to begin to challenge that authority.  In the case of 
the fine arts, Korsmeyer’s theory and the works produced by feminist artists are 
responding to a privilege that they find unacceptable.  Their challenges to the authority 
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of the canon have begun to modify that canon radically; they have begun to interrogate 
the deeply held beliefs and assumptions about what it means to make art and what things 
we might call art.  These challenges are, in effect, criticisms of our cultural beliefs about 
what counts as art.  While these criticisms have begun to destabilize the canon of fine 
arts, they can be further thought of as implying the need to transform the foundational 
beliefs and assumptions that give any oppressive systems their authority.  Identifying the 
patriarchal assumption as a liability to educational practices in artistry can, by extension, 
name it as a liability to educational practices in design.  Further, it can be held that the 
patriarchal assumption—an assumption at the “rock bottom” of Western thought—is a 
liability to all educational practices that do not attempt to address its oppression. 
Like the patriarchal assumption, education in artistry also exposes the liability of 
a monarchist sensibility.  This monarchist privilege arises from an acceptance of the 
infallibility of a monarch as a result of his having been divinely sanctioned.  In practices 
associated with artistry, monarchist privilege manifests itself as an unquestioning 
acceptance of those institutions that privilege canonical ways of knowing and that 
privilege precedents that were established in the past.  In discussing educational practices 
in artistry that were founded on, and acted to perpetuate, monarchist privilege, I explored 
educational practices at the École des Beaux-Arts.  The École des Beaux-Arts also 
provides us with an example of how issues of diversity have been addressed in response 
to social pressures designed to ensure inclusion.  In 1899, Julia Morgan, after completing 
an engineering degree at the University of California – Berkeley, became one of the first 
women allowed to enroll in the architecture program at the École des Beaux-Arts.  In 
1902, she became that institutions first female graduate (Wilson 2007).  While this may 
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seem like a victory in gender equity, I hold that it was only a shallow victory at the surface 
of issues that have continued to perpetuate the deep structure of Western thought; her 
victory did little to change either the patriarchal privilege or the monarchist privilege 
associated with the École des Beaux-Arts; associated with education in design.  When she 
returned to California and was employed as an architect, her employer, the architect John 
Galen Howard, suggested that Morgan was “an excellent draftsman [sic] whom I have to 
pay almost nothing, as it [sic] is a woman” (Boutelle 1996).  Later, when she began her 
own design practice, Morgan became the primary architect of the American newspaper 
magnate William Randolph Hearst.  Her most famous work for Hearst was La Cuesta 
Encantada, perhaps better known as Hearst Castle.  In this relationship between 
American royalty and design, we can see the deep structure of monarchist privilege; while 
Morgan was, at least marginally, included within the male dominated discipline of 
Architecture, she was obligated to remain beholden to manifestations of monarchist 
beliefs and assumptions. 
 
The Educational Liabilities of Workmanship 
Attempting to extend the history and philosophy of education in design, I 
theorized taking account of the assets and liabilities associated with the deep structure of 
thought related to the ways of making associated with artists, with workers, and with 
craftspeople.  In realizing that this deep structure of educational thought was built upon a 
foundation of deeply held beliefs and assumptions supporting Western thought, I began 
to engage liabilities associated with that foundation.  In the case of education in artistry, 
I identified the patriarchal assumption as one such foundational belief.  In exploring the 
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deep structure of thought related to workmanship, I identified a bias against labor; a bias 
toward expressions of theory over expressions of production.  In identifying this bias as 
having a binary relationship, it can be related to the oppressive binaries associated with 
feminist critique.  As such, labor can be associated with the subordination of the domestic, 
with the work of those who are not perceived of as being active participants in public life.  
In design education, this bias is so prevalent that one must turn to vocational education 
in order to fully theorize its effect upon educational practices. 
In discussing the advent of vocational education, Theodore Lewis suggested that 
vocational education arose as a result of class distinctions.  The elite of society were 
above the need to possess the “know-how” associated with making; with the work of 
workers.  Resultantly, vocational education became the province of those who were 
othered by privilege.  This privilege, associated with wealthy white men, acted to 
subordinate those who were not of the dominant class, the dominant race, or the dominant 
gender.  James Anderson’s work on the Hampton-Tuskegee model of education 
reinforces the racial marginalization associated with education in workmanship.  These 
models of education—vocational in conception—were intended to maintain the privilege 
of white males and ensure that the education of previously enslaved Black people forced 
them to remain in positions of servitude.  Even though Anderson’s work illustrates an 
attempt at maintaining a privileged social order, the educational model proposed at 
Tuskegee can be seen as a challenge to the marginalization of the vocational; a challenge 
to systems that are based upon race and class subjugation. 
Booker T. Washington’s Up from Slavery presents a philosophy of education that 
attempts to redress the bias associated with the vocational.  Washington’s educational 
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philosophy—in establishing dignity in labor—challenged the marginalization associated 
with the vocational arts.  In elevating labor beyond drudgery and toil, in dignifying the 
practices of workers as agential, Washington’s educational philosophy would allow the 
previously enslaved to begin to affect changes in cultural practices; it would allow them 
to begin to participate in the creation and maintenance of culture.  This philosophy would 
allow newly emancipated Black people to take part in a culture that had previously 
excluded their voices; would allow them to become recognized participants in the broader 
American culture not through confrontation but through economic cooperation.  In his 
proposal that making things well would lead to the cultural inclusion of the previously 
enslaved, we see a challenge to the race and class privilege of the antebellum United 
States.  This challenge, like challenges to the patriarchal assumption, is one means of 
exposing and eliminating the liabilities of these beliefs from Western thought.  Challenges 
to established cultural practices through critical exposure of their “rock bottom” beliefs 
and assumptions is at least one possible way of mitigating their effects upon educational 
thought and educational practice. 
 
The Educational Liabilities of Craftsmanship 
Engaging the history and philosophy of craftsmanship completed my examination 
of the ways of making that I thought might provide a foundation for educational practices 
in design.  Like artistry and workmanship, it appeared productive to engage the beliefs 
and assumptions that support the practices of craftsmanship; to take account of the assets 
and liabilities at the “rock bottom” of thought that—either explicitly or implicitly—
influence how we think about craftsmanship.  Having found that the most worrisome 
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liabilities to educational practices arose from the foundational beliefs and assumptions of 
Western thought, I began my exploration of craftsmanship in the stories of Greek 
mythology.  In the Western context, it is the Greek myths that have been most influential 
upon our beliefs and assumptions about the world.  In the allegorical stories of Pandora, 
Prometheus, and Hephaestus, there are explanations for the necessity of craftsmanship 
and for the skills that are associated with practices of craftsmanship.  In those stories, and 
in the Biblical account of Genesis, we can understand craftsmanship arising out of a need 
for human beings to create physical artifacts that would mediate their relationships with 
and within a seemingly hostile world; the physical world that mortals found themselves 
in after defying the gods.  While the stories of the fall of humankind may have resulted 
from political and theological shifts that ushered in a patriarchal worldview, they are, 
simultaneously, the first stories that provide an explanation of the relationship of 
craftsmanship to the experiential world of human life. 
In their relation to the rise of patriarchal systems, we see the practices of 
craftsmanship marginalized through an association with the domestic; with practices that 
are beneath the dignity of public life.  Greek philosophy, in attempting to intellectualize 
the allegorical stories expressed in their myths, reinforced the marginalization of the 
“know-how,” the technê, associated with craftspeople.  At the “rock bottom” of our 
Western worldview, the practices of craftsmanship are relegated to the lesser of those 
binary pairings that we associate with being oppressed—with the feminine, with the 
domestic realm, with race and class marginalization, and with the productive nature of 
labor.  The patriarchal assumption, the marginalization of the domestic, the politics of 
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race and class, and the marginalization of labor are liabilities that negatively influence 
education in design. 
 
The Educational Value of Craftsmanship 
While examining the Greek myths, and subsequent Greek philosophy, has 
exposed cultural and educational liabilities in the history and philosophy of 
craftsmanship—liabilities that still influence how we understand the world and how we 
think about craftsmanship—there is a historical text that discusses design education and 
that, subsequently, provides the possibility of theorizing a significant asset to educational 
practice.  In the de Architectura, and following the work of Aristotle, Vitruvius theorizes 
that the architectus—the predecessor of what we would now call a designer—required an 
education in both epistêmê and technê in order to reach the height of her profession, to 
achieve mastery of her trade.  While he clearly defines the education necessary to 
epistêmê, and suggests that it is in practice that one attains the “know-how” of technê, he 
does not clearly articulate how these lead to mastery.  He does not suggest how we might 
delineate the achievement of mastery.  Aristotle, as noted earlier, suggested that this 
mastery—his phronesis—comes in the ability to make judgments. 
In attempting to maintain some continuity of thought I theorized that while 
Vitruvius is not explicit in defining mastery of a trade as the attainment of phronesis, his 
claim that all constructions must “take account of durability, utility, and beauty” (Book 
I, Chapter III, 2) is an expression of judgment; an expression of the practical wisdom that 
just is phronesis.  These judgments of durability, utility, and beauty are what counts as 
mastery—they are a result of the application of knowledge in epistêmê and the “know-
189 
how” of technê in attaining the highest levels of craftsmanship.  Further, these questions 
of judgment can be seen as offering a form of mitigated relativism; a relativism of choice 
that is moderated by the necessity of function.  Mitigated relativism, the wisdom of 
phronesis, is necessary to craftspeople if they are to ensure that the artifacts they produce 
function in a way to take account of durability, utility, and beauty.  Likewise, the artifacts 
conceived of by designers must be judged against their ability to act in support of 
mediating human (and non-human) relationships with and in the world.  It is not in the 
skills of production, but in the judgment made regarding the artifacts produced, that we 
find craftsmanship’s most valuable asset.  Realizing that epistemic knowledge must be 
tempered with the experience of “know-how”—the attainment of the wisdom needed to 
make reasonable and informed judgments—is the educational value of craftsmanship. 
The strength of mitigated relativism, as an asset to the education of designers, is 
in its ability to challenge the authenticity of design artifacts.  It reminds us that judgments 
are necessary in acts of making—that the things we make must be the result of informed 
judgment.  In this way, the attainment of phronesis is one means of alleviating the fears 
of technology expressed by Martin Heidegger and Robert Oppenheimer.  In an 
educational context, the educational value of craftsmanship is in attaining the wisdom to 
take account of the assets and liabilities that exist at the “rock bottom” of the beliefs and 
assumptions that influence how we think about and teach design.  It is only through taking 
account that design educators can begin to foster assets appropriate to design education 
and eliminate liabilities—both cultural and educational—that prevent education in design 
from producing capable and competent designers and from participating in the creation 
and maintenance of culture. 
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A Neo-Vitruvian Philosophy of Education 
Although it is primarily understood as a treatise on architecture and has been 
highly influential upon design education, the de Architectura has not been of direct 
consequence to general education.  A neo-Vitruvian educational philosophy that 
establishes the educational necessity of the technê associated with craftsmanship can; 
however, be applied to general education.  While based upon the work of Varro and the 
seven liberal arts, Vitruvius assertion that education must combine theory and practice 
elevates any educational practice beyond a purely intellectual endeavor and firmly 
situates it as a practical pursuit grounded in the realm of lived experience.  His call for 
learning through doing—the practical knowledge of technê—foreshadows the later 
theories of Johann Pestalozzi, Friedrich Fröebel, Maria Montessori, John Dewey, and 
Jane Roland Martin.  Additionally, a Vitruvian influence can be seen in educational 
activist Alice Waters’ Edible Schoolyard, in Matthew Crawford’s Shop Class as 
Soulcraft, and in the contemporary Maker and DIY movements.  Certainly Pestalozzi’s 
motto “learning by head, hand, and heart” (Brühlmeier 2010) aptly describes the 
educational practices encouraged by a neo-Vitruvian philosophy of education. 
Further, this neo-Vitruvian philosophy acts to differentiate and legitimate 
knowledge in design from knowledge in the sciences and knowledge in the humanities.  
It dismantles the binary established by C.P. Snow and, possibly, begins to destabilize the 
hierarchy apparent in common perceptions of knowledge.  Vitruvius’ de Architectura, 
coupled with the Greek myths associated with Pandora, Prometheus, and Hephaestus that 
indicate a shift from an idyllic relation with the world, allows for a re-visioning of design 
education and design practice that places that education within a knowledge community 
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associated with creativity, with innovation, and with a pragmatic and engaged “know-
how” that realizes a material knowledge that would suggest its inclusion in any 
conversation about STEM education.  In its association with creativity and innovation, 
this neo-Vitruvian philosophy begins to respond to—and counter—the proceduralist 
expectations of beginning design students.  Further, in applying a feminist critique both 
to the story of Pandora and to Vitruvius’ de Architectura, my re-visioning opens up 
several questions about social equity in the design fields and may provide suggestions as 
to how we might begin to mitigate some of the gender, race, and class inequalities that 
have arisen in educational practices associated with both design and general education.  
While policies regarding social equity in design have been implemented in both 
professional and educational settings, they have not yet been successful in initiating 
inclusive and equitable environments and practices.  An educational philosophy engaging 
the educational value of craftsmanship may be assistive in interrogating the gap that exists 
between policies and practices; a gap that demands further research on the part of both 
design and educational theorists. 
 
The Future of Design Education 
In his essay “The Future That is Now,” design educator, practitioner, and theorist 
Stan Allen responds to the complex challenges associated with contemporary education 
by claiming;  
Clearly no single design direction dominates today, and while it is possible to map 
shifting intellectual agendas, the situation is not so much that one agenda 
supplants another as it is that one is layered over another, multiplying the 
possibilities and points of view (Allen 2015). 
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With this assertion—an encouraging claim that might be thought of as a denial of 
privilege—Allen reinforces the need to engage education in design from the viewpoint of 
educational philosophy.  He suggests that conversations are necessary in order to make 
sense of these possibilities and points of view.  Conversations are necessary in order to 
take account of the assets and liabilities associated with each of the multiple agendas that 
are influencing education in design.  Consequently, these conversations may lead us to 
new ways of thinking about and teaching design. 
As a student of philosophy of education and as a design educator, I believe that it 
is necessary to engage the voices of many different theorists—educational theorists, 
design theorists, feminist theorists, race theorists, class theorists, and other critical 
theorists who have begun to challenge the oppression inherent in Western culture.  In 
having conversations that are critical of both our cultural and educational practices there 
is the opportunity to take account of the assets and liabilities that affect both.  These 
conversations may lead us to think about, write about, and engage in teaching that 
addresses the educational value of craftsmanship and the theoretical constructs that form 
the deep structure of our beliefs and assumptions about design.  Further, these 
conversations may be useful in applying the educational value of craftsmanship to 
practices in general education. 
 
Design Education and Craftsmanship 
Beyond conversational engagement with the educational value of craftsmanship, 
educational philosophers should begin to explore and engage existent professional and 
educational practices that appear to be teaching the ability to make judgments based upon 
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both epistemic knowledge and the practical “know-how” of making.  As I noted earlier, 
most criticisms of design education have been methodological, they have not engaged 
educational philosophy.  There are, however, design practices and design programs that 
have begun to address these criticisms from an educational perspective—perhaps not 
intentionally as educational philosophy but, rather, as identified gaps in the relationship 
between cultural and educational practices.  In these gaps, there have been challenges that 
are attempting to question the privilege of design education and to ensure that designers 
act in support of human needs in regard to their relationships with and in the world.  These 
challenges can be found in industrial design practices like Timothy Prestero’s Design that 
Matters.73  Design that Matters works to develop products and practices that improve the 
life expectancies of infants in developing nations and for all people marginalized by the 
liabilities of our most basic beliefs and assumptions.  Challenges to educational practices 
in design can also be found in architectural Design-Build programs.  These programs 
have begun to assert the value of making, of attaining the “know-how” of technê, as an 
integral part of the education of designers.  One such challenge rose from the southern 
drawl of Samuel Mockbee. 
In 1993, architectural educator Samuel Mockbee founded Auburn University’s 
Rural Studio as an experimental method of teaching undergraduate architecture students 
the pragmatic skills of building construction as a means of teaching them to be better 
designers.74  Mockbee chose to carry out this hands-on experiment in the deep poverty of 
Hale County Alabama; an area made famous through the writing of James Agee and the 
                                                 
73 More information on Design that Matters can be found on their website at www.designthatmatters.org. 
74 Most of my knowledge of Auburn’s Rural Studio is first-hand.  For a comprehensive look at 
Mockbee’s work, see Andrea Oppenheimer Dean’s Rural Studio: Samuel Mockbee and an Architecture 
of Decency (2002). 
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photography of Walker Evans.75  While Mockbee’s experiment in addressing the “know-
how” of technê did teach students the pragmatics of building, it more importantly taught 
them what Mockbee called an “architecture of decency.”  By working hand-in-hand with 
the poor and socially disenfranchised, Mockbee’s students learned that design was not 
solely about making beautiful things but could be employed to provide human dignity 
and community pride.  By living and working with people outside of their privileged 
middle-class existence, Mockbee’s students gained an awareness of ways that they might 
harness their imaginative capabilities to make a world that supports the rights, the needs, 
and the dreams of all people. 
More than twenty years after Mockbee founded the Rural Studio, design 
education is still struggling to overcome the liabilities that have arisen out of the bias of 
privilege.  Design educators are still trying to find ways to make their fields culturally 
relevant in a time when our cultural practices continue to marginalize people based upon 
their race, their class, and their gender.  Design-Build programs like the Rural Studio are 
still creating culturally sensitive and very capable designers; however, there are still many 
areas of struggle that must be addressed if design education is truly to create an 
“architecture of decency.”  The relationship between the educational value of 
craftsmanship and Design-Build education must be more thoroughly theorized—and 
further supported—through a continued interrogation of the underlying privilege 
expressed in how designers understand themselves and their professions. 
While the relationship between the educational value of craftsmanship and 
Design-Build and other materially engaged educational practices does provide possible 
                                                 
75 Particularly, see Let Us Now Praise Famous Men (1941) and Cotton Tenants: Three Families (2013). 
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areas for further interrogation that might begin to address criticisms of education in 
design, these practices are only one small component of most design programs.  The 
predominant model of design education is studio based.  Students typically spend twelve 
to fifteen hours of class time per week developing their work, discussing that work with 
their professors, and critiquing that work in group settings.  Engaging educational 
practices—both pedagogical and curricular—that derive from the educational value of 
craftsmanship in regard to the studio model of design education can result in changes to 
that model that may more significantly respond to and transform the expectations of 
students and begin to address the race, class, and gender disparity in both educational and 
professional settings.  Currently this educational philosophy only identifies assets and 
liabilities that must be addressed but does not offer a fully realized theory of 
implementation.  My only attempts at application have occurred in beginning studios.  
While not fully fleshed out and, certainly, not fully tested, I have begun to implement 
practices that disrupt student expectations and address issues of race, class, and gender 
inequity.  At the beginning level, I have begun to teach through projects that allow for 
exploration and personal empowerment rather than through the typical engagement with 
design principles and precedents.  Students are encouraged to explore forms, materials, 
and their connections, prior to being challenged by defined programs that tend to lead 
them in prescribed directions.  We engage with an immediacy that is antithetical to the 
abstraction of drawing; our encounters are direct and attempt to be fully immersive in a 
material and spatial world.  In the studio, I try not to exert an impression of certainty and 
expertise but, rather, engage with students as a fellow explorer; as someone who is just 
as engaged as they must become.  While this has been effective in the beginning studio it 
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requires more development, more exploration, and more critical analysis as to its 
effectiveness.  Further, much more work needs to be done to devise ways that this theory 
might be included in the upper level—or professional—studios. 
 
General Education and Craftsmanship 
While conversations about the educational value of craftsmanship are applicable 
to all educational practices, I have predominantly thought about it in relation to design 
education.  In regard to both design and general education, one area that might prove 
beneficial in further theorizing the educational value of craftsmanship is to engage 
Donald Schön’s theory of reflective practice.  While Schön’s work is predominantly 
focused upon professional development, educational philosopher Leonard Waks has 
begun to theorize its educational value.  Schön’s assertion that all professional practices 
are ‘designlike’—in that they cohere to problem solving models of practice based in the 
experiential world—led Waks to theorize that Schön’s work “projected a new model for 
teaching and learning in the professions, and a new conception of the research university” 
(Waks 2001b, 37). 
Schön’s new model for teaching and learning constituted his theorizing a new 
epistemology of professional practice: an epistemology that can also be applied to 
practices in general education. Waks has theorized that this application would make 
“design know-how, as opposed to theoretical or applied scientific knowledge, the core 
knowledge transmitted in university-based education” (Waks 2001a, 2).  Such a new 
model for teaching and learning is based upon what Schön called reflective practice.  
Reflective practice can be seen to parallel the making of judgments that results in the 
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attainment of phronesis.  Reflective practice—the ability to solve designlike problems 
found in the messy complexity of human relationships with and in the world—is 
equivalent to the application of reasonable judgments that result from the practices 
associated with craftsmanship. Engaging in reflective practice—in making judgments—
accepts the knowledge of “know-how” as valid.  This validation of traditionally 
contingent ways of knowing is necessary to success in achieving the goals of education 
in design.  Further, in allowing for contingent ways of knowing, reflective practice 
challenges the privilege of epistemic knowledge that permeates our beliefs about all 
forms of education.  As such, it might also prove beneficial as educational philosophers 
continue to identify and address liabilities present in general education. 
 
A Final Reflection 
Philosopher Karsten Harries, in response to the contemporary criticisms of 
designers—predominantly architects—that their fields have failed to participate in the 
creation and maintenance of culture, suggested that design must have an ethical function.  
When he discusses designs function as ethical, he reminds us that the term derives from 
ethos, from the overarching character of a culture.  In this sense, the ethical function of 
design is “to help articulate a common ethos” (Harries 1997, 4).  In articulating a common 
ethos, Harries suggests that design artifacts must express the beliefs and assumptions that 
influence the practices of culture.  In proposing a “common ethos” and that this ethos 
“names the way human beings exist in the world,” (Harries 1997, 4) Harries almost slips 
into a Modernist dream of universality.  The universal character of Modernity implies an 
acceptance of only one culture, it privileges one set of beliefs and assumptions over other 
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ways of being human in the world.  While, as we will see later, this is not Harries position, 
it does begin to impact those earlier criticisms of design.  Designers, in their criticisms—
in their efforts to improve both design education and design practice—must make it clear 
that their call for participation in, and the maintenance of, culture is not representational 
of a single set of beliefs and assumptions about the world.  Recognizing that design cannot 
respond to a single and common ethos does not, however, mean that design has no 
function; that design has lost its ability to articulate human being in the world.  It does 
suggest that design professionals and design educators need to make room for other ways 
of being; that design artifacts must recognize and celebrate our differences. 
Bernard Rudofsky’s celebration of the vernacular—his recognition of those 
design artifacts that emerge from the daily lives of individuals in their attempts to mediate 
their relationships with and in the world—begins to reframe what we mean when we talk 
about culture.  The culture of the vernacular is the culture of the contingent and it stands 
in opposition to the privileged culture that is structured upon the foundation of the 
patriarchal assumption.  The culture of the vernacular is the culture of craftsmanship.  
Harries, ultimately, comes to the same conclusion.  In reflecting upon the fall of Adam 
and humankind’s expulsion from the Garden, Harries suggests that this story reminds us 
that we have, as rational beings, always been differentiated in our relationships with the 
world.  The allegory of the fall is just an expression of our being; an expression 
recognizing that “human beings have always already been sent forth into insecurity and 
uncertainty” (Harries 1997, 365).  As such, there is the suggestion that there has never 
been an Eden and that any Modernist dream for a return to the universal character implied 
in the Garden is, in the end, just a dream. 
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And even if they cannot and should not try to force their way back into some 
dreamed-of paradise, they can and must keep themselves open to the always-
mediated claim of a reason and a reality that they have not created, keep 
themselves open especially to the claims of the other, to the claims of the 
community, to the claims of coming generations (Harries 1997, 365). 
An education theorized upon the educational value of craftsmanship may be able to allow 
this.  Craftsmanship, as representational of those reflective practices that create physical 
artifacts that allow humans to mediate their relationships with and in the world, is an 
expression of inclusion, of acceptance, and of contingency.  It is a refusal to be defined 
by what is already established.  It is a refusal of canonical forms of knowledge that, as a 
result of the patriarchal assumption, privilege dominant binaries and dismiss other ways 
of knowing, of thinking, and of expressing the vernacular; of expressing the vitality of 
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